linux/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Provide access to virtual console memory.
* /dev/vcs: the screen as it is being viewed right now (possibly scrolled)
* /dev/vcsN: the screen of /dev/ttyN (1 <= N <= 63)
* [minor: N]
*
* /dev/vcsaN: idem, but including attributes, and prefixed with
* the 4 bytes lines,columns,x,y (as screendump used to give).
* Attribute/character pair is in native endianity.
* [minor: N+128]
*
* /dev/vcsuN: similar to /dev/vcsaN but using 4-byte unicode values
* instead of 1-byte screen glyph values.
* [minor: N+64]
*
* /dev/vcsuaN: same idea as /dev/vcsaN for unicode (not yet implemented).
*
* This replaces screendump and part of selection, so that the system
* administrator can control access using file system permissions.
*
* aeb@cwi.nl - efter Friedas begravelse - 950211
*
* machek@k332.feld.cvut.cz - modified not to send characters to wrong console
* - fixed some fatal off-by-one bugs (0-- no longer == -1 -> looping and looping and looping...)
* - making it shorter - scr_readw are macros which expand in PRETTY long code
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/major.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/vt_kern.h>
#include <linux/selection.h>
#include <linux/kbd_kern.h>
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#define HEADER_SIZE 4u
#define CON_BUF_SIZE (CONFIG_BASE_SMALL ? 256 : PAGE_SIZE)
/*
* Our minor space:
*
* 0 ... 63 glyph mode without attributes
* 64 ... 127 unicode mode without attributes
* 128 ... 191 glyph mode with attributes
* 192 ... 255 unused (reserved for unicode with attributes)
*
* This relies on MAX_NR_CONSOLES being <= 63, meaning 63 actual consoles
* with minors 0, 64, 128 and 192 being proxies for the foreground console.
*/
#if MAX_NR_CONSOLES > 63
#warning "/dev/vcs* devices may not accommodate more than 63 consoles"
#endif
#define console(inode) (iminor(inode) & 63)
#define use_unicode(inode) (iminor(inode) & 64)
#define use_attributes(inode) (iminor(inode) & 128)
struct vcs_poll_data {
struct notifier_block notifier;
unsigned int cons_num;
int event;
wait_queue_head_t waitq;
struct fasync_struct *fasync;
};
static int
vcs_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long code, void *_param)
{
struct vt_notifier_param *param = _param;
struct vc_data *vc = param->vc;
struct vcs_poll_data *poll =
container_of(nb, struct vcs_poll_data, notifier);
int currcons = poll->cons_num;
int fa_band;
switch (code) {
case VT_UPDATE:
fa_band = POLL_PRI;
break;
case VT_DEALLOCATE:
fa_band = POLL_HUP;
break;
default:
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
if (currcons == 0)
currcons = fg_console;
else
currcons--;
if (currcons != vc->vc_num)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
poll->event = code;
wake_up_interruptible(&poll->waitq);
kill_fasync(&poll->fasync, SIGIO, fa_band);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
static void
vcs_poll_data_free(struct vcs_poll_data *poll)
{
unregister_vt_notifier(&poll->notifier);
kfree(poll);
}
static struct vcs_poll_data *
vcs_poll_data_get(struct file *file)
{
struct vcs_poll_data *poll = file->private_data, *kill = NULL;
if (poll)
return poll;
poll = kzalloc(sizeof(*poll), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!poll)
return NULL;
poll->cons_num = console(file_inode(file));
init_waitqueue_head(&poll->waitq);
poll->notifier.notifier_call = vcs_notifier;
/*
* In order not to lose any update event, we must pretend one might
* have occurred before we have a chance to register our notifier.
* This is also how user space has come to detect which kernels
* support POLLPRI on /dev/vcs* devices i.e. using poll() with
* POLLPRI and a zero timeout.
*/
poll->event = VT_UPDATE;
if (register_vt_notifier(&poll->notifier) != 0) {
kfree(poll);
return NULL;
}
/*
* This code may be called either through ->poll() or ->fasync().
* If we have two threads using the same file descriptor, they could
* both enter this function, both notice that the structure hasn't
* been allocated yet and go ahead allocating it in parallel, but
* only one of them must survive and be shared otherwise we'd leak
* memory with a dangling notifier callback.
*/
spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
if (!file->private_data) {
file->private_data = poll;
} else {
/* someone else raced ahead of us */
kill = poll;
poll = file->private_data;
}
spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
if (kill)
vcs_poll_data_free(kill);
return poll;
}
/**
* vcs_vc - return VC for @inode
* @inode: inode for which to return a VC
* @viewed: returns whether this console is currently foreground (viewed)
*
* Must be called with console_lock.
*/
static struct vc_data *vcs_vc(struct inode *inode, bool *viewed)
{
unsigned int currcons = console(inode);
WARN_CONSOLE_UNLOCKED();
if (currcons == 0) {
currcons = fg_console;
if (viewed)
*viewed = true;
} else {
currcons--;
if (viewed)
*viewed = false;
}
return vc_cons[currcons].d;
}
/**
* vcs_size - return size for a VC in @vc
* @vc: which VC
* @attr: does it use attributes?
* @unicode: is it unicode?
*
* Must be called with console_lock.
*/
static int vcs_size(const struct vc_data *vc, bool attr, bool unicode)
{
int size;
WARN_CONSOLE_UNLOCKED();
size = vc->vc_rows * vc->vc_cols;
if (attr) {
if (unicode)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
size = 2 * size + HEADER_SIZE;
} else if (unicode)
size *= 4;
return size;
}
static loff_t vcs_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct vc_data *vc;
int size;
console_lock();
vc = vcs_vc(inode, NULL);
if (!vc) {
console_unlock();
return -ENXIO;
}
size = vcs_size(vc, use_attributes(inode), use_unicode(inode));
console_unlock();
if (size < 0)
return size;
return fixed_size_llseek(file, offset, orig, size);
}
static int vcs_read_buf_uni(struct vc_data *vc, char *con_buf,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, bool viewed)
{
unsigned int nr, row, col, maxcol = vc->vc_cols;
int ret;
ret = vc_uniscr_check(vc);
if (ret)
return ret;
pos /= 4;
row = pos / maxcol;
col = pos % maxcol;
nr = maxcol - col;
do {
if (nr > count / 4)
nr = count / 4;
vc_uniscr_copy_line(vc, con_buf, viewed, row, col, nr);
con_buf += nr * 4;
count -= nr * 4;
row++;
col = 0;
nr = maxcol;
} while (count);
return 0;
}
static void vcs_read_buf_noattr(const struct vc_data *vc, char *con_buf,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, bool viewed)
{
u16 *org;
unsigned int col, maxcol = vc->vc_cols;
org = screen_pos(vc, pos, viewed);
col = pos % maxcol;
pos += maxcol - col;
while (count-- > 0) {
*con_buf++ = (vcs_scr_readw(vc, org++) & 0xff);
if (++col == maxcol) {
org = screen_pos(vc, pos, viewed);
col = 0;
pos += maxcol;
}
}
}
static unsigned int vcs_read_buf(const struct vc_data *vc, char *con_buf,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, bool viewed,
unsigned int *skip)
{
u16 *org, *con_buf16;
unsigned int col, maxcol = vc->vc_cols;
unsigned int filled = count;
if (pos < HEADER_SIZE) {
Revert "vc_screen: extract vcs_read_buf_header" This reverts commit b1c32fcfadf5593ab7a63261cc8a5747c36e627e, because Syzkaller reports a use-after-free, a write in vcs_read: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs_read_buf drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:357 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs_read+0xaa7/0xb40 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:449 Write of size 2 at addr ffff8880a8014000 by task syz-executor.5/16936 CPU: 1 PID: 16936 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1-next-20200820-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: ... kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530 vcs_read_buf drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:357 [inline] vcs_read+0xaa7/0xb40 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:449 There are two issues with the patch: 1) vcs_read rounds the 'count' *up* to an even number. So if we read odd bytes from the header (3 bytes in the reproducer), the second byte of a (2-byte/ushort) write to temporary con_buf won't fit. It is because with the patch applied, we only subtract the real number read (3 bytes) and not the whole header (4 bytes). 2) in this scenario, we perform unaligned accesses now: there are 2-byte/ushort writes to odd addresses. Due to the same reason as above. Revert this for now, re-think and retry later. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Reported-by: syzbot+ad1f53726c3bd11180cb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b1c32fcfadf5 ("vc_screen: extract vcs_read_buf_header") Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: nico@fluxnic.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200824095425.4376-1-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-08-24 09:54:25 +00:00
/* clamp header values if they don't fit */
con_buf[0] = min(vc->vc_rows, 0xFFu);
con_buf[1] = min(vc->vc_cols, 0xFFu);
getconsxy(vc, con_buf + 2);
*skip += pos;
count += pos;
if (count > CON_BUF_SIZE) {
count = CON_BUF_SIZE;
filled = count - pos;
}
Revert "vc_screen: extract vcs_read_buf_header" This reverts commit b1c32fcfadf5593ab7a63261cc8a5747c36e627e, because Syzkaller reports a use-after-free, a write in vcs_read: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs_read_buf drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:357 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs_read+0xaa7/0xb40 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:449 Write of size 2 at addr ffff8880a8014000 by task syz-executor.5/16936 CPU: 1 PID: 16936 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1-next-20200820-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: ... kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530 vcs_read_buf drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:357 [inline] vcs_read+0xaa7/0xb40 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:449 There are two issues with the patch: 1) vcs_read rounds the 'count' *up* to an even number. So if we read odd bytes from the header (3 bytes in the reproducer), the second byte of a (2-byte/ushort) write to temporary con_buf won't fit. It is because with the patch applied, we only subtract the real number read (3 bytes) and not the whole header (4 bytes). 2) in this scenario, we perform unaligned accesses now: there are 2-byte/ushort writes to odd addresses. Due to the same reason as above. Revert this for now, re-think and retry later. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Reported-by: syzbot+ad1f53726c3bd11180cb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b1c32fcfadf5 ("vc_screen: extract vcs_read_buf_header") Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: nico@fluxnic.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200824095425.4376-1-jslaby@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-08-24 09:54:25 +00:00
/* Advance state pointers and move on. */
count -= min(HEADER_SIZE, count);
pos = HEADER_SIZE;
con_buf += HEADER_SIZE;
/* If count >= 0, then pos is even... */
} else if (pos & 1) {
/*
* Skip first byte for output if start address is odd. Update
* region sizes up/down depending on free space in buffer.
*/
(*skip)++;
if (count < CON_BUF_SIZE)
count++;
else
filled--;
}
if (!count)
return filled;
pos -= HEADER_SIZE;
pos /= 2;
col = pos % maxcol;
org = screen_pos(vc, pos, viewed);
pos += maxcol - col;
/*
* Buffer has even length, so we can always copy character + attribute.
* We do not copy last byte to userspace if count is odd.
*/
count = (count + 1) / 2;
con_buf16 = (u16 *)con_buf;
while (count) {
*con_buf16++ = vcs_scr_readw(vc, org++);
count--;
if (++col == maxcol) {
org = screen_pos(vc, pos, viewed);
col = 0;
pos += maxcol;
}
}
return filled;
}
static ssize_t
vcs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct vc_data *vc;
struct vcs_poll_data *poll;
unsigned int read;
ssize_t ret;
char *con_buf;
loff_t pos;
bool viewed, attr, uni_mode;
con_buf = (char *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!con_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
pos = *ppos;
/* Select the proper current console and verify
* sanity of the situation under the console lock.
*/
console_lock();
uni_mode = use_unicode(inode);
attr = use_attributes(inode);
ret = -EINVAL;
if (pos < 0)
goto unlock_out;
/* we enforce 32-bit alignment for pos and count in unicode mode */
if (uni_mode && (pos | count) & 3)
goto unlock_out;
poll = file->private_data;
if (count && poll)
poll->event = 0;
read = 0;
ret = 0;
while (count) {
unsigned int this_round, skip = 0;
int size;
vc_screen: move load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_read() to avoid UAF After a call to console_unlock() in vcs_read() the vc_data struct can be freed by vc_deallocate(). Because of that, the struct vc_data pointer load must be done at the top of while loop in vcs_read() to avoid a UAF when vcs_size() is called. Syzkaller reported a UAF in vcs_size(). BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215) Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881137479a8 by task 4a005ed81e27e65/1537 CPU: 0 PID: 1537 Comm: 4a005ed81e27e65 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.15.0-2.module Call Trace: <TASK> __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:350) vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215) vcs_read (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:415) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:468 fs/read_write.c:450) ... </TASK> Allocated by task 1191: ... kmalloc_trace (mm/slab_common.c:1069) vc_allocate (./include/linux/slab.h:580 ./include/linux/slab.h:720 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1128 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1108) con_install (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3383) tty_init_dev (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1301 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1413 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1390) tty_open (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2080 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2126) chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:415) do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:883) vfs_open (fs/open.c:1014) ... Freed by task 1548: ... kfree (mm/slab_common.c:1021) vc_port_destruct (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1094) tty_port_destructor (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:296) tty_port_put (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:312) vt_disallocate_all (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:662 (discriminator 2)) vt_ioctl (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:903) tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2776) ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888113747800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 424 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff888113747800, ffff888113747c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000b3fe6c7c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x113740 head:00000000b3fe6c7c order:3 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 anon flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 0017ffffc0010200 ffff888100042dc0 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888113747880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888113747900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ffff888113747980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888113747a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888113747a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: ac751efa6a0d ("console: rename acquire/release_console_sem() to console_lock/unlock()") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Suggested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1674577014-12374-1-git-send-email-george.kennedy@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-24 16:16:54 +00:00
vc = vcs_vc(inode, &viewed);
if (!vc) {
ret = -ENXIO;
break;
}
vc_screen: move load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_read() to avoid UAF After a call to console_unlock() in vcs_read() the vc_data struct can be freed by vc_deallocate(). Because of that, the struct vc_data pointer load must be done at the top of while loop in vcs_read() to avoid a UAF when vcs_size() is called. Syzkaller reported a UAF in vcs_size(). BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215) Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881137479a8 by task 4a005ed81e27e65/1537 CPU: 0 PID: 1537 Comm: 4a005ed81e27e65 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.15.0-2.module Call Trace: <TASK> __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:350) vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215) vcs_read (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:415) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:468 fs/read_write.c:450) ... </TASK> Allocated by task 1191: ... kmalloc_trace (mm/slab_common.c:1069) vc_allocate (./include/linux/slab.h:580 ./include/linux/slab.h:720 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1128 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1108) con_install (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3383) tty_init_dev (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1301 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1413 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1390) tty_open (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2080 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2126) chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:415) do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:883) vfs_open (fs/open.c:1014) ... Freed by task 1548: ... kfree (mm/slab_common.c:1021) vc_port_destruct (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1094) tty_port_destructor (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:296) tty_port_put (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:312) vt_disallocate_all (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:662 (discriminator 2)) vt_ioctl (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:903) tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2776) ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888113747800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 424 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff888113747800, ffff888113747c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000b3fe6c7c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x113740 head:00000000b3fe6c7c order:3 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 anon flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 0017ffffc0010200 ffff888100042dc0 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888113747880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888113747900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ffff888113747980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888113747a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888113747a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: ac751efa6a0d ("console: rename acquire/release_console_sem() to console_lock/unlock()") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Suggested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1674577014-12374-1-git-send-email-george.kennedy@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-24 16:16:54 +00:00
/* Check whether we are above size each round,
* as copy_to_user at the end of this loop
* could sleep.
*/
size = vcs_size(vc, attr, uni_mode);
if (size < 0) {
ret = size;
break;
}
if (pos >= size)
break;
if (count > size - pos)
count = size - pos;
this_round = count;
if (this_round > CON_BUF_SIZE)
this_round = CON_BUF_SIZE;
/* Perform the whole read into the local con_buf.
* Then we can drop the console spinlock and safely
* attempt to move it to userspace.
*/
if (uni_mode) {
ret = vcs_read_buf_uni(vc, con_buf, pos, this_round,
viewed);
if (ret)
break;
} else if (!attr) {
vcs_read_buf_noattr(vc, con_buf, pos, this_round,
viewed);
} else {
this_round = vcs_read_buf(vc, con_buf, pos, this_round,
viewed, &skip);
}
/* Finally, release the console semaphore while we push
* all the data to userspace from our temporary buffer.
*
* AKPM: Even though it's a semaphore, we should drop it because
* the pagefault handling code may want to call printk().
*/
console_unlock();
ret = copy_to_user(buf, con_buf + skip, this_round);
console_lock();
if (ret) {
read += this_round - ret;
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
buf += this_round;
pos += this_round;
read += this_round;
count -= this_round;
}
*ppos += read;
if (read)
ret = read;
unlock_out:
console_unlock();
free_page((unsigned long) con_buf);
return ret;
}
static u16 *vcs_write_buf_noattr(struct vc_data *vc, const char *con_buf,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, bool viewed, u16 **org0)
{
u16 *org;
unsigned int col, maxcol = vc->vc_cols;
*org0 = org = screen_pos(vc, pos, viewed);
col = pos % maxcol;
pos += maxcol - col;
while (count > 0) {
unsigned char c = *con_buf++;
count--;
vcs_scr_writew(vc,
(vcs_scr_readw(vc, org) & 0xff00) | c, org);
org++;
if (++col == maxcol) {
org = screen_pos(vc, pos, viewed);
col = 0;
pos += maxcol;
}
}
return org;
}
/*
* Compilers (gcc 10) are unable to optimize the swap in cpu_to_le16. So do it
* the poor man way.
*/
static inline u16 vc_compile_le16(u8 hi, u8 lo)
{
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
return (lo << 8u) | hi;
#else
return (hi << 8u) | lo;
#endif
}
static u16 *vcs_write_buf(struct vc_data *vc, const char *con_buf,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, bool viewed, u16 **org0)
{
u16 *org;
unsigned int col, maxcol = vc->vc_cols;
unsigned char c;
/* header */
if (pos < HEADER_SIZE) {
char header[HEADER_SIZE];
getconsxy(vc, header + 2);
while (pos < HEADER_SIZE && count > 0) {
count--;
header[pos++] = *con_buf++;
}
if (!viewed)
putconsxy(vc, header + 2);
}
if (!count)
return NULL;
pos -= HEADER_SIZE;
col = (pos/2) % maxcol;
*org0 = org = screen_pos(vc, pos/2, viewed);
/* odd pos -- the first single character */
if (pos & 1) {
count--;
c = *con_buf++;
vcs_scr_writew(vc, vc_compile_le16(c, vcs_scr_readw(vc, org)),
org);
org++;
pos++;
if (++col == maxcol) {
org = screen_pos(vc, pos/2, viewed);
col = 0;
}
}
pos /= 2;
pos += maxcol - col;
/* even pos -- handle attr+character pairs */
while (count > 1) {
unsigned short w;
w = get_unaligned(((unsigned short *)con_buf));
vcs_scr_writew(vc, w, org++);
con_buf += 2;
count -= 2;
if (++col == maxcol) {
org = screen_pos(vc, pos, viewed);
col = 0;
pos += maxcol;
}
}
if (!count)
return org;
/* odd pos -- the remaining character */
c = *con_buf++;
vcs_scr_writew(vc, vc_compile_le16(vcs_scr_readw(vc, org) >> 8, c),
org);
return org;
}
static ssize_t
vcs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct vc_data *vc;
char *con_buf;
u16 *org0, *org;
unsigned int written;
int size;
ssize_t ret;
loff_t pos;
bool viewed, attr;
if (use_unicode(inode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
con_buf = (char *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!con_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
pos = *ppos;
/* Select the proper current console and verify
* sanity of the situation under the console lock.
*/
console_lock();
attr = use_attributes(inode);
ret = -ENXIO;
vc = vcs_vc(inode, &viewed);
if (!vc)
goto unlock_out;
size = vcs_size(vc, attr, false);
if (size < 0) {
ret = size;
goto unlock_out;
}
ret = -EINVAL;
if (pos < 0 || pos > size)
goto unlock_out;
if (count > size - pos)
count = size - pos;
written = 0;
while (count) {
unsigned int this_round = count;
if (this_round > CON_BUF_SIZE)
this_round = CON_BUF_SIZE;
/* Temporarily drop the console lock so that we can read
* in the write data from userspace safely.
*/
console_unlock();
ret = copy_from_user(con_buf, buf, this_round);
console_lock();
if (ret) {
this_round -= ret;
if (!this_round) {
/* Abort loop if no data were copied. Otherwise
* fail with -EFAULT.
*/
if (written)
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
goto unlock_out;
}
}
vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF After a call to console_unlock() in vcs_write() the vc_data struct can be freed by vc_port_destruct(). Because of that, the struct vc_data pointer must be reloaded in the while loop in vcs_write() after console_lock() to avoid a UAF when vcs_size() is called. Syzkaller reported a UAF in vcs_size(). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215) Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880beab89a8 by task repro_vcs_size/4119 Call Trace: <TASK> __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:380) vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215) vcs_write (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:664) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:582 fs/read_write.c:564) ... <TASK> Allocated by task 1213: kmalloc_trace (mm/slab_common.c:1064) vc_allocate (./include/linux/slab.h:559 ./include/linux/slab.h:680 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1078 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1058) con_install (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3334) tty_init_dev (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1303 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1415 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1392) tty_open (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2082 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2128) chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:415) do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:921) vfs_open (fs/open.c:1052) ... Freed by task 4116: kfree (mm/slab_common.c:1016) vc_port_destruct (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1044) tty_port_destructor (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:296) tty_port_put (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:312) vt_disallocate_all (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:662 (discriminator 2)) vt_ioctl (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:903) tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2778) ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880beab8800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 424 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff8880beab8800, ffff8880beab8c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000afc77580 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xbeab8 head:00000000afc77580 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffff888100042dc0 ffffea000426de00 dead000000000002 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880beab8880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880beab8900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880beab8980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880beab8a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880beab8a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: ac751efa6a0d ("console: rename acquire/release_console_sem() to console_lock/unlock()") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1683889728-10411-1-git-send-email-george.kennedy@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-05-12 11:08:48 +00:00
/* The vc might have been freed or vcs_size might have changed
* while we slept to grab the user buffer, so recheck.
* Return data written up to now on failure.
*/
vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF After a call to console_unlock() in vcs_write() the vc_data struct can be freed by vc_port_destruct(). Because of that, the struct vc_data pointer must be reloaded in the while loop in vcs_write() after console_lock() to avoid a UAF when vcs_size() is called. Syzkaller reported a UAF in vcs_size(). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215) Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880beab89a8 by task repro_vcs_size/4119 Call Trace: <TASK> __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:380) vcs_size (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:215) vcs_write (drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:664) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:582 fs/read_write.c:564) ... <TASK> Allocated by task 1213: kmalloc_trace (mm/slab_common.c:1064) vc_allocate (./include/linux/slab.h:559 ./include/linux/slab.h:680 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1078 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1058) con_install (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3334) tty_init_dev (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1303 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1415 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1392) tty_open (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2082 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2128) chrdev_open (fs/char_dev.c:415) do_dentry_open (fs/open.c:921) vfs_open (fs/open.c:1052) ... Freed by task 4116: kfree (mm/slab_common.c:1016) vc_port_destruct (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1044) tty_port_destructor (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:296) tty_port_put (drivers/tty/tty_port.c:312) vt_disallocate_all (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:662 (discriminator 2)) vt_ioctl (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:903) tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2778) ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880beab8800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 424 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff8880beab8800, ffff8880beab8c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000afc77580 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xbeab8 head:00000000afc77580 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffff888100042dc0 ffffea000426de00 dead000000000002 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880beab8880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880beab8900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880beab8980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880beab8a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880beab8a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: ac751efa6a0d ("console: rename acquire/release_console_sem() to console_lock/unlock()") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1683889728-10411-1-git-send-email-george.kennedy@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-05-12 11:08:48 +00:00
vc = vcs_vc(inode, &viewed);
if (!vc) {
if (written)
break;
ret = -ENXIO;
goto unlock_out;
}
size = vcs_size(vc, attr, false);
if (size < 0) {
if (written)
break;
ret = size;
goto unlock_out;
}
if (pos >= size)
break;
if (this_round > size - pos)
this_round = size - pos;
/* OK, now actually push the write to the console
* under the lock using the local kernel buffer.
*/
if (attr)
org = vcs_write_buf(vc, con_buf, pos, this_round,
viewed, &org0);
else
org = vcs_write_buf_noattr(vc, con_buf, pos, this_round,
viewed, &org0);
count -= this_round;
written += this_round;
buf += this_round;
pos += this_round;
if (org)
update_region(vc, (unsigned long)(org0), org - org0);
}
*ppos += written;
ret = written;
if (written)
vcs_scr_updated(vc);
unlock_out:
console_unlock();
free_page((unsigned long) con_buf);
return ret;
}
static __poll_t
vcs_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct vcs_poll_data *poll = vcs_poll_data_get(file);
__poll_t ret = DEFAULT_POLLMASK|EPOLLERR;
if (poll) {
poll_wait(file, &poll->waitq, wait);
switch (poll->event) {
case VT_UPDATE:
ret = DEFAULT_POLLMASK|EPOLLPRI;
break;
case VT_DEALLOCATE:
ret = DEFAULT_POLLMASK|EPOLLHUP|EPOLLERR;
break;
case 0:
ret = DEFAULT_POLLMASK;
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
static int
vcs_fasync(int fd, struct file *file, int on)
{
struct vcs_poll_data *poll = file->private_data;
if (!poll) {
/* don't allocate anything if all we want is disable fasync */
if (!on)
return 0;
poll = vcs_poll_data_get(file);
if (!poll)
return -ENOMEM;
}
return fasync_helper(fd, file, on, &poll->fasync);
}
static int
vcs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
unsigned int currcons = console(inode);
bool attr = use_attributes(inode);
bool uni_mode = use_unicode(inode);
int ret = 0;
/* we currently don't support attributes in unicode mode */
if (attr && uni_mode)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
console_lock();
if(currcons && !vc_cons_allocated(currcons-1))
ret = -ENXIO;
console_unlock();
return ret;
}
static int vcs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct vcs_poll_data *poll = file->private_data;
if (poll)
vcs_poll_data_free(poll);
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations vcs_fops = {
.llseek = vcs_lseek,
.read = vcs_read,
.write = vcs_write,
.poll = vcs_poll,
.fasync = vcs_fasync,
.open = vcs_open,
.release = vcs_release,
};
static const struct class vc_class = {
.name = "vc",
};
void vcs_make_sysfs(int index)
{
device_create(&vc_class, NULL, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, index + 1), NULL, "vcs%u", index + 1);
device_create(&vc_class, NULL, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, index + 65), NULL, "vcsu%u", index + 1);
device_create(&vc_class, NULL, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, index + 129), NULL, "vcsa%u", index + 1);
}
void vcs_remove_sysfs(int index)
{
device_destroy(&vc_class, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, index + 1));
device_destroy(&vc_class, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, index + 65));
device_destroy(&vc_class, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, index + 129));
}
int __init vcs_init(void)
{
unsigned int i;
if (register_chrdev(VCS_MAJOR, "vcs", &vcs_fops))
panic("unable to get major %d for vcs device", VCS_MAJOR);
if (class_register(&vc_class))
panic("unable to create vc_class");
device_create(&vc_class, NULL, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, 0), NULL, "vcs");
device_create(&vc_class, NULL, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, 64), NULL, "vcsu");
device_create(&vc_class, NULL, MKDEV(VCS_MAJOR, 128), NULL, "vcsa");
for (i = 0; i < MIN_NR_CONSOLES; i++)
vcs_make_sysfs(i);
return 0;
}