linux/mm/kmsan/core.c

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kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* KMSAN runtime library.
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Google LLC
* Author: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
*
*/
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kmsan_types.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/mmzone.h>
#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
#include <linux/preempt.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "../slab.h"
#include "kmsan.h"
bool kmsan_enabled __read_mostly;
/*
* Per-CPU KMSAN context to be used in interrupts, where current->kmsan is
* unavaliable.
*/
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kmsan_ctx, kmsan_percpu_ctx);
kmsan: handle task creation and exiting Tell KMSAN that a new task is created, so the tool creates a backing metadata structure for that task. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-17-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:50 +00:00
void kmsan_internal_task_create(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct kmsan_ctx *ctx = &task->kmsan_ctx;
struct thread_info *info = current_thread_info();
__memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->allow_reporting = true;
kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory(info, sizeof(*info), false);
}
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
void kmsan_internal_poison_memory(void *address, size_t size, gfp_t flags,
unsigned int poison_flags)
{
u32 extra_bits =
kmsan_extra_bits(/*depth*/ 0, poison_flags & KMSAN_POISON_FREE);
bool checked = poison_flags & KMSAN_POISON_CHECK;
depot_stack_handle_t handle;
handle = kmsan_save_stack_with_flags(flags, extra_bits);
kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin(address, size, -1, handle, checked);
}
void kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory(void *address, size_t size, bool checked)
{
kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin(address, size, 0, 0, checked);
}
depot_stack_handle_t kmsan_save_stack_with_flags(gfp_t flags,
unsigned int extra)
{
unsigned long entries[KMSAN_STACK_DEPTH];
unsigned int nr_entries;
depot_stack_handle_t handle;
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
nr_entries = stack_trace_save(entries, KMSAN_STACK_DEPTH, 0);
/* Don't sleep. */
kasan,kmsan: remove __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM usage from kasan/kmsan syzbot is reporting lockdep warning in __stack_depot_save(), for the caller of __stack_depot_save() (i.e. __kasan_record_aux_stack() in this report) is responsible for masking __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag in order not to wake kswapd which in turn wakes kcompactd. Since kasan/kmsan functions might be called with arbitrary locks held, mask __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag from all GFP_NOWAIT/GFP_ATOMIC allocations in kasan/kmsan. Note that kmsan_save_stack_with_flags() is changed to mask both __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM flag and __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag, for wakeup_kswapd() from wake_all_kswapds() from __alloc_pages_slowpath() calls wakeup_kcompactd() if __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag is set and __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM flag is not set. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/656cb4f5-998b-c8d7-3c61-c2d37aa90f9a@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ece2915262061d6e0ac1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ece2915262061d6e0ac1 Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-27 15:25:31 +00:00
flags &= ~(__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM | __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM);
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
handle = stack_depot_save(entries, nr_entries, flags);
return stack_depot_set_extra_bits(handle, extra);
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
}
/* Copy the metadata following the memmove() behavior. */
void kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata(void *dst, void *src, size_t n)
{
kmsan: simplify kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is the function that implements copying metadata every time memcpy()/memmove() is called. Because shadow memory stores 1 byte per each byte of kernel memory, copying the shadow is trivial and can be done by a single memmove() call. Origins, on the other hand, are stored as 4-byte values corresponding to every aligned 4 bytes of kernel memory. Therefore, if either the source or the destination of kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is unaligned, the number of origin slots corresponding to the source or destination may differ: 1) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 2) memcpy(0xffff888080a00001, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 2 origin slots: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): .xxx x... dst origins: o111 o111 3) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900001, 4) copies 2 origin slots into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): .xxx x... src origins: o111 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 (or o222) Previously, kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() tried to solve this problem by copying min(src_slots, dst_slots) as is and cloning the missing slot on one of the ends, if needed. This was error-prone even in the simple cases where 4 bytes were copied, and did not account for situations where the total number of nonzero origin slots could have increased by more than one after copying: memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900002, 8) src (0xffff888080900002): ..xx .... xx.. src origins: o111 0000 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xx.. ..xx o111 0000 (or 0000 o222) The new implementation simply copies the shadow byte by byte, and updates the corresponding origin slot, if the shadow byte is nonzero. This approach can handle complex cases with mixed initialized and uninitialized bytes. Similarly to KMSAN inline instrumentation, latter writes to bytes sharing the same origin slots take precedence. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230911145702.2663753-1-glider@google.com Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-09-11 14:56:59 +00:00
depot_stack_handle_t prev_old_origin = 0, prev_new_origin = 0;
int i, iter, step, src_off, dst_off, oiter_src, oiter_dst;
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
depot_stack_handle_t old_origin = 0, new_origin = 0;
depot_stack_handle_t *origin_src, *origin_dst;
kmsan: simplify kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is the function that implements copying metadata every time memcpy()/memmove() is called. Because shadow memory stores 1 byte per each byte of kernel memory, copying the shadow is trivial and can be done by a single memmove() call. Origins, on the other hand, are stored as 4-byte values corresponding to every aligned 4 bytes of kernel memory. Therefore, if either the source or the destination of kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is unaligned, the number of origin slots corresponding to the source or destination may differ: 1) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 2) memcpy(0xffff888080a00001, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 2 origin slots: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): .xxx x... dst origins: o111 o111 3) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900001, 4) copies 2 origin slots into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): .xxx x... src origins: o111 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 (or o222) Previously, kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() tried to solve this problem by copying min(src_slots, dst_slots) as is and cloning the missing slot on one of the ends, if needed. This was error-prone even in the simple cases where 4 bytes were copied, and did not account for situations where the total number of nonzero origin slots could have increased by more than one after copying: memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900002, 8) src (0xffff888080900002): ..xx .... xx.. src origins: o111 0000 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xx.. ..xx o111 0000 (or 0000 o222) The new implementation simply copies the shadow byte by byte, and updates the corresponding origin slot, if the shadow byte is nonzero. This approach can handle complex cases with mixed initialized and uninitialized bytes. Similarly to KMSAN inline instrumentation, latter writes to bytes sharing the same origin slots take precedence. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230911145702.2663753-1-glider@google.com Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-09-11 14:56:59 +00:00
u8 *shadow_src, *shadow_dst;
u32 *align_shadow_dst;
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
bool backwards;
shadow_dst = kmsan_get_metadata(dst, KMSAN_META_SHADOW);
if (!shadow_dst)
return;
KMSAN_WARN_ON(!kmsan_metadata_is_contiguous(dst, n));
kmsan: simplify kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is the function that implements copying metadata every time memcpy()/memmove() is called. Because shadow memory stores 1 byte per each byte of kernel memory, copying the shadow is trivial and can be done by a single memmove() call. Origins, on the other hand, are stored as 4-byte values corresponding to every aligned 4 bytes of kernel memory. Therefore, if either the source or the destination of kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is unaligned, the number of origin slots corresponding to the source or destination may differ: 1) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 2) memcpy(0xffff888080a00001, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 2 origin slots: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): .xxx x... dst origins: o111 o111 3) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900001, 4) copies 2 origin slots into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): .xxx x... src origins: o111 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 (or o222) Previously, kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() tried to solve this problem by copying min(src_slots, dst_slots) as is and cloning the missing slot on one of the ends, if needed. This was error-prone even in the simple cases where 4 bytes were copied, and did not account for situations where the total number of nonzero origin slots could have increased by more than one after copying: memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900002, 8) src (0xffff888080900002): ..xx .... xx.. src origins: o111 0000 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xx.. ..xx o111 0000 (or 0000 o222) The new implementation simply copies the shadow byte by byte, and updates the corresponding origin slot, if the shadow byte is nonzero. This approach can handle complex cases with mixed initialized and uninitialized bytes. Similarly to KMSAN inline instrumentation, latter writes to bytes sharing the same origin slots take precedence. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230911145702.2663753-1-glider@google.com Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-09-11 14:56:59 +00:00
align_shadow_dst =
(u32 *)ALIGN_DOWN((u64)shadow_dst, KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE);
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
shadow_src = kmsan_get_metadata(src, KMSAN_META_SHADOW);
if (!shadow_src) {
kmsan: simplify kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is the function that implements copying metadata every time memcpy()/memmove() is called. Because shadow memory stores 1 byte per each byte of kernel memory, copying the shadow is trivial and can be done by a single memmove() call. Origins, on the other hand, are stored as 4-byte values corresponding to every aligned 4 bytes of kernel memory. Therefore, if either the source or the destination of kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is unaligned, the number of origin slots corresponding to the source or destination may differ: 1) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 2) memcpy(0xffff888080a00001, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 2 origin slots: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): .xxx x... dst origins: o111 o111 3) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900001, 4) copies 2 origin slots into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): .xxx x... src origins: o111 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 (or o222) Previously, kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() tried to solve this problem by copying min(src_slots, dst_slots) as is and cloning the missing slot on one of the ends, if needed. This was error-prone even in the simple cases where 4 bytes were copied, and did not account for situations where the total number of nonzero origin slots could have increased by more than one after copying: memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900002, 8) src (0xffff888080900002): ..xx .... xx.. src origins: o111 0000 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xx.. ..xx o111 0000 (or 0000 o222) The new implementation simply copies the shadow byte by byte, and updates the corresponding origin slot, if the shadow byte is nonzero. This approach can handle complex cases with mixed initialized and uninitialized bytes. Similarly to KMSAN inline instrumentation, latter writes to bytes sharing the same origin slots take precedence. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230911145702.2663753-1-glider@google.com Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-09-11 14:56:59 +00:00
/* @src is untracked: mark @dst as initialized. */
kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory(dst, n, /*checked*/ false);
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
return;
}
KMSAN_WARN_ON(!kmsan_metadata_is_contiguous(src, n));
origin_dst = kmsan_get_metadata(dst, KMSAN_META_ORIGIN);
origin_src = kmsan_get_metadata(src, KMSAN_META_ORIGIN);
KMSAN_WARN_ON(!origin_dst || !origin_src);
backwards = dst > src;
kmsan: simplify kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is the function that implements copying metadata every time memcpy()/memmove() is called. Because shadow memory stores 1 byte per each byte of kernel memory, copying the shadow is trivial and can be done by a single memmove() call. Origins, on the other hand, are stored as 4-byte values corresponding to every aligned 4 bytes of kernel memory. Therefore, if either the source or the destination of kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is unaligned, the number of origin slots corresponding to the source or destination may differ: 1) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 2) memcpy(0xffff888080a00001, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 2 origin slots: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): .xxx x... dst origins: o111 o111 3) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900001, 4) copies 2 origin slots into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): .xxx x... src origins: o111 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 (or o222) Previously, kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() tried to solve this problem by copying min(src_slots, dst_slots) as is and cloning the missing slot on one of the ends, if needed. This was error-prone even in the simple cases where 4 bytes were copied, and did not account for situations where the total number of nonzero origin slots could have increased by more than one after copying: memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900002, 8) src (0xffff888080900002): ..xx .... xx.. src origins: o111 0000 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xx.. ..xx o111 0000 (or 0000 o222) The new implementation simply copies the shadow byte by byte, and updates the corresponding origin slot, if the shadow byte is nonzero. This approach can handle complex cases with mixed initialized and uninitialized bytes. Similarly to KMSAN inline instrumentation, latter writes to bytes sharing the same origin slots take precedence. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230911145702.2663753-1-glider@google.com Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-09-11 14:56:59 +00:00
step = backwards ? -1 : 1;
iter = backwards ? n - 1 : 0;
src_off = (u64)src % KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE;
dst_off = (u64)dst % KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE;
/* Copy shadow bytes one by one, updating the origins if necessary. */
for (i = 0; i < n; i++, iter += step) {
oiter_src = (iter + src_off) / KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE;
oiter_dst = (iter + dst_off) / KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE;
if (!shadow_src[iter]) {
shadow_dst[iter] = 0;
if (!align_shadow_dst[oiter_dst])
origin_dst[oiter_dst] = 0;
continue;
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
}
kmsan: simplify kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is the function that implements copying metadata every time memcpy()/memmove() is called. Because shadow memory stores 1 byte per each byte of kernel memory, copying the shadow is trivial and can be done by a single memmove() call. Origins, on the other hand, are stored as 4-byte values corresponding to every aligned 4 bytes of kernel memory. Therefore, if either the source or the destination of kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is unaligned, the number of origin slots corresponding to the source or destination may differ: 1) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 2) memcpy(0xffff888080a00001, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 2 origin slots: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): .xxx x... dst origins: o111 o111 3) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900001, 4) copies 2 origin slots into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): .xxx x... src origins: o111 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 (or o222) Previously, kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() tried to solve this problem by copying min(src_slots, dst_slots) as is and cloning the missing slot on one of the ends, if needed. This was error-prone even in the simple cases where 4 bytes were copied, and did not account for situations where the total number of nonzero origin slots could have increased by more than one after copying: memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900002, 8) src (0xffff888080900002): ..xx .... xx.. src origins: o111 0000 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xx.. ..xx o111 0000 (or 0000 o222) The new implementation simply copies the shadow byte by byte, and updates the corresponding origin slot, if the shadow byte is nonzero. This approach can handle complex cases with mixed initialized and uninitialized bytes. Similarly to KMSAN inline instrumentation, latter writes to bytes sharing the same origin slots take precedence. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230911145702.2663753-1-glider@google.com Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-09-11 14:56:59 +00:00
shadow_dst[iter] = shadow_src[iter];
old_origin = origin_src[oiter_src];
if (old_origin == prev_old_origin)
new_origin = prev_new_origin;
else {
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
/*
* kmsan_internal_chain_origin() may return
* NULL, but we don't want to lose the previous
* origin value.
*/
kmsan: simplify kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is the function that implements copying metadata every time memcpy()/memmove() is called. Because shadow memory stores 1 byte per each byte of kernel memory, copying the shadow is trivial and can be done by a single memmove() call. Origins, on the other hand, are stored as 4-byte values corresponding to every aligned 4 bytes of kernel memory. Therefore, if either the source or the destination of kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is unaligned, the number of origin slots corresponding to the source or destination may differ: 1) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 2) memcpy(0xffff888080a00001, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 2 origin slots: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): .xxx x... dst origins: o111 o111 3) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900001, 4) copies 2 origin slots into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): .xxx x... src origins: o111 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 (or o222) Previously, kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() tried to solve this problem by copying min(src_slots, dst_slots) as is and cloning the missing slot on one of the ends, if needed. This was error-prone even in the simple cases where 4 bytes were copied, and did not account for situations where the total number of nonzero origin slots could have increased by more than one after copying: memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900002, 8) src (0xffff888080900002): ..xx .... xx.. src origins: o111 0000 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xx.. ..xx o111 0000 (or 0000 o222) The new implementation simply copies the shadow byte by byte, and updates the corresponding origin slot, if the shadow byte is nonzero. This approach can handle complex cases with mixed initialized and uninitialized bytes. Similarly to KMSAN inline instrumentation, latter writes to bytes sharing the same origin slots take precedence. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230911145702.2663753-1-glider@google.com Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-09-11 14:56:59 +00:00
new_origin = kmsan_internal_chain_origin(old_origin);
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
if (!new_origin)
new_origin = old_origin;
}
kmsan: simplify kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is the function that implements copying metadata every time memcpy()/memmove() is called. Because shadow memory stores 1 byte per each byte of kernel memory, copying the shadow is trivial and can be done by a single memmove() call. Origins, on the other hand, are stored as 4-byte values corresponding to every aligned 4 bytes of kernel memory. Therefore, if either the source or the destination of kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() is unaligned, the number of origin slots corresponding to the source or destination may differ: 1) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 2) memcpy(0xffff888080a00001, 0xffff888080900000, 4) copies 1 origin slot into 2 origin slots: src (0xffff888080900000): xxxx src origins: o111 dst (0xffff888080a00000): .xxx x... dst origins: o111 o111 3) memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900001, 4) copies 2 origin slots into 1 origin slot: src (0xffff888080900000): .xxx x... src origins: o111 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xxxx dst origins: o111 (or o222) Previously, kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata() tried to solve this problem by copying min(src_slots, dst_slots) as is and cloning the missing slot on one of the ends, if needed. This was error-prone even in the simple cases where 4 bytes were copied, and did not account for situations where the total number of nonzero origin slots could have increased by more than one after copying: memcpy(0xffff888080a00000, 0xffff888080900002, 8) src (0xffff888080900002): ..xx .... xx.. src origins: o111 0000 o222 dst (0xffff888080a00000): xx.. ..xx o111 0000 (or 0000 o222) The new implementation simply copies the shadow byte by byte, and updates the corresponding origin slot, if the shadow byte is nonzero. This approach can handle complex cases with mixed initialized and uninitialized bytes. Similarly to KMSAN inline instrumentation, latter writes to bytes sharing the same origin slots take precedence. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230911145702.2663753-1-glider@google.com Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-09-11 14:56:59 +00:00
origin_dst[oiter_dst] = new_origin;
prev_new_origin = new_origin;
prev_old_origin = old_origin;
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
}
}
depot_stack_handle_t kmsan_internal_chain_origin(depot_stack_handle_t id)
{
unsigned long entries[3];
u32 extra_bits;
int depth;
bool uaf;
depot_stack_handle_t handle;
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
if (!id)
return id;
/*
* Make sure we have enough spare bits in @id to hold the UAF bit and
* the chain depth.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(
(1 << STACK_DEPOT_EXTRA_BITS) <= (KMSAN_MAX_ORIGIN_DEPTH << 1));
extra_bits = stack_depot_get_extra_bits(id);
depth = kmsan_depth_from_eb(extra_bits);
uaf = kmsan_uaf_from_eb(extra_bits);
/*
* Stop chaining origins once the depth reached KMSAN_MAX_ORIGIN_DEPTH.
* This mostly happens in the case structures with uninitialized padding
* are copied around many times. Origin chains for such structures are
* usually periodic, and it does not make sense to fully store them.
*/
if (depth == KMSAN_MAX_ORIGIN_DEPTH)
return id;
depth++;
extra_bits = kmsan_extra_bits(depth, uaf);
entries[0] = KMSAN_CHAIN_MAGIC_ORIGIN;
kasan,kmsan: remove __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM usage from kasan/kmsan syzbot is reporting lockdep warning in __stack_depot_save(), for the caller of __stack_depot_save() (i.e. __kasan_record_aux_stack() in this report) is responsible for masking __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag in order not to wake kswapd which in turn wakes kcompactd. Since kasan/kmsan functions might be called with arbitrary locks held, mask __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag from all GFP_NOWAIT/GFP_ATOMIC allocations in kasan/kmsan. Note that kmsan_save_stack_with_flags() is changed to mask both __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM flag and __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag, for wakeup_kswapd() from wake_all_kswapds() from __alloc_pages_slowpath() calls wakeup_kcompactd() if __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag is set and __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM flag is not set. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/656cb4f5-998b-c8d7-3c61-c2d37aa90f9a@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ece2915262061d6e0ac1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ece2915262061d6e0ac1 Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-27 15:25:31 +00:00
entries[1] = kmsan_save_stack_with_flags(__GFP_HIGH, 0);
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
entries[2] = id;
/*
* @entries is a local var in non-instrumented code, so KMSAN does not
* know it is initialized. Explicitly unpoison it to avoid false
* positives when stack_depot_save() passes it to instrumented code.
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
*/
kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory(entries, sizeof(entries), false);
handle = stack_depot_save(entries, ARRAY_SIZE(entries), __GFP_HIGH);
return stack_depot_set_extra_bits(handle, extra_bits);
kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of metadata: 1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0) or not (shadow is 1). 2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing 4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were created. Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that leads to undefined behavior. KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory. To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the metadata of function parameters and return values for that task. Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable KMSAN instrumentation for certain files. Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly created stack memory initialized. Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called "poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is initialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
}
void kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin(void *addr, size_t size, int b,
u32 origin, bool checked)
{
u64 address = (u64)addr;
void *shadow_start;
u32 *origin_start;
size_t pad = 0;
KMSAN_WARN_ON(!kmsan_metadata_is_contiguous(addr, size));
shadow_start = kmsan_get_metadata(addr, KMSAN_META_SHADOW);
if (!shadow_start) {
/*
* kmsan_metadata_is_contiguous() is true, so either all shadow
* and origin pages are NULL, or all are non-NULL.
*/
if (checked) {
pr_err("%s: not memsetting %ld bytes starting at %px, because the shadow is NULL\n",
__func__, size, addr);
KMSAN_WARN_ON(true);
}
return;
}
__memset(shadow_start, b, size);
if (!IS_ALIGNED(address, KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE)) {
pad = address % KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE;
address -= pad;
size += pad;
}
size = ALIGN(size, KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE);
origin_start =
(u32 *)kmsan_get_metadata((void *)address, KMSAN_META_ORIGIN);
for (int i = 0; i < size / KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE; i++)
origin_start[i] = origin;
}
struct page *kmsan_vmalloc_to_page_or_null(void *vaddr)
{
struct page *page;
if (!kmsan_internal_is_vmalloc_addr(vaddr) &&
!kmsan_internal_is_module_addr(vaddr))
return NULL;
page = vmalloc_to_page(vaddr);
if (pfn_valid(page_to_pfn(page)))
return page;
else
return NULL;
}
void kmsan_internal_check_memory(void *addr, size_t size, const void *user_addr,
int reason)
{
depot_stack_handle_t cur_origin = 0, new_origin = 0;
unsigned long addr64 = (unsigned long)addr;
depot_stack_handle_t *origin = NULL;
unsigned char *shadow = NULL;
int cur_off_start = -1;
int chunk_size;
size_t pos = 0;
if (!size)
return;
KMSAN_WARN_ON(!kmsan_metadata_is_contiguous(addr, size));
while (pos < size) {
chunk_size = min(size - pos,
PAGE_SIZE - ((addr64 + pos) % PAGE_SIZE));
shadow = kmsan_get_metadata((void *)(addr64 + pos),
KMSAN_META_SHADOW);
if (!shadow) {
/*
* This page is untracked. If there were uninitialized
* bytes before, report them.
*/
if (cur_origin) {
kmsan_enter_runtime();
kmsan_report(cur_origin, addr, size,
cur_off_start, pos - 1, user_addr,
reason);
kmsan_leave_runtime();
}
cur_origin = 0;
cur_off_start = -1;
pos += chunk_size;
continue;
}
for (int i = 0; i < chunk_size; i++) {
if (!shadow[i]) {
/*
* This byte is unpoisoned. If there were
* poisoned bytes before, report them.
*/
if (cur_origin) {
kmsan_enter_runtime();
kmsan_report(cur_origin, addr, size,
cur_off_start, pos + i - 1,
user_addr, reason);
kmsan_leave_runtime();
}
cur_origin = 0;
cur_off_start = -1;
continue;
}
origin = kmsan_get_metadata((void *)(addr64 + pos + i),
KMSAN_META_ORIGIN);
KMSAN_WARN_ON(!origin);
new_origin = *origin;
/*
* Encountered new origin - report the previous
* uninitialized range.
*/
if (cur_origin != new_origin) {
if (cur_origin) {
kmsan_enter_runtime();
kmsan_report(cur_origin, addr, size,
cur_off_start, pos + i - 1,
user_addr, reason);
kmsan_leave_runtime();
}
cur_origin = new_origin;
cur_off_start = pos + i;
}
}
pos += chunk_size;
}
KMSAN_WARN_ON(pos != size);
if (cur_origin) {
kmsan_enter_runtime();
kmsan_report(cur_origin, addr, size, cur_off_start, pos - 1,
user_addr, reason);
kmsan_leave_runtime();
}
}
bool kmsan_metadata_is_contiguous(void *addr, size_t size)
{
char *cur_shadow = NULL, *next_shadow = NULL, *cur_origin = NULL,
*next_origin = NULL;
u64 cur_addr = (u64)addr, next_addr = cur_addr + PAGE_SIZE;
depot_stack_handle_t *origin_p;
bool all_untracked = false;
if (!size)
return true;
/* The whole range belongs to the same page. */
if (ALIGN_DOWN(cur_addr + size - 1, PAGE_SIZE) ==
ALIGN_DOWN(cur_addr, PAGE_SIZE))
return true;
cur_shadow = kmsan_get_metadata((void *)cur_addr, /*is_origin*/ false);
if (!cur_shadow)
all_untracked = true;
cur_origin = kmsan_get_metadata((void *)cur_addr, /*is_origin*/ true);
if (all_untracked && cur_origin)
goto report;
for (; next_addr < (u64)addr + size;
cur_addr = next_addr, cur_shadow = next_shadow,
cur_origin = next_origin, next_addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
next_shadow = kmsan_get_metadata((void *)next_addr, false);
next_origin = kmsan_get_metadata((void *)next_addr, true);
if (all_untracked) {
if (next_shadow || next_origin)
goto report;
if (!next_shadow && !next_origin)
continue;
}
if (((u64)cur_shadow == ((u64)next_shadow - PAGE_SIZE)) &&
((u64)cur_origin == ((u64)next_origin - PAGE_SIZE)))
continue;
goto report;
}
return true;
report:
pr_err("%s: attempting to access two shadow page ranges.\n", __func__);
pr_err("Access of size %ld at %px.\n", size, addr);
pr_err("Addresses belonging to different ranges: %px and %px\n",
(void *)cur_addr, (void *)next_addr);
pr_err("page[0].shadow: %px, page[1].shadow: %px\n", cur_shadow,
next_shadow);
pr_err("page[0].origin: %px, page[1].origin: %px\n", cur_origin,
next_origin);
origin_p = kmsan_get_metadata(addr, KMSAN_META_ORIGIN);
if (origin_p) {
pr_err("Origin: %08x\n", *origin_p);
kmsan_print_origin(*origin_p);
} else {
pr_err("Origin: unavailable\n");
}
return false;
}