linux/fs/fuse/Makefile

# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
#
# Makefile for the FUSE filesystem.
#

obj-$(CONFIG_FUSE_FS) += fuse.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CUSE) += cuse.o
obj-$(CONFIG_VIRTIO_FS) += virtiofs.o

fuse-y := dev.o dir.o file.o inode.o control.o xattr.o acl.o readdir.o ioctl.o
fuse-$(CONFIG_FUSE_DAX) += dax.o

virtiofs-y := virtio_fs.o
treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 2019-05-19 12:07:45 +00:00			`# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only`
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> 2005-09-09 20:10:26 +00:00			`#`
			`# Makefile for the FUSE filesystem.`
			`#`

			`obj-$(CONFIG_FUSE_FS) += fuse.o`
CUSE: implement CUSE - Character device in Userspace CUSE enables implementing character devices in userspace. With recent additions of ioctl and poll support, FUSE already has most of what's necessary to implement character devices. All CUSE has to do is bonding all those components - FUSE, chardev and the driver model - nicely. When client opens /dev/cuse, kernel starts conversation with CUSE_INIT. The client tells CUSE which device it wants to create. As the previous patch made fuse_file usable without associated fuse_inode, CUSE doesn't create super block or inodes. It attaches fuse_file to cdev file->private_data during open and set ff->fi to NULL. The rest of the operation is almost identical to FUSE direct IO case. Each CUSE device has a corresponding directory /sys/class/cuse/DEVNAME (which is symlink to /sys/devices/virtual/class/DEVNAME if SYSFS_DEPRECATED is turned off) which hosts "waiting" and "abort" among other things. Those two files have the same meaning as the FUSE control files. The only notable lacking feature compared to in-kernel implementation is mmap support. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> 2009-04-14 01:54:54 +00:00			`obj-$(CONFIG_CUSE) += cuse.o`
virtio-fs: Change module name to virtiofs.ko We have been calling it virtio_fs and even file name is virtio_fs.c. Module name is virtio_fs.ko but when registering file system user is supposed to specify filesystem type as "virtiofs". Masayoshi Mizuma reported that he specified filesytem type as "virtio_fs" and got this warning on console. ------------[ cut here ]------------ request_module fs-virtio_fs succeeded, but still no fs? WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1234 at fs/filesystems.c:274 get_fs_type+0x12c/0x138 Modules linked in: ... virtio_fs fuse virtio_net net_failover ... CPU: 1 PID: 1234 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1 #1 So looks like kernel could find the module virtio_fs.ko but could not find filesystem type after that. It probably is better to rename module name to virtiofs.ko so that above warning goes away in case user ends up specifying wrong fs name. Reported-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Tested-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> 2019-10-11 18:18:26 +00:00			`obj-$(CONFIG_VIRTIO_FS) += virtiofs.o`
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> 2005-09-09 20:10:26 +00:00
fuse: move ioctl to separate source file Next patch will expand ioctl code and fuse/file.c is large enough as it is. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> 2021-04-07 12:36:45 +00:00			`fuse-y := dev.o dir.o file.o inode.o control.o xattr.o acl.o readdir.o ioctl.o`
virtiofs: add a mount option to enable dax Add a mount option to allow using dax with virtio_fs. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> 2020-08-19 22:19:47 +00:00			`fuse-$(CONFIG_FUSE_DAX) += dax.o`

			`virtiofs-y := virtio_fs.o`