2019-05-19 12:07:45 +00:00
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2019-04-10 15:23:44 +00:00
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menu "Kernel hardening options"
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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bool
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help
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While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
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stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
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anything passed by reference to another function, under the
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occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
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the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
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flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
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such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.
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This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
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information at:
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* https://grsecurity.net/
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* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
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menu "Memory initialization"
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security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for
locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag
is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497).
Right now it is guarded by another flag,
-enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang,
which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another
possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist
(as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name
of the guard flag will change.
In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good
production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern
initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs,
zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes,
and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for
return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero
initialization for production builds.
Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization
is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero
initialization is more compact.
This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that
enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are
supported by Clang.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-16 08:34:35 +00:00
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config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
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2019-04-10 15:48:31 +00:00
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def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
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security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for
locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag
is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497).
Right now it is guarded by another flag,
-enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang,
which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another
possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist
(as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name
of the guard flag will change.
In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good
production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern
initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs,
zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes,
and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for
return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero
initialization for production builds.
Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization
is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero
initialization is more compact.
This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that
enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are
supported by Clang.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-16 08:34:35 +00:00
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config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
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def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
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2019-04-10 15:23:44 +00:00
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choice
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prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
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default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
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security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for
locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag
is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497).
Right now it is guarded by another flag,
-enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang,
which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another
possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist
(as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name
of the guard flag will change.
In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good
production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern
initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs,
zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes,
and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for
return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero
initialization for production builds.
Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization
is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero
initialization is more compact.
This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that
enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are
supported by Clang.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-16 08:34:35 +00:00
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default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
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2019-04-10 15:23:44 +00:00
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default INIT_STACK_NONE
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help
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This option enables initialization of stack variables at
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function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
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greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
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variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
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on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
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syscalls.
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This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
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uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
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initialized before use in a function.
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config INIT_STACK_NONE
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bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)"
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help
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Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
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This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
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classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
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and information exposures.
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER
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bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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help
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Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing
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a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of
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uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures, like CVE-2013-2141:
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https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
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bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK
The combination of KASAN_STACK and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
leads to much larger kernel stack usage, as seen from the warnings
about functions that now exceed the 2048 byte limit:
drivers/media/i2c/tvp5150.c:253:1: error: the frame size of 3936 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
drivers/media/tuners/r820t.c:1327:1: error: the frame size of 2816 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_n.c:16552:1: error: the frame size of 3144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1892:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c:737:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/namei.c:1677:1: error: the frame size of 2584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/super.c:1186:1: error: the frame size of 2640 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3678:1: error: the frame size of 2176 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7056:1: error: the frame size of 2144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c: In function 'l2cap_recv_frame':
net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1505:1: error: the frame size of 2448 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:548:1: error: the frame size of 2232 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:1726:1: error: the frame size of 2224 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:2357:1: error: the frame size of 4584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:5108:1: error: the frame size of 2760 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:6472:1: error: the frame size of 2112 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
The structleak plugin was previously disabled for CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST,
but meant we missed some bugs, so this time we should address them.
The frame size warnings are distracting, and risking a kernel stack
overflow is generally not beneficial to performance, so it may be best
to disallow that particular combination. This can be done by turning
off either one. I picked the dependency in GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL, as this option is designed to
make uninitialized stack usage less harmful when enabled on its own,
but it also prevents KASAN from detecting those cases in which it was
in fact needed.
KASAN_STACK is currently implied by KASAN on gcc, but could be made a
user selectable option if we want to allow combining (non-stack) KASAN
with GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF.
Note that it would be possible to specifically address the files that
print the warning, but presumably the overall stack usage is still
significantly higher than in other configurations, so this would not
address the full problem.
I could not test this with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL, which may or may not
suffer from a similar problem.
Fixes: 81a56f6dcd20 ("gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190722114134.3123901-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-07-22 11:41:20 +00:00
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depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1)
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2019-04-10 15:23:44 +00:00
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select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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help
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Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
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be passed by reference and had not already been
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explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes
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of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410:
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https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654
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structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK
The combination of KASAN_STACK and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
leads to much larger kernel stack usage, as seen from the warnings
about functions that now exceed the 2048 byte limit:
drivers/media/i2c/tvp5150.c:253:1: error: the frame size of 3936 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
drivers/media/tuners/r820t.c:1327:1: error: the frame size of 2816 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_n.c:16552:1: error: the frame size of 3144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1892:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c:737:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/namei.c:1677:1: error: the frame size of 2584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/super.c:1186:1: error: the frame size of 2640 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3678:1: error: the frame size of 2176 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7056:1: error: the frame size of 2144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c: In function 'l2cap_recv_frame':
net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1505:1: error: the frame size of 2448 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:548:1: error: the frame size of 2232 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:1726:1: error: the frame size of 2224 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:2357:1: error: the frame size of 4584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:5108:1: error: the frame size of 2760 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:6472:1: error: the frame size of 2112 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
The structleak plugin was previously disabled for CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST,
but meant we missed some bugs, so this time we should address them.
The frame size warnings are distracting, and risking a kernel stack
overflow is generally not beneficial to performance, so it may be best
to disallow that particular combination. This can be done by turning
off either one. I picked the dependency in GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL, as this option is designed to
make uninitialized stack usage less harmful when enabled on its own,
but it also prevents KASAN from detecting those cases in which it was
in fact needed.
KASAN_STACK is currently implied by KASAN on gcc, but could be made a
user selectable option if we want to allow combining (non-stack) KASAN
with GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF.
Note that it would be possible to specifically address the files that
print the warning, but presumably the overall stack usage is still
significantly higher than in other configurations, so this would not
address the full problem.
I could not test this with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL, which may or may not
suffer from a similar problem.
Fixes: 81a56f6dcd20 ("gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190722114134.3123901-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-07-22 11:41:20 +00:00
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As a side-effect, this keeps a lot of variables on the
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stack that can otherwise be optimized out, so combining
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this with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK can lead to a stack overflow
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and is disallowed.
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2019-04-10 15:23:44 +00:00
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
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bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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structleak: disable STRUCTLEAK_BYREF in combination with KASAN_STACK
The combination of KASAN_STACK and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
leads to much larger kernel stack usage, as seen from the warnings
about functions that now exceed the 2048 byte limit:
drivers/media/i2c/tvp5150.c:253:1: error: the frame size of 3936 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
drivers/media/tuners/r820t.c:1327:1: error: the frame size of 2816 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_n.c:16552:1: error: the frame size of 3144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1892:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c:737:1: error: the frame size of 2088 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/namei.c:1677:1: error: the frame size of 2584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/super.c:1186:1: error: the frame size of 2640 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3678:1: error: the frame size of 2176 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7056:1: error: the frame size of 2144 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c: In function 'l2cap_recv_frame':
net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1505:1: error: the frame size of 2448 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:548:1: error: the frame size of 2232 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:1726:1: error: the frame size of 2224 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:2357:1: error: the frame size of 4584 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:5108:1: error: the frame size of 2760 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
net/wireless/nl80211.c:6472:1: error: the frame size of 2112 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes
The structleak plugin was previously disabled for CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST,
but meant we missed some bugs, so this time we should address them.
The frame size warnings are distracting, and risking a kernel stack
overflow is generally not beneficial to performance, so it may be best
to disallow that particular combination. This can be done by turning
off either one. I picked the dependency in GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
and GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL, as this option is designed to
make uninitialized stack usage less harmful when enabled on its own,
but it also prevents KASAN from detecting those cases in which it was
in fact needed.
KASAN_STACK is currently implied by KASAN on gcc, but could be made a
user selectable option if we want to allow combining (non-stack) KASAN
with GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF.
Note that it would be possible to specifically address the files that
print the warning, but presumably the overall stack usage is still
significantly higher than in other configurations, so this would not
address the full problem.
I could not test this with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL, which may or may not
suffer from a similar problem.
Fixes: 81a56f6dcd20 ("gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190722114134.3123901-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-07-22 11:41:20 +00:00
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depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1)
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2019-04-10 15:23:44 +00:00
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select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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help
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Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
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by reference and had not already been explicitly
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initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
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|
|
of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
|
|
|
|
exposures.
|
|
|
|
|
security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for
locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag
is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497).
Right now it is guarded by another flag,
-enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang,
which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another
possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist
(as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name
of the guard flag will change.
In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good
production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern
initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs,
zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes,
and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for
return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero
initialization for production builds.
Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization
is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero
initialization is more compact.
This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that
enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are
supported by Clang.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-16 08:34:35 +00:00
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config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
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2019-04-10 15:48:31 +00:00
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bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
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security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for
locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag
is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497).
Right now it is guarded by another flag,
-enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang,
which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another
possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist
(as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name
of the guard flag will change.
In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good
production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern
initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs,
zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes,
and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for
return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero
initialization for production builds.
Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization
is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero
initialization is more compact.
This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that
enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are
supported by Clang.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-16 08:34:35 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
|
2019-04-10 15:48:31 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
|
|
|
|
pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
|
|
|
|
of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
|
|
|
|
exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
|
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|
left uninitialized.
|
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|
|
security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for
locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag
is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497).
Right now it is guarded by another flag,
-enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang,
which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another
possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist
(as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name
of the guard flag will change.
In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good
production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern
initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs,
zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes,
and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for
return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero
initialization for production builds.
Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization
is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero
initialization is more compact.
This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that
enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are
supported by Clang.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-16 08:34:35 +00:00
|
|
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Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs
|
|
|
|
related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive
|
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|
|
non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big.
|
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|
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|
|
config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
|
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|
|
bool "zero-init everything on the stack (strongest and safest)"
|
|
|
|
depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Initializes everything on the stack with a zero
|
|
|
|
value. This is intended to eliminate all classes
|
|
|
|
of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
|
|
|
|
exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
|
|
|
|
left uninitialized.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings,
|
|
|
|
pointers, indices and sizes, and is therefore
|
|
|
|
more suitable as a security mitigation measure.
|
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|
|
|
2019-04-10 15:23:44 +00:00
|
|
|
endchoice
|
|
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|
|
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
|
|
|
|
bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
|
|
|
|
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
|
|
|
|
depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
|
|
|
|
structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
|
|
|
|
initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
|
|
|
|
by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-10 16:04:40 +00:00
|
|
|
config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
|
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|
|
bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
|
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|
|
depends on GCC_PLUGINS
|
|
|
|
depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
|
|
|
|
returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
|
|
|
|
the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
|
|
|
|
the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
|
|
|
|
potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
|
|
|
|
exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
|
|
|
|
depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
|
|
|
|
most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
|
|
|
|
impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
|
|
|
|
the function calling complexity.
|
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|
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|
|
The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
|
|
|
|
sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
|
|
|
|
are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
|
|
|
|
deploying it.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
|
|
|
|
* https://grsecurity.net/
|
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|
|
* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
|
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|
config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
|
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|
|
int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
|
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|
|
default 100
|
|
|
|
range 0 4096
|
|
|
|
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
|
|
|
|
the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
|
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|
|
It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
|
|
|
|
a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
|
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|
|
If unsure, leave the default value 100.
|
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|
|
config STACKLEAK_METRICS
|
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|
|
bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
|
|
|
|
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
|
|
|
|
depends on PROC_FS
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
|
|
|
|
the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
|
|
|
|
shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
|
|
|
|
previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
|
|
|
|
can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
|
|
|
|
your workloads.
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
|
|
|
|
bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
|
|
|
|
depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
|
|
|
|
runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
|
|
|
|
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
|
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|
|
mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10.
Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options.
These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the
page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes. SLOB allocator
isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates
handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly.
Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are
initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access
stale data by using a dangling pointer.
As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to
disable initialization for certain allocations. There's not enough
evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways
to opt-out may result in things going out of control.
This patch (of 2):
The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it
gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the
boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks
where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)
init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the
places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.
init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data
doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.
Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with
constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never
zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.
Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take
precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only
applied to unpoisoned allocations.
Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0:
hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)
The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline
is within the standard error.
The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the
same cost as memory initialization.
Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various
arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
it seems reasonable to include it in this series.
[glider@google.com: v8]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v10]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> [page and dmapool parts
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>]
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 03:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
|
|
|
|
command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
|
|
|
|
When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab
|
|
|
|
allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating
|
|
|
|
many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially
|
|
|
|
heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by
|
|
|
|
workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic
|
|
|
|
workloads have measured as high as 7%.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
|
|
|
|
command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
|
|
|
|
Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled,
|
|
|
|
all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed
|
|
|
|
when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory"
|
|
|
|
flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference
|
|
|
|
with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced,
|
|
|
|
as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or
|
|
|
|
cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents.
|
|
|
|
The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive
|
|
|
|
than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of
|
|
|
|
touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
|
|
|
|
synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-10 15:23:44 +00:00
|
|
|
endmenu
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
endmenu
|