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linux/fs/afs/validation.c

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afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* vnode and volume validity verification.
*
* Copyright (C) 2023 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include "internal.h"
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
/*
* Data validation is managed through a number of mechanisms from the server:
*
* (1) On first contact with a server (such as if it has just been rebooted),
* the server sends us a CB.InitCallBackState* request.
*
* (2) On a RW volume, in response to certain vnode (inode)-accessing RPC
* calls, the server maintains a time-limited per-vnode promise that it
* will send us a CB.CallBack request if a third party alters the vnodes
* accessed.
*
* Note that a vnode-level callbacks may also be sent for other reasons,
* such as filelock release.
*
* (3) On a RO (or Backup) volume, in response to certain vnode-accessing RPC
* calls, each server maintains a time-limited per-volume promise that it
* will send us a CB.CallBack request if the RO volume is updated to a
* snapshot of the RW volume ("vos release"). This is an atomic event
* that cuts over all instances of the RO volume across multiple servers
* simultaneously.
*
* Note that a volume-level callbacks may also be sent for other reasons,
* such as the volumeserver taking over control of the volume from the
* fileserver.
*
* Note also that each server maintains an independent time limit on an
* independent callback.
*
* (4) Certain RPC calls include a volume information record "VolSync" in
* their reply. This contains a creation date for the volume that should
* remain unchanged for a RW volume (but will be changed if the volume is
* restored from backup) or will be bumped to the time of snapshotting
* when a RO volume is released.
*
* In order to track this events, the following are provided:
*
* ->cb_v_break. A counter of events that might mean that the contents of
* a volume have been altered since we last checked a vnode.
*
* ->cb_v_check. A counter of the number of events that we've sent a
* query to the server for. Everything's up to date if this equals
* cb_v_break.
*
* ->cb_scrub. A counter of the number of regression events for which we
* have to completely wipe the cache.
*
* ->cb_ro_snapshot. A counter of the number of times that we've
* recognised that a RO volume has been updated.
*
* ->cb_break. A counter of events that might mean that the contents of a
* vnode have been altered.
*
* ->cb_expires_at. The time at which the callback promise expires or
* AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE if we have no promise.
*
* The way we manage things is:
*
* (1) When a volume-level CB.CallBack occurs, we increment ->cb_v_break on
* the volume and reset ->cb_expires_at (ie. set AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE) on the
* volume and volume's server record.
*
* (2) When a CB.InitCallBackState occurs, we treat this as a volume-level
* callback break on all the volumes that have been using that volume
* (ie. increment ->cb_v_break and reset ->cb_expires_at).
*
* (3) When a vnode-level CB.CallBack occurs, we increment ->cb_break on the
* vnode and reset its ->cb_expires_at. If the vnode is mmapped, we also
* dispatch a work item to unmap all PTEs to the vnode's pagecache to
* force reentry to the filesystem for revalidation.
*
* (4) When entering the filesystem, we call afs_validate() to check the
* validity of a vnode. This first checks to see if ->cb_v_check and
* ->cb_v_break match, and if they don't, we lock volume->cb_check_lock
* exclusively and perform an FS.FetchStatus on the vnode.
*
* After checking the volume, we check the vnode. If there's a mismatch
* between the volume counters and the vnode's mirrors of those counters,
* we lock vnode->validate_lock and issue an FS.FetchStatus on the vnode.
*
* (5) When the reply from FS.FetchStatus arrives, the VolSync record is
* parsed:
*
* (A) If the Creation timestamp has changed on a RW volume or regressed
* on a RO volume, we try to increment ->cb_scrub; if it advances on a
* RO volume, we assume "vos release" happened and try to increment
* ->cb_ro_snapshot.
*
* (B) If the Update timestamp has regressed, we try to increment
* ->cb_scrub.
*
* Note that in both of these cases, we only do the increment if we can
* cmpxchg the value of the timestamp from the value we noted before the
* op. This tries to prevent parallel ops from fighting one another.
*
* volume->cb_v_check is then set to ->cb_v_break.
*
* (6) The AFSCallBack record included in the FS.FetchStatus reply is also
* parsed and used to set the promise in ->cb_expires_at for the vnode,
* the volume and the volume's server record.
*
* (7) If ->cb_scrub is seen to have advanced, we invalidate the pagecache for
* the vnode.
*/
/*
* Check the validity of a vnode/inode and its parent volume.
*/
bool afs_check_validity(const struct afs_vnode *vnode)
{
const struct afs_volume *volume = vnode->volume;
time64_t deadline = ktime_get_real_seconds() + 10;
afs: Fix occasional rmdir-then-VNOVNODE with generic/011 Sometimes generic/011 causes kafs to follow up an FS.RemoveDir RPC call by spending around a second sending a slew of FS.FetchStatus RPC calls to the directory just deleted that then abort with VNOVNODE, indicating deletion of the target directory. This seems to stem from userspace attempting to stat the directory or something in it: afs_select_fileserver+0x46d/0xaa2 afs_wait_for_operation+0x12/0x17e afs_fetch_status+0x56/0x75 afs_validate+0xfb/0x240 afs_permission+0xef/0x1b0 inode_permission+0x90/0x139 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x6f/0x2f0 path_lookupat+0x4c/0xfa filename_lookup+0x63/0xd7 vfs_statx+0x62/0x13f vfs_fstatat+0x72/0x8a The issue appears to be that afs_dir_remove_subdir() marks the callback promise as being cancelled by setting the expiry time to AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE - which then confuses afs_validate() which sends the FetchStatus to try and get a new one before it checks for the AFS_VNODE_DELETED flag which indicates that we know the directory got deleted. Fix this by: (1) Make afs_check_validity() return true if AFS_VNODE_DELETED is set, and then tweak the return from afs_validate() if the DELETED flag is set. (2) Move the AFS_VNODE_DELETED check in afs_validate() up above the expiration check to immediately after we've grabbed the validate_lock. Fixes: 453924de6212 ("afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313081505.3060173-3-dhowells@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-03-13 08:15:03 +00:00
if (test_bit(AFS_VNODE_DELETED, &vnode->flags))
return true;
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
if (atomic_read(&volume->cb_v_check) != atomic_read(&volume->cb_v_break) ||
atomic64_read(&vnode->cb_expires_at) <= deadline ||
volume->cb_expires_at <= deadline ||
vnode->cb_ro_snapshot != atomic_read(&volume->cb_ro_snapshot) ||
vnode->cb_scrub != atomic_read(&volume->cb_scrub) ||
test_bit(AFS_VNODE_ZAP_DATA, &vnode->flags)) {
_debug("inval");
return false;
}
return true;
}
afs: Parse the VolSync record in the reply of a number of RPC ops A number of fileserver RPC operations return a VolSync record as part of their reply that gives some information about the state of the volume being accessed, including: (1) A volume Creation timestamp. For an RW volume, this is the time at which the volume was created; if it changes, the RW volume was presumably restored from a backup and all cached data should be scrubbed as Data Version numbers could regress on the files in the volume. For an RO volume, this is the time it was last snapshotted from the RW volume. It is expected to advance each time this happens; if it regresses, cached data should be scrubbed. (2) A volume Update timestamp (Auristor only). For an RW volume, this is updated any time any change is made to a volume or its contents. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. For an RO volume, this is a copy of the RW volume's Update timestamp at the point of snapshotting. It can be used as a version number when checking to see if a callback on a RO volume was due to a snapshot. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. but this is currently not made use of by the in-kernel afs filesystem. Make the afs filesystem use this by: (1) Add an update time field to the afs_volsync struct and use a value of TIME64_MIN in both that and the creation time to indicate that they are unset. (2) Add creation and update time fields to the afs_volume struct and use this to track the two timestamps. (3) Add a volsync_lock mutex to the afs_volume struct to control modification access for when we detect a change in these values. (3) Add a 'pre-op volsync' struct to the afs_operation struct to record the state of the volume tracking before the op. (4) Add a new counter, cb_scrub, to the afs_volume struct to count events that require all data to be scrubbed. A copy is placed in the afs_vnode struct (inode) and if they no longer match, a scrub takes place. (5) When the result of an operation is being parsed, parse the VolSync data too, if it is provided. Note that the two timestamps are handled separately, since they don't work in quite the same way. - If the afs_volume tracking is unset, just set it and do nothing else. - If the result timestamps are the same as the ones in afs_volume, do nothing. - If the timestamps regress, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RW volume changes, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RO volume advances, update the server list and see if the current server has been excluded, if so reissue the op. Once over half of the replication sites have been updated, increment cb_ro_snapshot to indicate updates may be required and switch over to excluding unupdated replication sites. - If the creation timestamp on a Backup volume advances, just increment cb_ro_snapshot to trigger updates. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-05 16:11:07 +00:00
/*
* See if the server we've just talked to is currently excluded.
*/
static bool __afs_is_server_excluded(struct afs_operation *op, struct afs_volume *volume)
{
const struct afs_server_entry *se;
const struct afs_server_list *slist;
bool is_excluded = true;
int i;
rcu_read_lock();
slist = rcu_dereference(volume->servers);
for (i = 0; i < slist->nr_servers; i++) {
se = &slist->servers[i];
if (op->server == se->server) {
is_excluded = test_bit(AFS_SE_EXCLUDED, &se->flags);
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return is_excluded;
}
/*
* Update the volume's server list when the creation time changes and see if
* the server we've just talked to is currently excluded.
*/
static int afs_is_server_excluded(struct afs_operation *op, struct afs_volume *volume)
{
int ret;
if (__afs_is_server_excluded(op, volume))
return 1;
set_bit(AFS_VOLUME_NEEDS_UPDATE, &volume->flags);
ret = afs_check_volume_status(op->volume, op);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return __afs_is_server_excluded(op, volume);
}
/*
* Handle a change to the volume creation time in the VolSync record.
*/
static int afs_update_volume_creation_time(struct afs_operation *op, struct afs_volume *volume)
{
unsigned int snap;
time64_t cur = volume->creation_time;
time64_t old = op->pre_volsync.creation;
time64_t new = op->volsync.creation;
int ret;
_enter("%llx,%llx,%llx->%llx", volume->vid, cur, old, new);
if (cur == TIME64_MIN) {
volume->creation_time = new;
return 0;
}
if (new == cur)
return 0;
/* Try to advance the creation timestamp from what we had before the
* operation to what we got back from the server. This should
* hopefully ensure that in a race between multiple operations only one
* of them will do this.
*/
if (cur != old)
return 0;
/* If the creation time changes in an unexpected way, we need to scrub
* our caches. For a RW vol, this will only change if the volume is
* restored from a backup; for a RO/Backup vol, this will advance when
* the volume is updated to a new snapshot (eg. "vos release").
*/
if (volume->type == AFSVL_RWVOL)
goto regressed;
if (volume->type == AFSVL_BACKVOL) {
if (new < old)
goto regressed;
goto advance;
}
/* We have an RO volume, we need to query the VL server and look at the
* server flags to see if RW->RO replication is in progress.
*/
ret = afs_is_server_excluded(op, volume);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret > 0) {
snap = atomic_read(&volume->cb_ro_snapshot);
trace_afs_cb_v_break(volume->vid, snap, afs_cb_break_volume_excluded);
return ret;
}
advance:
snap = atomic_inc_return(&volume->cb_ro_snapshot);
trace_afs_cb_v_break(volume->vid, snap, afs_cb_break_for_vos_release);
volume->creation_time = new;
return 0;
regressed:
atomic_inc(&volume->cb_scrub);
trace_afs_cb_v_break(volume->vid, 0, afs_cb_break_for_creation_regress);
volume->creation_time = new;
return 0;
}
/*
* Handle a change to the volume update time in the VolSync record.
*/
static void afs_update_volume_update_time(struct afs_operation *op, struct afs_volume *volume)
{
enum afs_cb_break_reason reason = afs_cb_break_no_break;
time64_t cur = volume->update_time;
time64_t old = op->pre_volsync.update;
time64_t new = op->volsync.update;
_enter("%llx,%llx,%llx->%llx", volume->vid, cur, old, new);
if (cur == TIME64_MIN) {
volume->update_time = new;
return;
}
if (new == cur)
return;
/* If the volume update time changes in an unexpected way, we need to
* scrub our caches. For a RW vol, this will advance on every
* modification op; for a RO/Backup vol, this will advance when the
* volume is updated to a new snapshot (eg. "vos release").
*/
if (new < old)
reason = afs_cb_break_for_update_regress;
/* Try to advance the update timestamp from what we had before the
* operation to what we got back from the server. This should
* hopefully ensure that in a race between multiple operations only one
* of them will do this.
*/
if (cur == old) {
if (reason == afs_cb_break_for_update_regress) {
atomic_inc(&volume->cb_scrub);
trace_afs_cb_v_break(volume->vid, 0, reason);
}
volume->update_time = new;
}
}
static int afs_update_volume_times(struct afs_operation *op, struct afs_volume *volume)
{
int ret = 0;
if (likely(op->volsync.creation == volume->creation_time &&
op->volsync.update == volume->update_time))
return 0;
mutex_lock(&volume->volsync_lock);
if (op->volsync.creation != volume->creation_time) {
ret = afs_update_volume_creation_time(op, volume);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
}
if (op->volsync.update != volume->update_time)
afs_update_volume_update_time(op, volume);
out:
mutex_unlock(&volume->volsync_lock);
return ret;
}
/*
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
* Update the state of a volume, including recording the expiration time of the
* callback promise. Returns 1 to redo the operation from the start.
afs: Parse the VolSync record in the reply of a number of RPC ops A number of fileserver RPC operations return a VolSync record as part of their reply that gives some information about the state of the volume being accessed, including: (1) A volume Creation timestamp. For an RW volume, this is the time at which the volume was created; if it changes, the RW volume was presumably restored from a backup and all cached data should be scrubbed as Data Version numbers could regress on the files in the volume. For an RO volume, this is the time it was last snapshotted from the RW volume. It is expected to advance each time this happens; if it regresses, cached data should be scrubbed. (2) A volume Update timestamp (Auristor only). For an RW volume, this is updated any time any change is made to a volume or its contents. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. For an RO volume, this is a copy of the RW volume's Update timestamp at the point of snapshotting. It can be used as a version number when checking to see if a callback on a RO volume was due to a snapshot. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. but this is currently not made use of by the in-kernel afs filesystem. Make the afs filesystem use this by: (1) Add an update time field to the afs_volsync struct and use a value of TIME64_MIN in both that and the creation time to indicate that they are unset. (2) Add creation and update time fields to the afs_volume struct and use this to track the two timestamps. (3) Add a volsync_lock mutex to the afs_volume struct to control modification access for when we detect a change in these values. (3) Add a 'pre-op volsync' struct to the afs_operation struct to record the state of the volume tracking before the op. (4) Add a new counter, cb_scrub, to the afs_volume struct to count events that require all data to be scrubbed. A copy is placed in the afs_vnode struct (inode) and if they no longer match, a scrub takes place. (5) When the result of an operation is being parsed, parse the VolSync data too, if it is provided. Note that the two timestamps are handled separately, since they don't work in quite the same way. - If the afs_volume tracking is unset, just set it and do nothing else. - If the result timestamps are the same as the ones in afs_volume, do nothing. - If the timestamps regress, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RW volume changes, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RO volume advances, update the server list and see if the current server has been excluded, if so reissue the op. Once over half of the replication sites have been updated, increment cb_ro_snapshot to indicate updates may be required and switch over to excluding unupdated replication sites. - If the creation timestamp on a Backup volume advances, just increment cb_ro_snapshot to trigger updates. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-05 16:11:07 +00:00
*/
int afs_update_volume_state(struct afs_operation *op)
{
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
struct afs_server_list *slist = op->server_list;
struct afs_server_entry *se = &slist->servers[op->server_index];
struct afs_callback *cb = &op->file[0].scb.callback;
afs: Parse the VolSync record in the reply of a number of RPC ops A number of fileserver RPC operations return a VolSync record as part of their reply that gives some information about the state of the volume being accessed, including: (1) A volume Creation timestamp. For an RW volume, this is the time at which the volume was created; if it changes, the RW volume was presumably restored from a backup and all cached data should be scrubbed as Data Version numbers could regress on the files in the volume. For an RO volume, this is the time it was last snapshotted from the RW volume. It is expected to advance each time this happens; if it regresses, cached data should be scrubbed. (2) A volume Update timestamp (Auristor only). For an RW volume, this is updated any time any change is made to a volume or its contents. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. For an RO volume, this is a copy of the RW volume's Update timestamp at the point of snapshotting. It can be used as a version number when checking to see if a callback on a RO volume was due to a snapshot. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. but this is currently not made use of by the in-kernel afs filesystem. Make the afs filesystem use this by: (1) Add an update time field to the afs_volsync struct and use a value of TIME64_MIN in both that and the creation time to indicate that they are unset. (2) Add creation and update time fields to the afs_volume struct and use this to track the two timestamps. (3) Add a volsync_lock mutex to the afs_volume struct to control modification access for when we detect a change in these values. (3) Add a 'pre-op volsync' struct to the afs_operation struct to record the state of the volume tracking before the op. (4) Add a new counter, cb_scrub, to the afs_volume struct to count events that require all data to be scrubbed. A copy is placed in the afs_vnode struct (inode) and if they no longer match, a scrub takes place. (5) When the result of an operation is being parsed, parse the VolSync data too, if it is provided. Note that the two timestamps are handled separately, since they don't work in quite the same way. - If the afs_volume tracking is unset, just set it and do nothing else. - If the result timestamps are the same as the ones in afs_volume, do nothing. - If the timestamps regress, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RW volume changes, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RO volume advances, update the server list and see if the current server has been excluded, if so reissue the op. Once over half of the replication sites have been updated, increment cb_ro_snapshot to indicate updates may be required and switch over to excluding unupdated replication sites. - If the creation timestamp on a Backup volume advances, just increment cb_ro_snapshot to trigger updates. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-05 16:11:07 +00:00
struct afs_volume *volume = op->volume;
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
unsigned int cb_v_break = atomic_read(&volume->cb_v_break);
unsigned int cb_v_check = atomic_read(&volume->cb_v_check);
afs: Parse the VolSync record in the reply of a number of RPC ops A number of fileserver RPC operations return a VolSync record as part of their reply that gives some information about the state of the volume being accessed, including: (1) A volume Creation timestamp. For an RW volume, this is the time at which the volume was created; if it changes, the RW volume was presumably restored from a backup and all cached data should be scrubbed as Data Version numbers could regress on the files in the volume. For an RO volume, this is the time it was last snapshotted from the RW volume. It is expected to advance each time this happens; if it regresses, cached data should be scrubbed. (2) A volume Update timestamp (Auristor only). For an RW volume, this is updated any time any change is made to a volume or its contents. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. For an RO volume, this is a copy of the RW volume's Update timestamp at the point of snapshotting. It can be used as a version number when checking to see if a callback on a RO volume was due to a snapshot. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. but this is currently not made use of by the in-kernel afs filesystem. Make the afs filesystem use this by: (1) Add an update time field to the afs_volsync struct and use a value of TIME64_MIN in both that and the creation time to indicate that they are unset. (2) Add creation and update time fields to the afs_volume struct and use this to track the two timestamps. (3) Add a volsync_lock mutex to the afs_volume struct to control modification access for when we detect a change in these values. (3) Add a 'pre-op volsync' struct to the afs_operation struct to record the state of the volume tracking before the op. (4) Add a new counter, cb_scrub, to the afs_volume struct to count events that require all data to be scrubbed. A copy is placed in the afs_vnode struct (inode) and if they no longer match, a scrub takes place. (5) When the result of an operation is being parsed, parse the VolSync data too, if it is provided. Note that the two timestamps are handled separately, since they don't work in quite the same way. - If the afs_volume tracking is unset, just set it and do nothing else. - If the result timestamps are the same as the ones in afs_volume, do nothing. - If the timestamps regress, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RW volume changes, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RO volume advances, update the server list and see if the current server has been excluded, if so reissue the op. Once over half of the replication sites have been updated, increment cb_ro_snapshot to indicate updates may be required and switch over to excluding unupdated replication sites. - If the creation timestamp on a Backup volume advances, just increment cb_ro_snapshot to trigger updates. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-05 16:11:07 +00:00
int ret;
_enter("%llx", op->volume->vid);
if (op->volsync.creation != TIME64_MIN || op->volsync.update != TIME64_MIN) {
ret = afs_update_volume_times(op, volume);
if (ret != 0) {
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
}
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
if (op->cb_v_break == cb_v_break &&
(op->file[0].scb.have_cb || op->file[1].scb.have_cb)) {
time64_t expires_at = cb->expires_at;
if (!op->file[0].scb.have_cb)
expires_at = op->file[1].scb.callback.expires_at;
se->cb_expires_at = expires_at;
volume->cb_expires_at = expires_at;
}
if (cb_v_check < op->cb_v_break)
atomic_cmpxchg(&volume->cb_v_check, cb_v_check, op->cb_v_break);
afs: Parse the VolSync record in the reply of a number of RPC ops A number of fileserver RPC operations return a VolSync record as part of their reply that gives some information about the state of the volume being accessed, including: (1) A volume Creation timestamp. For an RW volume, this is the time at which the volume was created; if it changes, the RW volume was presumably restored from a backup and all cached data should be scrubbed as Data Version numbers could regress on the files in the volume. For an RO volume, this is the time it was last snapshotted from the RW volume. It is expected to advance each time this happens; if it regresses, cached data should be scrubbed. (2) A volume Update timestamp (Auristor only). For an RW volume, this is updated any time any change is made to a volume or its contents. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. For an RO volume, this is a copy of the RW volume's Update timestamp at the point of snapshotting. It can be used as a version number when checking to see if a callback on a RO volume was due to a snapshot. If it regresses, all cached data must be scrubbed. but this is currently not made use of by the in-kernel afs filesystem. Make the afs filesystem use this by: (1) Add an update time field to the afs_volsync struct and use a value of TIME64_MIN in both that and the creation time to indicate that they are unset. (2) Add creation and update time fields to the afs_volume struct and use this to track the two timestamps. (3) Add a volsync_lock mutex to the afs_volume struct to control modification access for when we detect a change in these values. (3) Add a 'pre-op volsync' struct to the afs_operation struct to record the state of the volume tracking before the op. (4) Add a new counter, cb_scrub, to the afs_volume struct to count events that require all data to be scrubbed. A copy is placed in the afs_vnode struct (inode) and if they no longer match, a scrub takes place. (5) When the result of an operation is being parsed, parse the VolSync data too, if it is provided. Note that the two timestamps are handled separately, since they don't work in quite the same way. - If the afs_volume tracking is unset, just set it and do nothing else. - If the result timestamps are the same as the ones in afs_volume, do nothing. - If the timestamps regress, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RW volume changes, increment cb_scrub if not already done so. - If the creation timestamp on a RO volume advances, update the server list and see if the current server has been excluded, if so reissue the op. Once over half of the replication sites have been updated, increment cb_ro_snapshot to indicate updates may be required and switch over to excluding unupdated replication sites. - If the creation timestamp on a Backup volume advances, just increment cb_ro_snapshot to trigger updates. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-05 16:11:07 +00:00
return 0;
}
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
/*
* mark the data attached to an inode as obsolete due to a write on the server
* - might also want to ditch all the outstanding writes and dirty pages
*/
static void afs_zap_data(struct afs_vnode *vnode)
{
_enter("{%llx:%llu}", vnode->fid.vid, vnode->fid.vnode);
afs_invalidate_cache(vnode, 0);
/* nuke all the non-dirty pages that aren't locked, mapped or being
* written back in a regular file and completely discard the pages in a
* directory or symlink */
if (S_ISREG(vnode->netfs.inode.i_mode))
invalidate_remote_inode(&vnode->netfs.inode);
else
invalidate_inode_pages2(vnode->netfs.inode.i_mapping);
}
/*
* validate a vnode/inode
* - there are several things we need to check
* - parent dir data changes (rm, rmdir, rename, mkdir, create, link,
* symlink)
* - parent dir metadata changed (security changes)
* - dentry data changed (write, truncate)
* - dentry metadata changed (security changes)
*/
int afs_validate(struct afs_vnode *vnode, struct key *key)
{
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
struct afs_volume *volume = vnode->volume;
unsigned int cb_ro_snapshot, cb_scrub;
time64_t deadline = ktime_get_real_seconds() + 10;
bool zap = false, locked_vol = false;
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
int ret;
_enter("{v={%llx:%llu} fl=%lx},%x",
vnode->fid.vid, vnode->fid.vnode, vnode->flags,
key_serial(key));
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
if (afs_check_validity(vnode))
afs: Fix occasional rmdir-then-VNOVNODE with generic/011 Sometimes generic/011 causes kafs to follow up an FS.RemoveDir RPC call by spending around a second sending a slew of FS.FetchStatus RPC calls to the directory just deleted that then abort with VNOVNODE, indicating deletion of the target directory. This seems to stem from userspace attempting to stat the directory or something in it: afs_select_fileserver+0x46d/0xaa2 afs_wait_for_operation+0x12/0x17e afs_fetch_status+0x56/0x75 afs_validate+0xfb/0x240 afs_permission+0xef/0x1b0 inode_permission+0x90/0x139 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x6f/0x2f0 path_lookupat+0x4c/0xfa filename_lookup+0x63/0xd7 vfs_statx+0x62/0x13f vfs_fstatat+0x72/0x8a The issue appears to be that afs_dir_remove_subdir() marks the callback promise as being cancelled by setting the expiry time to AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE - which then confuses afs_validate() which sends the FetchStatus to try and get a new one before it checks for the AFS_VNODE_DELETED flag which indicates that we know the directory got deleted. Fix this by: (1) Make afs_check_validity() return true if AFS_VNODE_DELETED is set, and then tweak the return from afs_validate() if the DELETED flag is set. (2) Move the AFS_VNODE_DELETED check in afs_validate() up above the expiration check to immediately after we've grabbed the validate_lock. Fixes: 453924de6212 ("afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313081505.3060173-3-dhowells@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-03-13 08:15:03 +00:00
return test_bit(AFS_VNODE_DELETED, &vnode->flags) ? -ESTALE : 0;
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
ret = down_write_killable(&vnode->validate_lock);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
afs: Fix occasional rmdir-then-VNOVNODE with generic/011 Sometimes generic/011 causes kafs to follow up an FS.RemoveDir RPC call by spending around a second sending a slew of FS.FetchStatus RPC calls to the directory just deleted that then abort with VNOVNODE, indicating deletion of the target directory. This seems to stem from userspace attempting to stat the directory or something in it: afs_select_fileserver+0x46d/0xaa2 afs_wait_for_operation+0x12/0x17e afs_fetch_status+0x56/0x75 afs_validate+0xfb/0x240 afs_permission+0xef/0x1b0 inode_permission+0x90/0x139 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x6f/0x2f0 path_lookupat+0x4c/0xfa filename_lookup+0x63/0xd7 vfs_statx+0x62/0x13f vfs_fstatat+0x72/0x8a The issue appears to be that afs_dir_remove_subdir() marks the callback promise as being cancelled by setting the expiry time to AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE - which then confuses afs_validate() which sends the FetchStatus to try and get a new one before it checks for the AFS_VNODE_DELETED flag which indicates that we know the directory got deleted. Fix this by: (1) Make afs_check_validity() return true if AFS_VNODE_DELETED is set, and then tweak the return from afs_validate() if the DELETED flag is set. (2) Move the AFS_VNODE_DELETED check in afs_validate() up above the expiration check to immediately after we've grabbed the validate_lock. Fixes: 453924de6212 ("afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313081505.3060173-3-dhowells@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-03-13 08:15:03 +00:00
if (test_bit(AFS_VNODE_DELETED, &vnode->flags)) {
ret = -ESTALE;
goto error_unlock;
}
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
/* Validate a volume after the v_break has changed or the volume
* callback expired. We only want to do this once per volume per
* v_break change. The actual work will be done when parsing the
* status fetch reply.
*/
if (volume->cb_expires_at <= deadline ||
atomic_read(&volume->cb_v_check) != atomic_read(&volume->cb_v_break)) {
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&volume->cb_check_lock);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_unlock;
locked_vol = true;
}
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
cb_ro_snapshot = atomic_read(&volume->cb_ro_snapshot);
cb_scrub = atomic_read(&volume->cb_scrub);
if (vnode->cb_ro_snapshot != cb_ro_snapshot ||
vnode->cb_scrub != cb_scrub)
unmap_mapping_pages(vnode->netfs.inode.i_mapping, 0, 0, false);
if (vnode->cb_ro_snapshot != cb_ro_snapshot ||
vnode->cb_scrub != cb_scrub ||
volume->cb_expires_at <= deadline ||
atomic_read(&volume->cb_v_check) != atomic_read(&volume->cb_v_break) ||
atomic64_read(&vnode->cb_expires_at) <= deadline
) {
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
ret = afs_fetch_status(vnode, key, false, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOENT) {
set_bit(AFS_VNODE_DELETED, &vnode->flags);
ret = -ESTALE;
}
goto error_unlock;
}
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
_debug("new promise [fl=%lx]", vnode->flags);
}
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
/* We can drop the volume lock now as. */
if (locked_vol) {
mutex_unlock(&volume->cb_check_lock);
locked_vol = false;
}
cb_ro_snapshot = atomic_read(&volume->cb_ro_snapshot);
cb_scrub = atomic_read(&volume->cb_scrub);
_debug("vnode inval %x==%x %x==%x",
vnode->cb_ro_snapshot, cb_ro_snapshot,
vnode->cb_scrub, cb_scrub);
if (vnode->cb_scrub != cb_scrub)
zap = true;
vnode->cb_ro_snapshot = cb_ro_snapshot;
vnode->cb_scrub = cb_scrub;
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
/* if the vnode's data version number changed then its contents are
* different */
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
zap |= test_and_clear_bit(AFS_VNODE_ZAP_DATA, &vnode->flags);
if (zap)
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
afs_zap_data(vnode);
up_write(&vnode->validate_lock);
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
error_unlock:
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
if (locked_vol)
mutex_unlock(&volume->cb_check_lock);
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
up_write(&vnode->validate_lock);
afs: Overhaul invalidation handling to better support RO volumes Overhaul the third party-induced invalidation handling, making use of the previously added volume-level event counters (cb_scrub and cb_ro_snapshot) that are now being parsed out of the VolSync record returned by the fileserver in many of its replies. This allows better handling of RO (and Backup) volumes. Since these are snapshot of a RW volume that are updated atomically simultantanously across all servers that host them, they only require a single callback promise for the entire volume. The currently upstream code assumes that RO volumes operate in the same manner as RW volumes, and that each file has its own individual callback - which means that it does a status fetch for *every* file in a RO volume, whether or not the volume got "released" (volume callback breaks can occur for other reasons too, such as the volumeserver taking ownership of a volume from a fileserver). To this end, make the following changes: (1) Change the meaning of the volume's cb_v_break counter so that it is now a hint that we need to issue a status fetch to work out the state of a volume. cb_v_break is incremented by volume break callbacks and by server initialisation callbacks. (2) Add a second counter, cb_v_check, to the afs_volume struct such that if this differs from cb_v_break, we need to do a check. When the check is complete, cb_v_check is advanced to what cb_v_break was at the start of the status fetch. (3) Move the list of mmap'd vnodes to the volume and trigger removal of PTEs that map to files on a volume break rather than on a server break. (4) When a server reinitialisation callback comes in, use the server-to-volume reverse mapping added in a preceding patch to iterate over all the volumes using that server and clear the volume callback promises for that server and the general volume promise as a whole to trigger reanalysis. (5) Replace the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag with an AFS_NO_CB_PROMISE (TIME64_MIN) value in the cb_expires_at field, reducing the number of checks we need to make. (6) Change afs_check_validity() to quickly see if various event counters have been incremented or if the vnode or volume callback promise is due to expire/has expired without making any changes to the state. That is now left to afs_validate() as this may get more complicated in future as we may have to examine server records too. (7) Overhaul afs_validate() so that it does a single status fetch if we need to check the state of either the vnode or the volume - and do so under appropriate locking. The function does the following steps: (A) If the vnode/volume is no longer seen as valid, then we take the vnode validation lock and, if the volume promise has expired, the volume check lock also. The latter prevents redundant checks being made to find out if a new version of the volume got released. (B) If a previous RPC call found that the volsync changed unexpectedly or that a RO volume was updated, then we unmap all PTEs pointing to the file to stop mmap being used for access. (C) If the vnode is still seen to be of uncertain validity, then we perform an FS.FetchStatus RPC op to jointly update the volume status and the vnode status. This assessment is done as part of parsing the reply: If the RO volume creation timestamp advances, cb_ro_snapshot is incremented; if either the creation or update timestamps changes in an unexpected way, the cb_scrub counter is incremented If the Data Version returned doesn't match the copy we have locally, then we ask for the pagecache to be zapped. This takes care of handling RO update. (D) If cb_scrub differs between volume and vnode, the vnode's pagecache is zapped and the vnode's cb_scrub is updated unless the file is marked as having been deleted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-08 13:57:42 +00:00
error:
afs: Move the vnode/volume validity checking code into its own file Move the code that does validity checking of vnodes and volumes with respect to third-party changes into its own file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2023-11-07 09:47:52 +00:00
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
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