linux/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S

1889 lines
46 KiB
ArmAsm
Raw Normal View History

/*
* linux/arch/x86_64/entry.S
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
* Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002 Andi Kleen SuSE Labs
* Copyright (C) 2000 Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
*/
/*
* entry.S contains the system-call and fault low-level handling routines.
*
* Some of this is documented in Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt
*
* NOTE: This code handles signal-recognition, which happens every time
* after an interrupt and after each system call.
*
* Normal syscalls and interrupts don't save a full stack frame, this is
* only done for syscall tracing, signals or fork/exec et.al.
*
* A note on terminology:
* - top of stack: Architecture defined interrupt frame from SS to RIP
* at the top of the kernel process stack.
* - partial stack frame: partially saved registers up to R11.
* - full stack frame: Like partial stack frame, but all register saved.
*
* Some macro usage:
* - CFI macros are used to generate dwarf2 unwind information for better
* backtraces. They don't change any code.
* - SAVE_ALL/RESTORE_ALL - Save/restore all registers
* - SAVE_ARGS/RESTORE_ARGS - Save/restore registers that C functions modify.
* There are unfortunately lots of special cases where some registers
* not touched. The macro is a big mess that should be cleaned up.
* - SAVE_REST/RESTORE_REST - Handle the registers not saved by SAVE_ARGS.
* Gives a full stack frame.
* - ENTRY/END Define functions in the symbol table.
* - FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK/RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK - Fix up the hardware stack
* frame that is otherwise undefined after a SYSCALL
* - TRACE_IRQ_* - Trace hard interrupt state for lock debugging.
* - errorentry/paranoidentry/zeroentry - Define exception entry points.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/dwarf2.h>
#include <asm/calling.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
#include <asm/page_types.h>
#include <asm/irqflags.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/ftrace.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/context_tracking.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was. Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure. We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void* for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the arch correct structure to dereference it. The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure. THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs. In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3]. For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative before calling the audit code when appropriate. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion] Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64] Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml] Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc] Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips] Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
2012-01-03 19:23:06 +00:00
#include <linux/err.h>
/* Avoid __ASSEMBLER__'ifying <linux/audit.h> just for this. */
#include <linux/elf-em.h>
#define AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 (EM_X86_64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
#define __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT 0x80000000
#define __AUDIT_ARCH_LE 0x40000000
.code64
x86: Separate out entry text section Put x86 entry code into a separate link section: .entry.text. Separating the entry text section seems to have performance benefits - caused by more efficient instruction cache usage. Running hackbench with perf stat --repeat showed that the change compresses the icache footprint. The icache load miss rate went down by about 15%: before patch: 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) after patch: 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) The motivation of the patch was to fix a particular kprobes bug that relates to the entry text section, the performance advantage was discovered accidentally. Whole perf output follows: - results for current tip tree: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) 2676914223 instructions # 0.497 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5389516026 cycles ( +- 0.144% ) 0.206267711 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.138% ) - results for current tip tree with the patch applied: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) 2717734941 instructions # 0.502 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5414756975 cycles ( +- 0.148% ) 0.206747566 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.137% ) Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com Cc: ananth@in.ibm.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: 2nddept-manager@sdl.hitachi.co.jp LKML-Reference: <20110307181039.GB15197@jolsa.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-07 18:10:39 +00:00
.section .entry.text, "ax"
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
#ifdef CC_USING_FENTRY
# define function_hook __fentry__
#else
# define function_hook mcount
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
ENTRY(function_hook)
retq
END(function_hook)
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
/* skip is set if stack has been adjusted */
.macro ftrace_caller_setup skip=0
MCOUNT_SAVE_FRAME \skip
/* Load the ftrace_ops into the 3rd parameter */
leaq function_trace_op, %rdx
/* Load ip into the first parameter */
movq RIP(%rsp), %rdi
subq $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %rdi
/* Load the parent_ip into the second parameter */
#ifdef CC_USING_FENTRY
movq SS+16(%rsp), %rsi
#else
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
movq 8(%rbp), %rsi
#endif
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
.endm
ENTRY(ftrace_caller)
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
/* Check if tracing was disabled (quick check) */
cmpl $0, function_trace_stop
jne ftrace_stub
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
ftrace_caller_setup
/* regs go into 4th parameter (but make it NULL) */
movq $0, %rcx
GLOBAL(ftrace_call)
call ftrace_stub
MCOUNT_RESTORE_FRAME
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
ftrace_return:
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
GLOBAL(ftrace_graph_call)
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
jmp ftrace_stub
#endif
GLOBAL(ftrace_stub)
retq
END(ftrace_caller)
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
ENTRY(ftrace_regs_caller)
/* Save the current flags before compare (in SS location)*/
pushfq
/* Check if tracing was disabled (quick check) */
cmpl $0, function_trace_stop
jne ftrace_restore_flags
/* skip=8 to skip flags saved in SS */
ftrace_caller_setup 8
/* Save the rest of pt_regs */
movq %r15, R15(%rsp)
movq %r14, R14(%rsp)
movq %r13, R13(%rsp)
movq %r12, R12(%rsp)
movq %r11, R11(%rsp)
movq %r10, R10(%rsp)
movq %rbp, RBP(%rsp)
movq %rbx, RBX(%rsp)
/* Copy saved flags */
movq SS(%rsp), %rcx
movq %rcx, EFLAGS(%rsp)
/* Kernel segments */
movq $__KERNEL_DS, %rcx
movq %rcx, SS(%rsp)
movq $__KERNEL_CS, %rcx
movq %rcx, CS(%rsp)
/* Stack - skipping return address */
leaq SS+16(%rsp), %rcx
movq %rcx, RSP(%rsp)
/* regs go into 4th parameter */
leaq (%rsp), %rcx
GLOBAL(ftrace_regs_call)
call ftrace_stub
/* Copy flags back to SS, to restore them */
movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %rax
movq %rax, SS(%rsp)
/* Handlers can change the RIP */
movq RIP(%rsp), %rax
movq %rax, SS+8(%rsp)
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
/* restore the rest of pt_regs */
movq R15(%rsp), %r15
movq R14(%rsp), %r14
movq R13(%rsp), %r13
movq R12(%rsp), %r12
movq R10(%rsp), %r10
movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp
movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx
/* skip=8 to skip flags saved in SS */
MCOUNT_RESTORE_FRAME 8
/* Restore flags */
popfq
jmp ftrace_return
ftrace_restore_flags:
popfq
jmp ftrace_stub
END(ftrace_regs_caller)
#else /* ! CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE */
ENTRY(function_hook)
cmpl $0, function_trace_stop
jne ftrace_stub
cmpq $ftrace_stub, ftrace_trace_function
jnz trace
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
cmpq $ftrace_stub, ftrace_graph_return
jnz ftrace_graph_caller
cmpq $ftrace_graph_entry_stub, ftrace_graph_entry
jnz ftrace_graph_caller
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
#endif
GLOBAL(ftrace_stub)
retq
trace:
MCOUNT_SAVE_FRAME
ftrace/x86: Add separate function to save regs Add a way to have different functions calling different trampolines. If a ftrace_ops wants regs saved on the return, then have only the functions with ops registered to save regs. Functions registered by other ops would not be affected, unless the functions overlap. If one ftrace_ops registered functions A, B and C and another ops registered fucntions to save regs on A, and D, then only functions A and D would be saving regs. Function B and C would work as normal. Although A is registered by both ops: normal and saves regs; this is fine as saving the regs is needed to satisfy one of the ops that calls it but the regs are ignored by the other ops function. x86_64 implements the full regs saving, and i386 just passes a NULL for regs to satisfy the ftrace_ops passing. Where an arch must supply both regs and ftrace_ops parameters, even if regs is just NULL. It is OK for an arch to pass NULL regs. All function trace users that require regs passing must add the flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS when registering the ftrace_ops. If the arch does not support saving regs then the ftrace_ops will fail to register. The flag FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED may be set that will prevent the ftrace_ops from failing to register. In this case, the handler may either check if regs is not NULL or check if ARCH_SUPPORTS_FTRACE_SAVE_REGS. If the arch supports passing regs it will set this macro and pass regs for ops that request them. All other archs will just pass NULL. Link: Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120711195745.107705970@goodmis.org Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-04-30 20:20:23 +00:00
movq RIP(%rsp), %rdi
#ifdef CC_USING_FENTRY
movq SS+16(%rsp), %rsi
#else
movq 8(%rbp), %rsi
#endif
subq $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %rdi
call *ftrace_trace_function
MCOUNT_RESTORE_FRAME
jmp ftrace_stub
END(function_hook)
#endif /* CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE */
#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER */
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
ENTRY(ftrace_graph_caller)
MCOUNT_SAVE_FRAME
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
#ifdef CC_USING_FENTRY
leaq SS+16(%rsp), %rdi
movq $0, %rdx /* No framepointers needed */
#else
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
leaq 8(%rbp), %rdi
function-graph: add stack frame test In case gcc does something funny with the stack frames, or the return from function code, we would like to detect that. An arch may implement passing of a variable that is unique to the function and can be saved on entering a function and can be tested when exiting the function. Usually the frame pointer can be used for this purpose. This patch also implements this for x86. Where it passes in the stack frame of the parent function, and will test that frame on exit. There was a case in x86_32 with optimize for size (-Os) where, for a few functions, gcc would align the stack frame and place a copy of the return address into it. The function graph tracer modified the copy and not the actual return address. On return from the funtion, it did not go to the tracer hook, but returned to the parent. This broke the function graph tracer, because the return of the parent (where gcc did not do this funky manipulation) returned to the location that the child function was suppose to. This caused strange kernel crashes. This test detected the problem and pointed out where the issue was. This modifies the parameters of one of the functions that the arch specific code calls, so it includes changes to arch code to accommodate the new prototype. Note, I notice that the parsic arch implements its own push_return_trace. This is now a generic function and the ftrace_push_return_trace should be used instead. This patch does not touch that code. Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2009-06-18 16:45:08 +00:00
movq (%rbp), %rdx
#endif
movq RIP(%rsp), %rsi
subq $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %rsi
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
call prepare_ftrace_return
MCOUNT_RESTORE_FRAME
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
retq
END(ftrace_graph_caller)
GLOBAL(return_to_handler)
subq $24, %rsp
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
/* Save the return values */
movq %rax, (%rsp)
movq %rdx, 8(%rsp)
function-graph: add stack frame test In case gcc does something funny with the stack frames, or the return from function code, we would like to detect that. An arch may implement passing of a variable that is unique to the function and can be saved on entering a function and can be tested when exiting the function. Usually the frame pointer can be used for this purpose. This patch also implements this for x86. Where it passes in the stack frame of the parent function, and will test that frame on exit. There was a case in x86_32 with optimize for size (-Os) where, for a few functions, gcc would align the stack frame and place a copy of the return address into it. The function graph tracer modified the copy and not the actual return address. On return from the funtion, it did not go to the tracer hook, but returned to the parent. This broke the function graph tracer, because the return of the parent (where gcc did not do this funky manipulation) returned to the location that the child function was suppose to. This caused strange kernel crashes. This test detected the problem and pointed out where the issue was. This modifies the parameters of one of the functions that the arch specific code calls, so it includes changes to arch code to accommodate the new prototype. Note, I notice that the parsic arch implements its own push_return_trace. This is now a generic function and the ftrace_push_return_trace should be used instead. This patch does not touch that code. Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2009-06-18 16:45:08 +00:00
movq %rbp, %rdi
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
call ftrace_return_to_handler
movq %rax, %rdi
movq 8(%rsp), %rdx
movq (%rsp), %rax
addq $24, %rsp
jmp *%rdi
tracing/function-graph-tracer: support for x86-64 Impact: extend and enable the function graph tracer to 64-bit x86 This patch implements the support for function graph tracer under x86-64. Both static and dynamic tracing are supported. This causes some small CPP conditional asm on arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c I wanted to use probe_kernel_read/write to make the return address saving/patching code more generic but it causes tracing recursion. That would be perhaps useful to implement a notrace version of these function for other archs ports. Note that arch/x86/process_64.c is not traced, as in X86-32. I first thought __switch_to() was responsible of crashes during tracing because I believed current task were changed inside but that's actually not the case (actually yes, but not the "current" pointer). So I will have to investigate to find the functions that harm here, to enable tracing of the other functions inside (but there is no issue at this time, while process_64.c stays out of -pg flags). A little possible race condition is fixed inside this patch too. When the tracer allocate a return stack dynamically, the current depth is not initialized before but after. An interrupt could occur at this time and, after seeing that the return stack is allocated, the tracer could try to trace it with a random uninitialized depth. It's a prevention, even if I hadn't problems with it. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Bird <tim.bird@am.sony.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-12-01 23:20:39 +00:00
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT
#define retint_kernel retint_restore_args
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
ENTRY(native_usergs_sysret64)
swapgs
sysretq
ENDPROC(native_usergs_sysret64)
#endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
.macro TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ offset=ARGOFFSET
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
bt $9,EFLAGS-\offset(%rsp) /* interrupts off? */
jnc 1f
TRACE_IRQS_ON
1:
#endif
.endm
ftrace/x86: Do not change stacks in DEBUG when calling lockdep When both DYNAMIC_FTRACE and LOCKDEP are set, the TRACE_IRQS_ON/OFF will call into the lockdep code. The lockdep code can call lots of functions that may be traced by ftrace. When ftrace is updating its code and hits a breakpoint, the breakpoint handler will call into lockdep. If lockdep happens to call a function that also has a breakpoint attached, it will jump back into the breakpoint handler resetting the stack to the debug stack and corrupt the contents currently on that stack. The 'do_sym' call that calls do_int3() is protected by modifying the IST table to point to a different location if another breakpoint is hit. But the TRACE_IRQS_OFF/ON are outside that protection, and if a breakpoint is hit from those, the stack will get corrupted, and the kernel will crash: [ 1013.243754] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002 [ 1013.272665] IP: [<ffff880145cc0000>] 0xffff880145cbffff [ 1013.285186] PGD 1401b2067 PUD 14324c067 PMD 0 [ 1013.298832] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1013.310600] CPU 2 [ 1013.317904] Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel microcode usb_debug serio_raw pcspkr iTCO_wdt i2c_i801 iTCO_vendor_support e1000e nfsd nfs_acl auth_rpcgss lockd sunrpc i915 video i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] [ 1013.401848] [ 1013.407399] Pid: 112, comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 3.4.0+ #30 [ 1013.437943] RIP: 8eb8:[<ffff88014630a000>] [<ffff88014630a000>] 0xffff880146309fff [ 1013.459871] RSP: ffffffff8165e919:ffff88014780f408 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 1013.477909] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff81104020 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.499458] RDX: ffff880148008ea8 RSI: ffffffff8131ef40 RDI: ffffffff82203b20 [ 1013.521612] RBP: ffffffff81005751 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.543121] R10: ffffffff82cdc318 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880145cc0000 [ 1013.564614] R13: ffff880148008eb8 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88014780cb40 [ 1013.586108] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880148000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1013.609458] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1013.627420] CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 0000000141f10000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 1013.649051] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.670724] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1013.692376] Process kworker/2:1 (pid: 112, threadinfo ffff88013fe0e000, task ffff88014020a6a0) [ 1013.717028] Stack: [ 1013.724131] ffff88014780f570 ffff880145cc0000 0000400000004000 0000000000000000 [ 1013.745918] cccccccccccccccc ffff88014780cca8 ffffffff811072bb ffffffff81651627 [ 1013.767870] ffffffff8118f8a7 ffffffff811072bb ffffffff81f2b6c5 ffffffff81f11bdb [ 1013.790021] Call Trace: [ 1013.800701] Code: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a <e7> d7 64 81 ff ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 65 d9 64 81 ff [ 1013.861443] RIP [<ffff88014630a000>] 0xffff880146309fff [ 1013.884466] RSP <ffff88014780f408> [ 1013.901507] CR2: 0000000000000002 The solution was to reuse the NMI functions that change the IDT table to make the debug stack keep its current stack (in kernel mode) when hitting a breakpoint: call debug_stack_set_zero TRACE_IRQS_ON call debug_stack_reset If the TRACE_IRQS_ON happens to hit a breakpoint then it will keep the current stack and not crash the box. Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-05-30 15:54:53 +00:00
/*
* When dynamic function tracer is enabled it will add a breakpoint
* to all locations that it is about to modify, sync CPUs, update
* all the code, sync CPUs, then remove the breakpoints. In this time
* if lockdep is enabled, it might jump back into the debug handler
* outside the updating of the IST protection. (TRACE_IRQS_ON/OFF).
*
* We need to change the IDT table before calling TRACE_IRQS_ON/OFF to
* make sure the stack pointer does not get reset back to the top
* of the debug stack, and instead just reuses the current stack.
*/
#if defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE) && defined(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS)
.macro TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG
call debug_stack_set_zero
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
call debug_stack_reset
.endm
.macro TRACE_IRQS_ON_DEBUG
call debug_stack_set_zero
TRACE_IRQS_ON
call debug_stack_reset
.endm
.macro TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG offset=ARGOFFSET
bt $9,EFLAGS-\offset(%rsp) /* interrupts off? */
jnc 1f
TRACE_IRQS_ON_DEBUG
1:
.endm
#else
# define TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG TRACE_IRQS_OFF
# define TRACE_IRQS_ON_DEBUG TRACE_IRQS_ON
# define TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
#endif
/*
* C code is not supposed to know about undefined top of stack. Every time
* a C function with an pt_regs argument is called from the SYSCALL based
* fast path FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK is needed.
* RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK syncs the syscall state after any possible ptregs
* manipulation.
*/
/* %rsp:at FRAMEEND */
.macro FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK tmp offset=0
movq PER_CPU_VAR(old_rsp),\tmp
movq \tmp,RSP+\offset(%rsp)
movq $__USER_DS,SS+\offset(%rsp)
movq $__USER_CS,CS+\offset(%rsp)
movq $-1,RCX+\offset(%rsp)
movq R11+\offset(%rsp),\tmp /* get eflags */
movq \tmp,EFLAGS+\offset(%rsp)
.endm
.macro RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK tmp offset=0
movq RSP+\offset(%rsp),\tmp
movq \tmp,PER_CPU_VAR(old_rsp)
movq EFLAGS+\offset(%rsp),\tmp
movq \tmp,R11+\offset(%rsp)
.endm
.macro FAKE_STACK_FRAME child_rip
/* push in order ss, rsp, eflags, cs, rip */
xorl %eax, %eax
pushq_cfi $__KERNEL_DS /* ss */
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET ss,0*/
pushq_cfi %rax /* rsp */
CFI_REL_OFFSET rsp,0
pushq_cfi $(X86_EFLAGS_IF|X86_EFLAGS_BIT1) /* eflags - interrupts on */
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET rflags,0*/
pushq_cfi $__KERNEL_CS /* cs */
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET cs,0*/
pushq_cfi \child_rip /* rip */
CFI_REL_OFFSET rip,0
pushq_cfi %rax /* orig rax */
.endm
.macro UNFAKE_STACK_FRAME
addq $8*6, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -(6*8)
.endm
/*
* initial frame state for interrupts (and exceptions without error code)
*/
.macro EMPTY_FRAME start=1 offset=0
.if \start
CFI_STARTPROC simple
CFI_SIGNAL_FRAME
CFI_DEF_CFA rsp,8+\offset
.else
CFI_DEF_CFA_OFFSET 8+\offset
.endif
.endm
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
/*
* initial frame state for interrupts (and exceptions without error code)
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
*/
.macro INTR_FRAME start=1 offset=0
EMPTY_FRAME \start, SS+8+\offset-RIP
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET ss, SS+\offset-RIP*/
CFI_REL_OFFSET rsp, RSP+\offset-RIP
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET rflags, EFLAGS+\offset-RIP*/
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET cs, CS+\offset-RIP*/
CFI_REL_OFFSET rip, RIP+\offset-RIP
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
.endm
/*
* initial frame state for exceptions with error code (and interrupts
* with vector already pushed)
*/
.macro XCPT_FRAME start=1 offset=0
INTR_FRAME \start, RIP+\offset-ORIG_RAX
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET orig_rax, ORIG_RAX-ORIG_RAX*/
.endm
/*
* frame that enables calling into C.
*/
.macro PARTIAL_FRAME start=1 offset=0
XCPT_FRAME \start, ORIG_RAX+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET rdi, RDI+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET rsi, RSI+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET rdx, RDX+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET rcx, RCX+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET rax, RAX+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET r8, R8+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET r9, R9+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET r10, R10+\offset-ARGOFFSET
CFI_REL_OFFSET r11, R11+\offset-ARGOFFSET
.endm
/*
* frame that enables passing a complete pt_regs to a C function.
*/
.macro DEFAULT_FRAME start=1 offset=0
PARTIAL_FRAME \start, R11+\offset-R15
CFI_REL_OFFSET rbx, RBX+\offset
CFI_REL_OFFSET rbp, RBP+\offset
CFI_REL_OFFSET r12, R12+\offset
CFI_REL_OFFSET r13, R13+\offset
CFI_REL_OFFSET r14, R14+\offset
CFI_REL_OFFSET r15, R15+\offset
.endm
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
/* save partial stack frame */
.macro SAVE_ARGS_IRQ
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
cld
/* start from rbp in pt_regs and jump over */
movq_cfi rdi, (RDI-RBP)
movq_cfi rsi, (RSI-RBP)
movq_cfi rdx, (RDX-RBP)
movq_cfi rcx, (RCX-RBP)
movq_cfi rax, (RAX-RBP)
movq_cfi r8, (R8-RBP)
movq_cfi r9, (R9-RBP)
movq_cfi r10, (R10-RBP)
movq_cfi r11, (R11-RBP)
x86: Don't use frame pointer to save old stack on irq entry rbp is used in SAVE_ARGS_IRQ to save the old stack pointer in order to restore it later in ret_from_intr. It is convenient because we save its value in the irq regs and it's easily restored using the leave instruction. However this is a kind of abuse of the frame pointer which role is to help unwinding the kernel by chaining frames together, each node following the return address to the previous frame. But although we are breaking the frame by changing the stack pointer, there is no preceding return address before the new frame. Hence using the frame pointer to link the two stacks breaks the stack unwinders that find a random value instead of a return address here. There is no workaround that can work in every case. We are using the fixup_bp_irq_link() function to dereference that abused frame pointer in the case of non nesting interrupt (which means stack changed). But that doesn't fix the case of interrupts that don't change the stack (but we still have the unconditional frame link), which is the case of hardirq interrupting softirq. We have no way to detect this transition so the frame irq link is considered as a real frame pointer and the return address is dereferenced but it is still a spurious one. There are two possible results of this: either the spurious return address, a random stack value, luckily belongs to the kernel text and then the unwinding can continue and we just have a weird entry in the stack trace. Or it doesn't belong to the kernel text and unwinding stops there. This is the reason why stacktraces (including perf callchains) on irqs that interrupted softirqs don't work very well. To solve this, we don't save the old stack pointer on rbp anymore but we save it to a scratch register that we push on the new stack and that we pop back later on irq return. This preserves the whole frame chain without spurious return addresses in the middle and drops the need for the horrid fixup_bp_irq_link() workaround. And finally irqs that interrupt softirq are sanely unwinded. Before: 99.81% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--41.60%-- __read | | | |--99.90%-- create_worker | | bench_sched_messaging | | cmd_bench | | run_builtin | | main | | __libc_start_main | --0.10%-- [...] After: 1.64% swapper [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--95.00%-- arch_irq_work_raise | irq_work_queue | __perf_event_overflow | perf_swevent_overflow | perf_swevent_event | perf_tp_event | perf_trace_softirq | __do_softirq | call_softirq | do_softirq | irq_exit | | | |--73.68%-- smp_apic_timer_interrupt | | apic_timer_interrupt | | | | | |--96.43%-- amd_e400_idle | | | cpu_idle | | | start_secondary Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
2011-07-02 14:52:45 +00:00
/* Save rbp so that we can unwind from get_irq_regs() */
movq_cfi rbp, 0
/* Save previous stack value */
movq %rsp, %rsi
leaq -RBP(%rsp),%rdi /* arg1 for handler */
testl $3, CS-RBP(%rsi)
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
je 1f
SWAPGS
/*
* irq_count is used to check if a CPU is already on an interrupt stack
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
* or not. While this is essentially redundant with preempt_count it is
* a little cheaper to use a separate counter in the PDA (short of
* moving irq_enter into assembly, which would be too much work)
*/
1: incl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
cmovzq PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_ptr),%rsp
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rsi
x86: Don't use frame pointer to save old stack on irq entry rbp is used in SAVE_ARGS_IRQ to save the old stack pointer in order to restore it later in ret_from_intr. It is convenient because we save its value in the irq regs and it's easily restored using the leave instruction. However this is a kind of abuse of the frame pointer which role is to help unwinding the kernel by chaining frames together, each node following the return address to the previous frame. But although we are breaking the frame by changing the stack pointer, there is no preceding return address before the new frame. Hence using the frame pointer to link the two stacks breaks the stack unwinders that find a random value instead of a return address here. There is no workaround that can work in every case. We are using the fixup_bp_irq_link() function to dereference that abused frame pointer in the case of non nesting interrupt (which means stack changed). But that doesn't fix the case of interrupts that don't change the stack (but we still have the unconditional frame link), which is the case of hardirq interrupting softirq. We have no way to detect this transition so the frame irq link is considered as a real frame pointer and the return address is dereferenced but it is still a spurious one. There are two possible results of this: either the spurious return address, a random stack value, luckily belongs to the kernel text and then the unwinding can continue and we just have a weird entry in the stack trace. Or it doesn't belong to the kernel text and unwinding stops there. This is the reason why stacktraces (including perf callchains) on irqs that interrupted softirqs don't work very well. To solve this, we don't save the old stack pointer on rbp anymore but we save it to a scratch register that we push on the new stack and that we pop back later on irq return. This preserves the whole frame chain without spurious return addresses in the middle and drops the need for the horrid fixup_bp_irq_link() workaround. And finally irqs that interrupt softirq are sanely unwinded. Before: 99.81% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--41.60%-- __read | | | |--99.90%-- create_worker | | bench_sched_messaging | | cmd_bench | | run_builtin | | main | | __libc_start_main | --0.10%-- [...] After: 1.64% swapper [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--95.00%-- arch_irq_work_raise | irq_work_queue | __perf_event_overflow | perf_swevent_overflow | perf_swevent_event | perf_tp_event | perf_trace_softirq | __do_softirq | call_softirq | do_softirq | irq_exit | | | |--73.68%-- smp_apic_timer_interrupt | | apic_timer_interrupt | | | | | |--96.43%-- amd_e400_idle | | | cpu_idle | | | start_secondary Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
2011-07-02 14:52:45 +00:00
/* Store previous stack value */
x86: Don't use frame pointer to save old stack on irq entry rbp is used in SAVE_ARGS_IRQ to save the old stack pointer in order to restore it later in ret_from_intr. It is convenient because we save its value in the irq regs and it's easily restored using the leave instruction. However this is a kind of abuse of the frame pointer which role is to help unwinding the kernel by chaining frames together, each node following the return address to the previous frame. But although we are breaking the frame by changing the stack pointer, there is no preceding return address before the new frame. Hence using the frame pointer to link the two stacks breaks the stack unwinders that find a random value instead of a return address here. There is no workaround that can work in every case. We are using the fixup_bp_irq_link() function to dereference that abused frame pointer in the case of non nesting interrupt (which means stack changed). But that doesn't fix the case of interrupts that don't change the stack (but we still have the unconditional frame link), which is the case of hardirq interrupting softirq. We have no way to detect this transition so the frame irq link is considered as a real frame pointer and the return address is dereferenced but it is still a spurious one. There are two possible results of this: either the spurious return address, a random stack value, luckily belongs to the kernel text and then the unwinding can continue and we just have a weird entry in the stack trace. Or it doesn't belong to the kernel text and unwinding stops there. This is the reason why stacktraces (including perf callchains) on irqs that interrupted softirqs don't work very well. To solve this, we don't save the old stack pointer on rbp anymore but we save it to a scratch register that we push on the new stack and that we pop back later on irq return. This preserves the whole frame chain without spurious return addresses in the middle and drops the need for the horrid fixup_bp_irq_link() workaround. And finally irqs that interrupt softirq are sanely unwinded. Before: 99.81% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--41.60%-- __read | | | |--99.90%-- create_worker | | bench_sched_messaging | | cmd_bench | | run_builtin | | main | | __libc_start_main | --0.10%-- [...] After: 1.64% swapper [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--95.00%-- arch_irq_work_raise | irq_work_queue | __perf_event_overflow | perf_swevent_overflow | perf_swevent_event | perf_tp_event | perf_trace_softirq | __do_softirq | call_softirq | do_softirq | irq_exit | | | |--73.68%-- smp_apic_timer_interrupt | | apic_timer_interrupt | | | | | |--96.43%-- amd_e400_idle | | | cpu_idle | | | start_secondary Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
2011-07-02 14:52:45 +00:00
pushq %rsi
CFI_ESCAPE 0x0f /* DW_CFA_def_cfa_expression */, 6, \
0x77 /* DW_OP_breg7 */, 0, \
0x06 /* DW_OP_deref */, \
0x08 /* DW_OP_const1u */, SS+8-RBP, \
0x22 /* DW_OP_plus */
x86: Don't use frame pointer to save old stack on irq entry rbp is used in SAVE_ARGS_IRQ to save the old stack pointer in order to restore it later in ret_from_intr. It is convenient because we save its value in the irq regs and it's easily restored using the leave instruction. However this is a kind of abuse of the frame pointer which role is to help unwinding the kernel by chaining frames together, each node following the return address to the previous frame. But although we are breaking the frame by changing the stack pointer, there is no preceding return address before the new frame. Hence using the frame pointer to link the two stacks breaks the stack unwinders that find a random value instead of a return address here. There is no workaround that can work in every case. We are using the fixup_bp_irq_link() function to dereference that abused frame pointer in the case of non nesting interrupt (which means stack changed). But that doesn't fix the case of interrupts that don't change the stack (but we still have the unconditional frame link), which is the case of hardirq interrupting softirq. We have no way to detect this transition so the frame irq link is considered as a real frame pointer and the return address is dereferenced but it is still a spurious one. There are two possible results of this: either the spurious return address, a random stack value, luckily belongs to the kernel text and then the unwinding can continue and we just have a weird entry in the stack trace. Or it doesn't belong to the kernel text and unwinding stops there. This is the reason why stacktraces (including perf callchains) on irqs that interrupted softirqs don't work very well. To solve this, we don't save the old stack pointer on rbp anymore but we save it to a scratch register that we push on the new stack and that we pop back later on irq return. This preserves the whole frame chain without spurious return addresses in the middle and drops the need for the horrid fixup_bp_irq_link() workaround. And finally irqs that interrupt softirq are sanely unwinded. Before: 99.81% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--41.60%-- __read | | | |--99.90%-- create_worker | | bench_sched_messaging | | cmd_bench | | run_builtin | | main | | __libc_start_main | --0.10%-- [...] After: 1.64% swapper [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--95.00%-- arch_irq_work_raise | irq_work_queue | __perf_event_overflow | perf_swevent_overflow | perf_swevent_event | perf_tp_event | perf_trace_softirq | __do_softirq | call_softirq | do_softirq | irq_exit | | | |--73.68%-- smp_apic_timer_interrupt | | apic_timer_interrupt | | | | | |--96.43%-- amd_e400_idle | | | cpu_idle | | | start_secondary Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
2011-07-02 14:52:45 +00:00
/* We entered an interrupt context - irqs are off: */
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
.endm
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
ENTRY(save_rest)
PARTIAL_FRAME 1 (REST_SKIP+8)
movq 5*8+16(%rsp), %r11 /* save return address */
movq_cfi rbx, RBX+16
movq_cfi rbp, RBP+16
movq_cfi r12, R12+16
movq_cfi r13, R13+16
movq_cfi r14, R14+16
movq_cfi r15, R15+16
movq %r11, 8(%rsp) /* return address */
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, 16
ret
CFI_ENDPROC
END(save_rest)
/* save complete stack frame */
.pushsection .kprobes.text, "ax"
ENTRY(save_paranoid)
XCPT_FRAME 1 RDI+8
cld
movq_cfi rdi, RDI+8
movq_cfi rsi, RSI+8
movq_cfi rdx, RDX+8
movq_cfi rcx, RCX+8
movq_cfi rax, RAX+8
movq_cfi r8, R8+8
movq_cfi r9, R9+8
movq_cfi r10, R10+8
movq_cfi r11, R11+8
movq_cfi rbx, RBX+8
movq_cfi rbp, RBP+8
movq_cfi r12, R12+8
movq_cfi r13, R13+8
movq_cfi r14, R14+8
movq_cfi r15, R15+8
movl $1,%ebx
movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx
rdmsr
testl %edx,%edx
js 1f /* negative -> in kernel */
SWAPGS
xorl %ebx,%ebx
1: ret
CFI_ENDPROC
END(save_paranoid)
.popsection
/*
* A newly forked process directly context switches into this address.
*
* rdi: prev task we switched from
*/
ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
DEFAULT_FRAME
LOCK ; btr $TIF_FORK,TI_flags(%r8)
pushq_cfi $0x0002
popfq_cfi # reset kernel eflags
call schedule_tail # rdi: 'prev' task parameter
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
RESTORE_REST
testl $3, CS-ARGOFFSET(%rsp) # from kernel_thread?
jz 1f
testl $_TIF_IA32, TI_flags(%rcx) # 32-bit compat task needs IRET
jnz int_ret_from_sys_call
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi, -ARGOFFSET
jmp ret_from_sys_call # go to the SYSRET fastpath
1:
subq $REST_SKIP, %rsp # leave space for volatiles
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET REST_SKIP
movq %rbp, %rdi
call *%rbx
movl $0, RAX(%rsp)
RESTORE_REST
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
CFI_ENDPROC
END(ret_from_fork)
/*
* System call entry. Up to 6 arguments in registers are supported.
*
* SYSCALL does not save anything on the stack and does not change the
* stack pointer. However, it does mask the flags register for us, so
* CLD and CLAC are not needed.
*/
/*
* Register setup:
* rax system call number
* rdi arg0
* rcx return address for syscall/sysret, C arg3
* rsi arg1
* rdx arg2
* r10 arg3 (--> moved to rcx for C)
* r8 arg4
* r9 arg5
* r11 eflags for syscall/sysret, temporary for C
* r12-r15,rbp,rbx saved by C code, not touched.
*
* Interrupts are off on entry.
* Only called from user space.
*
* XXX if we had a free scratch register we could save the RSP into the stack frame
* and report it properly in ps. Unfortunately we haven't.
*
* When user can change the frames always force IRET. That is because
* it deals with uncanonical addresses better. SYSRET has trouble
* with them due to bugs in both AMD and Intel CPUs.
*/
ENTRY(system_call)
CFI_STARTPROC simple
CFI_SIGNAL_FRAME
CFI_DEF_CFA rsp,KERNEL_STACK_OFFSET
CFI_REGISTER rip,rcx
/*CFI_REGISTER rflags,r11*/
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
/*
* A hypervisor implementation might want to use a label
* after the swapgs, so that it can do the swapgs
* for the guest and jump here on syscall.
*/
GLOBAL(system_call_after_swapgs)
movq %rsp,PER_CPU_VAR(old_rsp)
movq PER_CPU_VAR(kernel_stack),%rsp
/*
* No need to follow this irqs off/on section - it's straight
* and short:
*/
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
SAVE_ARGS 8,0
movq %rax,ORIG_RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
movq %rcx,RIP-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
CFI_REL_OFFSET rip,RIP-ARGOFFSET
testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY,TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET)
jnz tracesys
system_call_fastpath:
#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0
cmpq $__NR_syscall_max,%rax
#else
andl $__SYSCALL_MASK,%eax
cmpl $__NR_syscall_max,%eax
#endif
ja badsys
movq %r10,%rcx
call *sys_call_table(,%rax,8) # XXX: rip relative
movq %rax,RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
/*
* Syscall return path ending with SYSRET (fast path)
* Has incomplete stack frame and undefined top of stack.
*/
ret_from_sys_call:
movl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK,%edi
/* edi: flagmask */
sysret_check:
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET),%edx
andl %edi,%edx
jnz sysret_careful
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
/*
* sysretq will re-enable interrupts:
*/
TRACE_IRQS_ON
movq RIP-ARGOFFSET(%rsp),%rcx
CFI_REGISTER rip,rcx
RESTORE_ARGS 1,-ARG_SKIP,0
/*CFI_REGISTER rflags,r11*/
movq PER_CPU_VAR(old_rsp), %rsp
USERGS_SYSRET64
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
/* Handle reschedules */
/* edx: work, edi: workmask */
sysret_careful:
bt $TIF_NEED_RESCHED,%edx
jnc sysret_signal
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
pushq_cfi %rdi
SCHEDULE_USER
popq_cfi %rdi
jmp sysret_check
/* Handle a signal */
sysret_signal:
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
bt $TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT,%edx
jc sysret_audit
#endif
x86: ptrace: sysret path should reach syscall_trace_leave If TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE or TIF_SINGLESTEP is set while inside a syscall, the path back to user mode should get to syscall_trace_leave. This does happen in most circumstances. The exception to this is on the 64-bit syscall fastpath, when no such flag was set on syscall entry and nothing else has punted it off the fastpath for exit. That one exit fastpath fails to check for _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT flags. This makes the behavior inconsistent with what 32-bit tasks see and what the native 32-bit kernel always does, and what 64-bit tasks see in all cases where the iret path is taken anyhow. Perhaps the only example that is affected is a ptrace stop inside do_fork (for PTRACE_O_TRACE{CLONE,FORK,VFORK,VFORKDONE}). Other syscalls with internal ptrace stop points (execve) already take the iret exit path for unrelated reasons. Test cases for both PTRACE_SYSCALL and PTRACE_SINGLESTEP variants are at: http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/syscall-from-clone.c?cvsroot=systemtap http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/step-from-clone.c?cvsroot=systemtap There was no special benefit to the sysret path's special path to call do_notify_resume, because it always takes the iret exit path at the end. So this change just makes the sysret exit path join the iret exit path for all the signals and ptrace cases. The fastpath still applies to the plain syscall-audit and resched cases. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2009-09-22 23:46:34 +00:00
/*
* We have a signal, or exit tracing or single-step.
* These all wind up with the iret return path anyway,
* so just join that path right now.
*/
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, -ARGOFFSET
jmp int_check_syscall_exit_work
badsys:
movq $-ENOSYS,RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
jmp ret_from_sys_call
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
/*
* Fast path for syscall audit without full syscall trace.
* We just call __audit_syscall_entry() directly, and then
* jump back to the normal fast path.
*/
auditsys:
movq %r10,%r9 /* 6th arg: 4th syscall arg */
movq %rdx,%r8 /* 5th arg: 3rd syscall arg */
movq %rsi,%rcx /* 4th arg: 2nd syscall arg */
movq %rdi,%rdx /* 3rd arg: 1st syscall arg */
movq %rax,%rsi /* 2nd arg: syscall number */
movl $AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,%edi /* 1st arg: audit arch */
call __audit_syscall_entry
LOAD_ARGS 0 /* reload call-clobbered registers */
jmp system_call_fastpath
/*
Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was. Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure. We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void* for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the arch correct structure to dereference it. The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure. THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs. In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3]. For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative before calling the audit code when appropriate. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion] Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64] Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml] Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc] Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips] Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
2012-01-03 19:23:06 +00:00
* Return fast path for syscall audit. Call __audit_syscall_exit()
* directly and then jump back to the fast path with TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
* masked off.
*/
sysret_audit:
movq RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp),%rsi /* second arg, syscall return value */
Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was. Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure. We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void* for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the arch correct structure to dereference it. The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure. THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs. In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3]. For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative before calling the audit code when appropriate. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion] Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64] Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml] Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc] Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips] Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
2012-01-03 19:23:06 +00:00
cmpq $-MAX_ERRNO,%rsi /* is it < -MAX_ERRNO? */
setbe %al /* 1 if so, 0 if not */
movzbl %al,%edi /* zero-extend that into %edi */
Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was. Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure. We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void* for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the arch correct structure to dereference it. The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure. THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs. In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3]. For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative before calling the audit code when appropriate. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion] Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64] Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml] Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc] Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips] Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
2012-01-03 19:23:06 +00:00
call __audit_syscall_exit
movl $(_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK & ~_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),%edi
jmp sysret_check
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
/* Do syscall tracing */
tracesys:
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
testl $(_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY & ~_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),TI_flags+THREAD_INFO(%rsp,RIP-ARGOFFSET)
jz auditsys
#endif
SAVE_REST
movq $-ENOSYS,RAX(%rsp) /* ptrace can change this for a bad syscall */
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi
movq %rsp,%rdi
call syscall_trace_enter
/*
* Reload arg registers from stack in case ptrace changed them.
* We don't reload %rax because syscall_trace_enter() returned
* the value it wants us to use in the table lookup.
*/
LOAD_ARGS ARGOFFSET, 1
RESTORE_REST
#if __SYSCALL_MASK == ~0
cmpq $__NR_syscall_max,%rax
#else
andl $__SYSCALL_MASK,%eax
cmpl $__NR_syscall_max,%eax
#endif
ja int_ret_from_sys_call /* RAX(%rsp) set to -ENOSYS above */
movq %r10,%rcx /* fixup for C */
call *sys_call_table(,%rax,8)
movq %rax,RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
/* Use IRET because user could have changed frame */
/*
* Syscall return path ending with IRET.
* Has correct top of stack, but partial stack frame.
*/
GLOBAL(int_ret_from_sys_call)
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK,%edi
/* edi: mask to check */
GLOBAL(int_with_check)
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT_IRQ
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx
andl %edi,%edx
jnz int_careful
andl $~TS_COMPAT,TI_status(%rcx)
jmp retint_swapgs
/* Either reschedule or signal or syscall exit tracking needed. */
/* First do a reschedule test. */
/* edx: work, edi: workmask */
int_careful:
bt $TIF_NEED_RESCHED,%edx
jnc int_very_careful
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
pushq_cfi %rdi
SCHEDULE_USER
popq_cfi %rdi
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
jmp int_with_check
/* handle signals and tracing -- both require a full stack frame */
int_very_careful:
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
x86: ptrace: sysret path should reach syscall_trace_leave If TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE or TIF_SINGLESTEP is set while inside a syscall, the path back to user mode should get to syscall_trace_leave. This does happen in most circumstances. The exception to this is on the 64-bit syscall fastpath, when no such flag was set on syscall entry and nothing else has punted it off the fastpath for exit. That one exit fastpath fails to check for _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT flags. This makes the behavior inconsistent with what 32-bit tasks see and what the native 32-bit kernel always does, and what 64-bit tasks see in all cases where the iret path is taken anyhow. Perhaps the only example that is affected is a ptrace stop inside do_fork (for PTRACE_O_TRACE{CLONE,FORK,VFORK,VFORKDONE}). Other syscalls with internal ptrace stop points (execve) already take the iret exit path for unrelated reasons. Test cases for both PTRACE_SYSCALL and PTRACE_SINGLESTEP variants are at: http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/syscall-from-clone.c?cvsroot=systemtap http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/step-from-clone.c?cvsroot=systemtap There was no special benefit to the sysret path's special path to call do_notify_resume, because it always takes the iret exit path at the end. So this change just makes the sysret exit path join the iret exit path for all the signals and ptrace cases. The fastpath still applies to the plain syscall-audit and resched cases. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2009-09-22 23:46:34 +00:00
int_check_syscall_exit_work:
SAVE_REST
/* Check for syscall exit trace */
testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT,%edx
jz int_signal
pushq_cfi %rdi
leaq 8(%rsp),%rdi # &ptregs -> arg1
call syscall_trace_leave
popq_cfi %rdi
andl $~(_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT|_TIF_SYSCALL_EMU),%edi
jmp int_restore_rest
int_signal:
testl $_TIF_DO_NOTIFY_MASK,%edx
jz 1f
movq %rsp,%rdi # &ptregs -> arg1
xorl %esi,%esi # oldset -> arg2
call do_notify_resume
x86_64: fix delayed signals On three of the several paths in entry_64.S that call do_notify_resume() on the way back to user mode, we fail to properly check again for newly-arrived work that requires another call to do_notify_resume() before going to user mode. These paths set the mask to check only _TIF_NEED_RESCHED, but this is wrong. The other paths that lead to do_notify_resume() do this correctly already, and entry_32.S does it correctly in all cases. All paths back to user mode have to check all the _TIF_WORK_MASK flags at the last possible stage, with interrupts disabled. Otherwise, we miss any flags (TIF_SIGPENDING for example) that were set any time after we entered do_notify_resume(). More work flags can be set (or left set) synchronously inside do_notify_resume(), as TIF_SIGPENDING can be, or asynchronously by interrupts or other CPUs (which then send an asynchronous interrupt). There are many different scenarios that could hit this bug, most of them races. The simplest one to demonstrate does not require any race: when one signal has done handler setup at the check before returning from a syscall, and there is another signal pending that should be handled. The second signal's handler should interrupt the first signal handler before it actually starts (so the interrupted PC is still at the handler's entry point). Instead, it runs away until the next kernel entry (next syscall, tick, etc). This test behaves correctly on 32-bit kernels, and fails on 64-bit (either 32-bit or 64-bit test binary). With this fix, it works. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <signal.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/ucontext.h> #ifndef REG_RIP #define REG_RIP REG_EIP #endif static sig_atomic_t hit1, hit2; static void handler (int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx) { ucontext_t *uc = ctx; if ((void *) uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] == &handler) { if (sig == SIGUSR1) hit1 = 1; else hit2 = 1; } printf ("%s at %#lx\n", strsignal (sig), uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP]); } int main (void) { struct sigaction sa; sigset_t set; sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; sa.sa_sigaction = &handler; if (sigaction (SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL) || sigaction (SIGUSR2, &sa, NULL)) return 2; sigemptyset (&set); sigaddset (&set, SIGUSR1); sigaddset (&set, SIGUSR2); if (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &set, NULL)) return 3; printf ("main at %p, handler at %p\n", &main, &handler); raise (SIGUSR1); raise (SIGUSR2); if (sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, NULL)) return 4; if (hit1 + hit2 == 1) { puts ("PASS"); return 0; } puts ("FAIL"); return 1; } Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 21:50:39 +00:00
1: movl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%edi
int_restore_rest:
RESTORE_REST
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
jmp int_with_check
CFI_ENDPROC
END(system_call)
.macro FORK_LIKE func
ENTRY(stub_\func)
CFI_STARTPROC
popq %r11 /* save return address */
PARTIAL_FRAME 0
SAVE_REST
pushq %r11 /* put it back on stack */
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, 8
DEFAULT_FRAME 0 8 /* offset 8: return address */
call sys_\func
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, 8
ret $REST_SKIP /* pop extended registers */
CFI_ENDPROC
END(stub_\func)
.endm
.macro FIXED_FRAME label,func
ENTRY(\label)
CFI_STARTPROC
PARTIAL_FRAME 0 8 /* offset 8: return address */
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, 8-ARGOFFSET
call \func
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, 8-ARGOFFSET
ret
CFI_ENDPROC
END(\label)
.endm
FORK_LIKE clone
FORK_LIKE fork
FORK_LIKE vfork
FIXED_FRAME stub_iopl, sys_iopl
ENTRY(ptregscall_common)
DEFAULT_FRAME 1 8 /* offset 8: return address */
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11, 8
movq_cfi_restore R15+8, r15
movq_cfi_restore R14+8, r14
movq_cfi_restore R13+8, r13
movq_cfi_restore R12+8, r12
movq_cfi_restore RBP+8, rbp
movq_cfi_restore RBX+8, rbx
ret $REST_SKIP /* pop extended registers */
CFI_ENDPROC
END(ptregscall_common)
ENTRY(stub_execve)
CFI_STARTPROC
addq $8, %rsp
PARTIAL_FRAME 0
SAVE_REST
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
call sys_execve
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
RESTORE_REST
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
CFI_ENDPROC
END(stub_execve)
/*
* sigreturn is special because it needs to restore all registers on return.
* This cannot be done with SYSRET, so use the IRET return path instead.
*/
ENTRY(stub_rt_sigreturn)
CFI_STARTPROC
addq $8, %rsp
PARTIAL_FRAME 0
SAVE_REST
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
call sys_rt_sigreturn
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp) # fixme, this could be done at the higher layer
RESTORE_REST
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
CFI_ENDPROC
END(stub_rt_sigreturn)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
ENTRY(stub_x32_rt_sigreturn)
CFI_STARTPROC
addq $8, %rsp
PARTIAL_FRAME 0
SAVE_REST
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
call sys32_x32_rt_sigreturn
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp) # fixme, this could be done at the higher layer
RESTORE_REST
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
CFI_ENDPROC
END(stub_x32_rt_sigreturn)
ENTRY(stub_x32_execve)
CFI_STARTPROC
addq $8, %rsp
PARTIAL_FRAME 0
SAVE_REST
FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
call compat_sys_execve
RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
RESTORE_REST
jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
CFI_ENDPROC
END(stub_x32_execve)
#endif
/*
* Build the entry stubs and pointer table with some assembler magic.
* We pack 7 stubs into a single 32-byte chunk, which will fit in a
* single cache line on all modern x86 implementations.
*/
.section .init.rodata,"a"
ENTRY(interrupt)
x86: Separate out entry text section Put x86 entry code into a separate link section: .entry.text. Separating the entry text section seems to have performance benefits - caused by more efficient instruction cache usage. Running hackbench with perf stat --repeat showed that the change compresses the icache footprint. The icache load miss rate went down by about 15%: before patch: 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) after patch: 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) The motivation of the patch was to fix a particular kprobes bug that relates to the entry text section, the performance advantage was discovered accidentally. Whole perf output follows: - results for current tip tree: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) 2676914223 instructions # 0.497 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5389516026 cycles ( +- 0.144% ) 0.206267711 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.138% ) - results for current tip tree with the patch applied: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) 2717734941 instructions # 0.502 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5414756975 cycles ( +- 0.148% ) 0.206747566 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.137% ) Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com Cc: ananth@in.ibm.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: 2nddept-manager@sdl.hitachi.co.jp LKML-Reference: <20110307181039.GB15197@jolsa.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-07 18:10:39 +00:00
.section .entry.text
.p2align 5
.p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT
ENTRY(irq_entries_start)
INTR_FRAME
vector=FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR
.rept (NR_VECTORS-FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR+6)/7
.balign 32
.rept 7
.if vector < NR_VECTORS
.if vector <> FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -8
.endif
1: pushq_cfi $(~vector+0x80) /* Note: always in signed byte range */
.if ((vector-FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR)%7) <> 6
jmp 2f
.endif
.previous
.quad 1b
x86: Separate out entry text section Put x86 entry code into a separate link section: .entry.text. Separating the entry text section seems to have performance benefits - caused by more efficient instruction cache usage. Running hackbench with perf stat --repeat showed that the change compresses the icache footprint. The icache load miss rate went down by about 15%: before patch: 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) after patch: 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) The motivation of the patch was to fix a particular kprobes bug that relates to the entry text section, the performance advantage was discovered accidentally. Whole perf output follows: - results for current tip tree: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) 2676914223 instructions # 0.497 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5389516026 cycles ( +- 0.144% ) 0.206267711 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.138% ) - results for current tip tree with the patch applied: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) 2717734941 instructions # 0.502 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5414756975 cycles ( +- 0.148% ) 0.206747566 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.137% ) Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com Cc: ananth@in.ibm.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: 2nddept-manager@sdl.hitachi.co.jp LKML-Reference: <20110307181039.GB15197@jolsa.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-07 18:10:39 +00:00
.section .entry.text
vector=vector+1
.endif
.endr
2: jmp common_interrupt
.endr
CFI_ENDPROC
END(irq_entries_start)
.previous
END(interrupt)
.previous
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
/*
* Interrupt entry/exit.
*
* Interrupt entry points save only callee clobbered registers in fast path.
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
*
* Entry runs with interrupts off.
*/
/* 0(%rsp): ~(interrupt number) */
.macro interrupt func
x86: Save rbp in pt_regs on irq entry From the x86_64 low level interrupt handlers, the frame pointer is saved right after the partial pt_regs frame. rbp is not supposed to be part of the irq partial saved registers, but it only requires to extend the pt_regs frame by 8 bytes to do so, plus a tiny stack offset fixup on irq exit. This changes a bit the semantics or get_irq_entry() that is supposed to provide only the value of caller saved registers and the cpu saved frame. However it's a win for unwinders that can walk through stack frames on top of get_irq_regs() snapshots. A noticeable impact is that it makes perf events cpu-clock and task-clock events based callchains working on x86_64. Let's then save rbp into the irq pt_regs. As a result with: perf record -e cpu-clock perf bench sched messaging perf report --stdio Before: 20.94% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] lock_acquire | --- lock_acquire | |--44.01%-- __write_nocancel | |--43.18%-- __read | |--6.08%-- fork | create_worker | |--0.88%-- _dl_fixup | |--0.65%-- do_lookup_x | |--0.53%-- __GI___libc_read --4.67%-- [...] After: 19.23% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __lock_acquire | --- __lock_acquire | |--97.74%-- lock_acquire | | | |--21.82%-- _raw_spin_lock | | | | | |--37.26%-- unix_stream_recvmsg | | | sock_aio_read | | | do_sync_read | | | vfs_read | | | sys_read | | | system_call | | | __read | | | | | |--24.09%-- unix_stream_sendmsg | | | sock_aio_write | | | do_sync_write | | | vfs_write | | | sys_write | | | system_call | | | __write_nocancel v2: Fix cfi annotations. Reported-by: Soeren Sandmann Pedersen <sandmann@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
2011-01-06 14:22:47 +00:00
/* reserve pt_regs for scratch regs and rbp */
subq $ORIG_RAX-RBP, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET ORIG_RAX-RBP
SAVE_ARGS_IRQ
call \func
.endm
/*
* Interrupt entry/exit should be protected against kprobes
*/
.pushsection .kprobes.text, "ax"
/*
* The interrupt stubs push (~vector+0x80) onto the stack and
* then jump to common_interrupt.
*/
.p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT
common_interrupt:
XCPT_FRAME
ASM_CLAC
addq $-0x80,(%rsp) /* Adjust vector to [-256,-1] range */
interrupt do_IRQ
/* 0(%rsp): old_rsp-ARGOFFSET */
ret_from_intr:
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
decl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
x86: Save rbp in pt_regs on irq entry From the x86_64 low level interrupt handlers, the frame pointer is saved right after the partial pt_regs frame. rbp is not supposed to be part of the irq partial saved registers, but it only requires to extend the pt_regs frame by 8 bytes to do so, plus a tiny stack offset fixup on irq exit. This changes a bit the semantics or get_irq_entry() that is supposed to provide only the value of caller saved registers and the cpu saved frame. However it's a win for unwinders that can walk through stack frames on top of get_irq_regs() snapshots. A noticeable impact is that it makes perf events cpu-clock and task-clock events based callchains working on x86_64. Let's then save rbp into the irq pt_regs. As a result with: perf record -e cpu-clock perf bench sched messaging perf report --stdio Before: 20.94% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] lock_acquire | --- lock_acquire | |--44.01%-- __write_nocancel | |--43.18%-- __read | |--6.08%-- fork | create_worker | |--0.88%-- _dl_fixup | |--0.65%-- do_lookup_x | |--0.53%-- __GI___libc_read --4.67%-- [...] After: 19.23% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __lock_acquire | --- __lock_acquire | |--97.74%-- lock_acquire | | | |--21.82%-- _raw_spin_lock | | | | | |--37.26%-- unix_stream_recvmsg | | | sock_aio_read | | | do_sync_read | | | vfs_read | | | sys_read | | | system_call | | | __read | | | | | |--24.09%-- unix_stream_sendmsg | | | sock_aio_write | | | do_sync_write | | | vfs_write | | | sys_write | | | system_call | | | __write_nocancel v2: Fix cfi annotations. Reported-by: Soeren Sandmann Pedersen <sandmann@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
2011-01-06 14:22:47 +00:00
x86: Don't use frame pointer to save old stack on irq entry rbp is used in SAVE_ARGS_IRQ to save the old stack pointer in order to restore it later in ret_from_intr. It is convenient because we save its value in the irq regs and it's easily restored using the leave instruction. However this is a kind of abuse of the frame pointer which role is to help unwinding the kernel by chaining frames together, each node following the return address to the previous frame. But although we are breaking the frame by changing the stack pointer, there is no preceding return address before the new frame. Hence using the frame pointer to link the two stacks breaks the stack unwinders that find a random value instead of a return address here. There is no workaround that can work in every case. We are using the fixup_bp_irq_link() function to dereference that abused frame pointer in the case of non nesting interrupt (which means stack changed). But that doesn't fix the case of interrupts that don't change the stack (but we still have the unconditional frame link), which is the case of hardirq interrupting softirq. We have no way to detect this transition so the frame irq link is considered as a real frame pointer and the return address is dereferenced but it is still a spurious one. There are two possible results of this: either the spurious return address, a random stack value, luckily belongs to the kernel text and then the unwinding can continue and we just have a weird entry in the stack trace. Or it doesn't belong to the kernel text and unwinding stops there. This is the reason why stacktraces (including perf callchains) on irqs that interrupted softirqs don't work very well. To solve this, we don't save the old stack pointer on rbp anymore but we save it to a scratch register that we push on the new stack and that we pop back later on irq return. This preserves the whole frame chain without spurious return addresses in the middle and drops the need for the horrid fixup_bp_irq_link() workaround. And finally irqs that interrupt softirq are sanely unwinded. Before: 99.81% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--41.60%-- __read | | | |--99.90%-- create_worker | | bench_sched_messaging | | cmd_bench | | run_builtin | | main | | __libc_start_main | --0.10%-- [...] After: 1.64% swapper [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_pending_event | --- perf_pending_event irq_work_run smp_irq_work_interrupt irq_work_interrupt | |--95.00%-- arch_irq_work_raise | irq_work_queue | __perf_event_overflow | perf_swevent_overflow | perf_swevent_event | perf_tp_event | perf_trace_softirq | __do_softirq | call_softirq | do_softirq | irq_exit | | | |--73.68%-- smp_apic_timer_interrupt | | apic_timer_interrupt | | | | | |--96.43%-- amd_e400_idle | | | cpu_idle | | | start_secondary Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
2011-07-02 14:52:45 +00:00
/* Restore saved previous stack */
popq %rsi
CFI_DEF_CFA rsi,SS+8-RBP /* reg/off reset after def_cfa_expr */
leaq ARGOFFSET-RBP(%rsi), %rsp
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET RBP-ARGOFFSET
x86: Save rbp in pt_regs on irq entry From the x86_64 low level interrupt handlers, the frame pointer is saved right after the partial pt_regs frame. rbp is not supposed to be part of the irq partial saved registers, but it only requires to extend the pt_regs frame by 8 bytes to do so, plus a tiny stack offset fixup on irq exit. This changes a bit the semantics or get_irq_entry() that is supposed to provide only the value of caller saved registers and the cpu saved frame. However it's a win for unwinders that can walk through stack frames on top of get_irq_regs() snapshots. A noticeable impact is that it makes perf events cpu-clock and task-clock events based callchains working on x86_64. Let's then save rbp into the irq pt_regs. As a result with: perf record -e cpu-clock perf bench sched messaging perf report --stdio Before: 20.94% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] lock_acquire | --- lock_acquire | |--44.01%-- __write_nocancel | |--43.18%-- __read | |--6.08%-- fork | create_worker | |--0.88%-- _dl_fixup | |--0.65%-- do_lookup_x | |--0.53%-- __GI___libc_read --4.67%-- [...] After: 19.23% perf [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __lock_acquire | --- __lock_acquire | |--97.74%-- lock_acquire | | | |--21.82%-- _raw_spin_lock | | | | | |--37.26%-- unix_stream_recvmsg | | | sock_aio_read | | | do_sync_read | | | vfs_read | | | sys_read | | | system_call | | | __read | | | | | |--24.09%-- unix_stream_sendmsg | | | sock_aio_write | | | do_sync_write | | | vfs_write | | | sys_write | | | system_call | | | __write_nocancel v2: Fix cfi annotations. Reported-by: Soeren Sandmann Pedersen <sandmann@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
2011-01-06 14:22:47 +00:00
exit_intr:
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
testl $3,CS-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)
je retint_kernel
/* Interrupt came from user space */
/*
* Has a correct top of stack, but a partial stack frame
* %rcx: thread info. Interrupts off.
*/
retint_with_reschedule:
movl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%edi
retint_check:
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT_IRQ
movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx
andl %edi,%edx
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
jnz retint_careful
retint_swapgs: /* return to user-space */
/*
* The iretq could re-enable interrupts:
*/
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
SWAPGS
jmp restore_args
retint_restore_args: /* return to kernel space */
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
/*
* The iretq could re-enable interrupts:
*/
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
restore_args:
RESTORE_ARGS 1,8,1
irq_return:
INTERRUPT_RETURN
_ASM_EXTABLE(irq_return, bad_iret)
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
ENTRY(native_iret)
iretq
_ASM_EXTABLE(native_iret, bad_iret)
#endif
.section .fixup,"ax"
bad_iret:
/*
* The iret traps when the %cs or %ss being restored is bogus.
* We've lost the original trap vector and error code.
* #GPF is the most likely one to get for an invalid selector.
* So pretend we completed the iret and took the #GPF in user mode.
*
* We are now running with the kernel GS after exception recovery.
* But error_entry expects us to have user GS to match the user %cs,
* so swap back.
*/
pushq $0
SWAPGS
jmp general_protection
.previous
/* edi: workmask, edx: work */
retint_careful:
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
bt $TIF_NEED_RESCHED,%edx
jnc retint_signal
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
pushq_cfi %rdi
SCHEDULE_USER
popq_cfi %rdi
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
jmp retint_check
retint_signal:
testl $_TIF_DO_NOTIFY_MASK,%edx
jz retint_swapgs
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
SAVE_REST
movq $-1,ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
xorl %esi,%esi # oldset
movq %rsp,%rdi # &pt_regs
call do_notify_resume
RESTORE_REST
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
x86_64: fix delayed signals On three of the several paths in entry_64.S that call do_notify_resume() on the way back to user mode, we fail to properly check again for newly-arrived work that requires another call to do_notify_resume() before going to user mode. These paths set the mask to check only _TIF_NEED_RESCHED, but this is wrong. The other paths that lead to do_notify_resume() do this correctly already, and entry_32.S does it correctly in all cases. All paths back to user mode have to check all the _TIF_WORK_MASK flags at the last possible stage, with interrupts disabled. Otherwise, we miss any flags (TIF_SIGPENDING for example) that were set any time after we entered do_notify_resume(). More work flags can be set (or left set) synchronously inside do_notify_resume(), as TIF_SIGPENDING can be, or asynchronously by interrupts or other CPUs (which then send an asynchronous interrupt). There are many different scenarios that could hit this bug, most of them races. The simplest one to demonstrate does not require any race: when one signal has done handler setup at the check before returning from a syscall, and there is another signal pending that should be handled. The second signal's handler should interrupt the first signal handler before it actually starts (so the interrupted PC is still at the handler's entry point). Instead, it runs away until the next kernel entry (next syscall, tick, etc). This test behaves correctly on 32-bit kernels, and fails on 64-bit (either 32-bit or 64-bit test binary). With this fix, it works. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <signal.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/ucontext.h> #ifndef REG_RIP #define REG_RIP REG_EIP #endif static sig_atomic_t hit1, hit2; static void handler (int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx) { ucontext_t *uc = ctx; if ((void *) uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] == &handler) { if (sig == SIGUSR1) hit1 = 1; else hit2 = 1; } printf ("%s at %#lx\n", strsignal (sig), uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP]); } int main (void) { struct sigaction sa; sigset_t set; sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; sa.sa_sigaction = &handler; if (sigaction (SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL) || sigaction (SIGUSR2, &sa, NULL)) return 2; sigemptyset (&set); sigaddset (&set, SIGUSR1); sigaddset (&set, SIGUSR2); if (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &set, NULL)) return 3; printf ("main at %p, handler at %p\n", &main, &handler); raise (SIGUSR1); raise (SIGUSR2); if (sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, NULL)) return 4; if (hit1 + hit2 == 1) { puts ("PASS"); return 0; } puts ("FAIL"); return 1; } Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-10 21:50:39 +00:00
jmp retint_with_reschedule
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT
/* Returning to kernel space. Check if we need preemption */
/* rcx: threadinfo. interrupts off. */
ENTRY(retint_kernel)
cmpl $0,TI_preempt_count(%rcx)
jnz retint_restore_args
bt $TIF_NEED_RESCHED,TI_flags(%rcx)
jnc retint_restore_args
bt $9,EFLAGS-ARGOFFSET(%rsp) /* interrupts off? */
jnc retint_restore_args
call preempt_schedule_irq
jmp exit_intr
#endif
CFI_ENDPROC
END(common_interrupt)
/*
* End of kprobes section
*/
.popsection
/*
* APIC interrupts.
*/
.macro apicinterrupt num sym do_sym
ENTRY(\sym)
INTR_FRAME
ASM_CLAC
pushq_cfi $~(\num)
.Lcommon_\sym:
interrupt \do_sym
jmp ret_from_intr
CFI_ENDPROC
END(\sym)
.endm
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
apicinterrupt IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR \
irq_move_cleanup_interrupt smp_irq_move_cleanup_interrupt
x86: fix panic with interrupts off (needed for MCE) For some time each panic() called with interrupts disabled triggered the !irqs_disabled() WARN_ON in smp_call_function(), producing ugly backtraces and confusing users. This is a common situation with machine checks for example which tend to call panic with interrupts disabled, but will also hit in other situations e.g. panic during early boot. In fact it means that panic cannot be called in many circumstances, which would be bad. This all started with the new fancy queued smp_call_function, which is then used by the shutdown path to shut down the other CPUs. On closer examination it turned out that the fancy RCU smp_call_function() does lots of things not suitable in a panic situation anyways, like allocating memory and relying on complex system state. I originally tried to patch this over by checking for panic there, but it was quite complicated and the original patch was also not very popular. This also didn't fix some of the underlying complexity problems. The new code in post 2.6.29 tries to patch around this by checking for oops_in_progress, but that is not enough to make this fully safe and I don't think that's a real solution because panic has to be reliable. So instead use an own vector to reboot. This makes the reboot code extremly straight forward, which is definitely a big plus in a panic situation where it is important to avoid relying on too much kernel state. The new simple code is also safe to be called from interupts off region because it is very very simple. There can be situations where it is important that panic is reliable. For example on a fatal machine check the panic is needed to get the system up again and running as quickly as possible. So it's important that panic is reliable and all function it calls simple. This is why I came up with this simple vector scheme. It's very hard to beat in simplicity. Vectors are not particularly precious anymore since all big systems are using per CPU vectors. Another possibility would have been to use an NMI similar to kdump, but there is still the problem that NMIs don't work reliably on some systems due to BIOS issues. NMIs would have been able to stop CPUs running with interrupts off too. In the sake of universal reliability I opted for using a non NMI vector for now. I put the reboot vector into the highest priority bucket of the APIC vectors and moved the 64bit UV_BAU message down instead into the next lower priority. [ Impact: bug fix, fixes an old regression ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:52 +00:00
apicinterrupt REBOOT_VECTOR \
reboot_interrupt smp_reboot_interrupt
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_UV
apicinterrupt UV_BAU_MESSAGE \
uv_bau_message_intr1 uv_bau_message_interrupt
#endif
apicinterrupt LOCAL_TIMER_VECTOR \
apic_timer_interrupt smp_apic_timer_interrupt
apicinterrupt X86_PLATFORM_IPI_VECTOR \
x86_platform_ipi smp_x86_platform_ipi
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM
apicinterrupt POSTED_INTR_VECTOR \
kvm_posted_intr_ipi smp_kvm_posted_intr_ipi
#endif
apicinterrupt THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR \
threshold_interrupt smp_threshold_interrupt
apicinterrupt THERMAL_APIC_VECTOR \
thermal_interrupt smp_thermal_interrupt
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
apicinterrupt CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR \
call_function_single_interrupt smp_call_function_single_interrupt
apicinterrupt CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR \
call_function_interrupt smp_call_function_interrupt
apicinterrupt RESCHEDULE_VECTOR \
reschedule_interrupt smp_reschedule_interrupt
#endif
apicinterrupt ERROR_APIC_VECTOR \
error_interrupt smp_error_interrupt
apicinterrupt SPURIOUS_APIC_VECTOR \
spurious_interrupt smp_spurious_interrupt
#ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_WORK
apicinterrupt IRQ_WORK_VECTOR \
irq_work_interrupt smp_irq_work_interrupt
#endif
/*
* Exception entry points.
*/
.macro zeroentry sym do_sym
ENTRY(\sym)
INTR_FRAME
ASM_CLAC
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
subq $ORIG_RAX-R15, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET ORIG_RAX-R15
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
call error_entry
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
movq %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
xorl %esi,%esi /* no error code */
call \do_sym
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
jmp error_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
CFI_ENDPROC
END(\sym)
.endm
.macro paranoidzeroentry sym do_sym
ENTRY(\sym)
INTR_FRAME
ASM_CLAC
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
subq $ORIG_RAX-R15, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET ORIG_RAX-R15
call save_paranoid
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movq %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
xorl %esi,%esi /* no error code */
call \do_sym
jmp paranoid_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
CFI_ENDPROC
END(\sym)
.endm
#define INIT_TSS_IST(x) PER_CPU_VAR(init_tss) + (TSS_ist + ((x) - 1) * 8)
.macro paranoidzeroentry_ist sym do_sym ist
ENTRY(\sym)
INTR_FRAME
ASM_CLAC
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
subq $ORIG_RAX-R15, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET ORIG_RAX-R15
call save_paranoid
ftrace/x86: Do not change stacks in DEBUG when calling lockdep When both DYNAMIC_FTRACE and LOCKDEP are set, the TRACE_IRQS_ON/OFF will call into the lockdep code. The lockdep code can call lots of functions that may be traced by ftrace. When ftrace is updating its code and hits a breakpoint, the breakpoint handler will call into lockdep. If lockdep happens to call a function that also has a breakpoint attached, it will jump back into the breakpoint handler resetting the stack to the debug stack and corrupt the contents currently on that stack. The 'do_sym' call that calls do_int3() is protected by modifying the IST table to point to a different location if another breakpoint is hit. But the TRACE_IRQS_OFF/ON are outside that protection, and if a breakpoint is hit from those, the stack will get corrupted, and the kernel will crash: [ 1013.243754] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002 [ 1013.272665] IP: [<ffff880145cc0000>] 0xffff880145cbffff [ 1013.285186] PGD 1401b2067 PUD 14324c067 PMD 0 [ 1013.298832] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1013.310600] CPU 2 [ 1013.317904] Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel microcode usb_debug serio_raw pcspkr iTCO_wdt i2c_i801 iTCO_vendor_support e1000e nfsd nfs_acl auth_rpcgss lockd sunrpc i915 video i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] [ 1013.401848] [ 1013.407399] Pid: 112, comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 3.4.0+ #30 [ 1013.437943] RIP: 8eb8:[<ffff88014630a000>] [<ffff88014630a000>] 0xffff880146309fff [ 1013.459871] RSP: ffffffff8165e919:ffff88014780f408 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 1013.477909] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff81104020 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.499458] RDX: ffff880148008ea8 RSI: ffffffff8131ef40 RDI: ffffffff82203b20 [ 1013.521612] RBP: ffffffff81005751 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.543121] R10: ffffffff82cdc318 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880145cc0000 [ 1013.564614] R13: ffff880148008eb8 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88014780cb40 [ 1013.586108] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880148000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1013.609458] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1013.627420] CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 0000000141f10000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 1013.649051] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.670724] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1013.692376] Process kworker/2:1 (pid: 112, threadinfo ffff88013fe0e000, task ffff88014020a6a0) [ 1013.717028] Stack: [ 1013.724131] ffff88014780f570 ffff880145cc0000 0000400000004000 0000000000000000 [ 1013.745918] cccccccccccccccc ffff88014780cca8 ffffffff811072bb ffffffff81651627 [ 1013.767870] ffffffff8118f8a7 ffffffff811072bb ffffffff81f2b6c5 ffffffff81f11bdb [ 1013.790021] Call Trace: [ 1013.800701] Code: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a <e7> d7 64 81 ff ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 65 d9 64 81 ff [ 1013.861443] RIP [<ffff88014630a000>] 0xffff880146309fff [ 1013.884466] RSP <ffff88014780f408> [ 1013.901507] CR2: 0000000000000002 The solution was to reuse the NMI functions that change the IDT table to make the debug stack keep its current stack (in kernel mode) when hitting a breakpoint: call debug_stack_set_zero TRACE_IRQS_ON call debug_stack_reset If the TRACE_IRQS_ON happens to hit a breakpoint then it will keep the current stack and not crash the box. Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-05-30 15:54:53 +00:00
TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG
movq %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
xorl %esi,%esi /* no error code */
subq $EXCEPTION_STKSZ, INIT_TSS_IST(\ist)
call \do_sym
addq $EXCEPTION_STKSZ, INIT_TSS_IST(\ist)
jmp paranoid_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
CFI_ENDPROC
END(\sym)
.endm
.macro errorentry sym do_sym
ENTRY(\sym)
XCPT_FRAME
ASM_CLAC
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
subq $ORIG_RAX-R15, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET ORIG_RAX-R15
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
call error_entry
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
movq %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp),%rsi /* get error code */
movq $-1,ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
call \do_sym
x86: move entry_64.S register saving out of the macros Here is a combined patch that moves "save_args" out-of-line for the interrupt macro and moves "error_entry" mostly out-of-line for the zeroentry and errorentry macros. The save_args function becomes really straightforward and easy to understand, with the possible exception of the stack switch code, which now needs to copy the return address of to the calling function. Normal interrupts arrive with ((~vector)-0x80) on the stack, which gets adjusted in common_interrupt: <common_interrupt>: (5) addq $0xffffffffffffff80,(%rsp) /* -> ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80214290 <do_IRQ> <ret_from_intr>: ... An apic interrupt stub now look like this: <thermal_interrupt>: (5) pushq $0xffffffffffffff05 /* ~(vector) */ (4) sub $0x50,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff80211290 <save_args> (5) callq ffffffff80212b8f <smp_thermal_interrupt> (5) jmpq ffffffff80211f93 <ret_from_intr> Similarly the exception handler register saving function becomes simpler, without the need of any parameter shuffling. The stub for an exception without errorcode looks like this: <overflow>: (6) callq *0x1cad12(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (2) pushq $0xffffffffffffffff /* no syscall */ (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (2) xor %esi,%esi /* no error code */ (5) callq ffffffff80213446 <do_overflow> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> And one for an exception with errorcode like this: <segment_not_present>: (6) callq *0x1cab92(%rip) # ffffffff803dd448 <pv_irq_ops+0x38> (4) sub $0x78,%rsp /* space for registers */ (5) callq ffffffff8030e3b0 <error_entry> (3) mov %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ (5) mov 0x78(%rsp),%rsi /* load error code */ (9) movq $0xffffffffffffffff,0x78(%rsp) /* no syscall */ (5) callq ffffffff80213209 <do_segment_not_present> (5) jmpq ffffffff8030e460 <error_exit> Unfortunately, this last type is more than 32 bytes. But the total space savings due to this patch is about 2500 bytes on an smp-configuration, and I think the code is clearer than it was before. The tested kernels were non-paravirt ones (i.e., without the indirect call at the top of the exception handlers). Anyhow, I tested this patch on top of a recent -tip. The machine was an 2x4-core Xeon at 2333MHz. Measured where the delays between (almost-)adjacent rdtsc instructions. The graphs show how much time is spent outside of the program as a function of the measured delay. The area under the graph represents the total time spent outside the program. Eight instances of the rdtsctest were started, each pinned to a single cpu. The histogams are added. For each kernel two measurements were done: one in mostly idle condition, the other while running "bonnie++ -f", bound to cpu 0. Each measurement took 40 minutes runtime. See the attached graphs for the results. The graphs overlap almost everywhere, but there are small differences. Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-19 00:18:11 +00:00
jmp error_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
CFI_ENDPROC
END(\sym)
.endm
/* error code is on the stack already */
.macro paranoiderrorentry sym do_sym
ENTRY(\sym)
XCPT_FRAME
ASM_CLAC
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
subq $ORIG_RAX-R15, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET ORIG_RAX-R15
call save_paranoid
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movq %rsp,%rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp),%rsi /* get error code */
movq $-1,ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
call \do_sym
jmp paranoid_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */
CFI_ENDPROC
END(\sym)
.endm
zeroentry divide_error do_divide_error
zeroentry overflow do_overflow
zeroentry bounds do_bounds
zeroentry invalid_op do_invalid_op
zeroentry device_not_available do_device_not_available
paranoiderrorentry double_fault do_double_fault
zeroentry coprocessor_segment_overrun do_coprocessor_segment_overrun
errorentry invalid_TSS do_invalid_TSS
errorentry segment_not_present do_segment_not_present
zeroentry spurious_interrupt_bug do_spurious_interrupt_bug
zeroentry coprocessor_error do_coprocessor_error
errorentry alignment_check do_alignment_check
zeroentry simd_coprocessor_error do_simd_coprocessor_error
x86-64: Emulate legacy vsyscalls There's a fair amount of code in the vsyscall page. It contains a syscall instruction (in the gettimeofday fallback) and who knows what will happen if an exploit jumps into the middle of some other code. Reduce the risk by replacing the vsyscalls with short magic incantations that cause the kernel to emulate the real vsyscalls. These incantations are useless if entered in the middle. This causes vsyscalls to be a little more expensive than real syscalls. Fortunately sensible programs don't use them. The only exception is time() which is still called by glibc through the vsyscall - but calling time() millions of times per second is not sensible. glibc has this fixed in the development tree. This patch is not perfect: the vread_tsc and vread_hpet functions are still at a fixed address. Fixing that might involve making alternative patching work in the vDSO. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com> Cc: richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com> Cc: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Louis Rilling <Louis.Rilling@kerlabs.com> Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu Cc: pageexec@freemail.hu Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e64e1b3c64858820d12c48fa739efbd1485e79d5.1307292171.git.luto@mit.edu [ Removed the CONFIG option - it's simpler to just do it unconditionally. Tidied up the code as well. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-06-05 17:50:24 +00:00
/* Reload gs selector with exception handling */
/* edi: new selector */
ENTRY(native_load_gs_index)
CFI_STARTPROC
pushfq_cfi
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY & ~CLBR_RDI)
SWAPGS
gs_change:
movl %edi,%gs
2: mfence /* workaround */
SWAPGS
popfq_cfi
ret
CFI_ENDPROC
END(native_load_gs_index)
_ASM_EXTABLE(gs_change,bad_gs)
.section .fixup,"ax"
/* running with kernelgs */
bad_gs:
SWAPGS /* switch back to user gs */
xorl %eax,%eax
movl %eax,%gs
jmp 2b
.previous
/* Call softirq on interrupt stack. Interrupts are off. */
ENTRY(call_softirq)
CFI_STARTPROC
pushq_cfi %rbp
CFI_REL_OFFSET rbp,0
mov %rsp,%rbp
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rbp
incl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
cmove PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_ptr),%rsp
push %rbp # backlink for old unwinder
call __do_softirq
leaveq
CFI_RESTORE rbp
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -8
decl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
ret
CFI_ENDPROC
END(call_softirq)
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
zeroentry xen_hypervisor_callback xen_do_hypervisor_callback
/*
* A note on the "critical region" in our callback handler.
* We want to avoid stacking callback handlers due to events occurring
* during handling of the last event. To do this, we keep events disabled
* until we've done all processing. HOWEVER, we must enable events before
* popping the stack frame (can't be done atomically) and so it would still
* be possible to get enough handler activations to overflow the stack.
* Although unlikely, bugs of that kind are hard to track down, so we'd
* like to avoid the possibility.
* So, on entry to the handler we detect whether we interrupted an
* existing activation in its critical region -- if so, we pop the current
* activation and restart the handler using the previous one.
*/
ENTRY(xen_do_hypervisor_callback) # do_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs)
CFI_STARTPROC
/*
* Since we don't modify %rdi, evtchn_do_upall(struct *pt_regs) will
* see the correct pointer to the pt_regs
*/
movq %rdi, %rsp # we don't return, adjust the stack frame
CFI_ENDPROC
DEFAULT_FRAME
11: incl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
movq %rsp,%rbp
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rbp
cmovzq PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_ptr),%rsp
pushq %rbp # backlink for old unwinder
call xen_evtchn_do_upcall
popq %rsp
CFI_DEF_CFA_REGISTER rsp
decl PER_CPU_VAR(irq_count)
jmp error_exit
CFI_ENDPROC
x86, binutils, xen: Fix another wrong size directive The latest binutils (2.21.0.20110302/Ubuntu) breaks the build yet another time, under CONFIG_XEN=y due to a .size directive that refers to a slightly differently named (hence, to the now very strict and unforgiving assembler, non-existent) symbol. [ mingo: This unnecessary build breakage caused by new binutils version 2.21 gets escallated back several kernel releases spanning several years of Linux history, affecting over 130,000 upstream kernel commits (!), on CONFIG_XEN=y 64-bit kernels (i.e. essentially affecting all major Linux distro kernel configs). Git annotate tells us that this slight debug symbol code mismatch bug has been introduced in 2008 in commit 3d75e1b8: 3d75e1b8 (Jeremy Fitzhardinge 2008-07-08 15:06:49 -0700 1231) ENTRY(xen_do_hypervisor_callback) # do_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs) The 'bug' is just a slight assymetry in ENTRY()/END() debug-symbols sequences, with lots of assembly code between the ENTRY() and the END(): ENTRY(xen_do_hypervisor_callback) # do_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs) ... END(do_hypervisor_callback) Human reviewers almost never catch such small mismatches, and binutils never even warned about it either. This new binutils version thus breaks the Xen build on all upstream kernels since v2.6.27, out of the blue. This makes a straightforward Git bisection of all 64-bit Xen-enabled kernels impossible on such binutils, for a bisection window of over hundred thousand historic commits. (!) This is a major fail on the side of binutils and binutils needs to turn this show-stopper build failure into a warning ASAP. ] Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> LKML-Reference: <1299877178-26063-1-git-send-email-heukelum@fastmail.fm> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-11 20:59:38 +00:00
END(xen_do_hypervisor_callback)
/*
* Hypervisor uses this for application faults while it executes.
* We get here for two reasons:
* 1. Fault while reloading DS, ES, FS or GS
* 2. Fault while executing IRET
* Category 1 we do not need to fix up as Xen has already reloaded all segment
* registers that could be reloaded and zeroed the others.
* Category 2 we fix up by killing the current process. We cannot use the
* normal Linux return path in this case because if we use the IRET hypercall
* to pop the stack frame we end up in an infinite loop of failsafe callbacks.
* We distinguish between categories by comparing each saved segment register
* with its current contents: any discrepancy means we in category 1.
*/
ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
INTR_FRAME 1 (6*8)
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET gs,GS*/
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET fs,FS*/
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET es,ES*/
/*CFI_REL_OFFSET ds,DS*/
CFI_REL_OFFSET r11,8
CFI_REL_OFFSET rcx,0
movw %ds,%cx
cmpw %cx,0x10(%rsp)
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
jne 1f
movw %es,%cx
cmpw %cx,0x18(%rsp)
jne 1f
movw %fs,%cx
cmpw %cx,0x20(%rsp)
jne 1f
movw %gs,%cx
cmpw %cx,0x28(%rsp)
jne 1f
/* All segments match their saved values => Category 2 (Bad IRET). */
movq (%rsp),%rcx
CFI_RESTORE rcx
movq 8(%rsp),%r11
CFI_RESTORE r11
addq $0x30,%rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -0x30
pushq_cfi $0 /* RIP */
pushq_cfi %r11
pushq_cfi %rcx
jmp general_protection
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
1: /* Segment mismatch => Category 1 (Bad segment). Retry the IRET. */
movq (%rsp),%rcx
CFI_RESTORE rcx
movq 8(%rsp),%r11
CFI_RESTORE r11
addq $0x30,%rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -0x30
xen/x86: don't corrupt %eip when returning from a signal handler In 32 bit guests, if a userspace process has %eax == -ERESTARTSYS (-512) or -ERESTARTNOINTR (-513) when it is interrupted by an event /and/ the process has a pending signal then %eip (and %eax) are corrupted when returning to the main process after handling the signal. The application may then crash with SIGSEGV or a SIGILL or it may have subtly incorrect behaviour (depending on what instruction it returned to). The occurs because handle_signal() is incorrectly thinking that there is a system call that needs to restarted so it adjusts %eip and %eax to re-execute the system call instruction (even though user space had not done a system call). If %eax == -514 (-ERESTARTNOHAND (-514) or -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK (-516) then handle_signal() only corrupted %eax (by setting it to -EINTR). This may cause the application to crash or have incorrect behaviour. handle_signal() assumes that regs->orig_ax >= 0 means a system call so any kernel entry point that is not for a system call must push a negative value for orig_ax. For example, for physical interrupts on bare metal the inverse of the vector is pushed and page_fault() sets regs->orig_ax to -1, overwriting the hardware provided error code. xen_hypervisor_callback() was incorrectly pushing 0 for orig_ax instead of -1. Classic Xen kernels pushed %eax which works as %eax cannot be both non-negative and -RESTARTSYS (etc.), but using -1 is consistent with other non-system call entry points and avoids some of the tests in handle_signal(). There were similar bugs in xen_failsafe_callback() of both 32 and 64-bit guests. If the fault was corrected and the normal return path was used then 0 was incorrectly pushed as the value for orig_ax. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-19 16:29:07 +00:00
pushq_cfi $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
SAVE_ALL
jmp error_exit
CFI_ENDPROC
END(xen_failsafe_callback)
apicinterrupt HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR \
xen_hvm_callback_vector xen_evtchn_do_upcall
#endif /* CONFIG_XEN */
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
apicinterrupt HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR \
hyperv_callback_vector hyperv_vector_handler
#endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
/*
* Some functions should be protected against kprobes
*/
.pushsection .kprobes.text, "ax"
paranoidzeroentry_ist debug do_debug DEBUG_STACK
paranoidzeroentry_ist int3 do_int3 DEBUG_STACK
paranoiderrorentry stack_segment do_stack_segment
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
zeroentry xen_debug do_debug
zeroentry xen_int3 do_int3
errorentry xen_stack_segment do_stack_segment
#endif
errorentry general_protection do_general_protection
errorentry page_fault do_page_fault
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
errorentry async_page_fault do_async_page_fault
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
paranoidzeroentry machine_check *machine_check_vector(%rip)
#endif
/*
* "Paranoid" exit path from exception stack.
* Paranoid because this is used by NMIs and cannot take
* any kernel state for granted.
* We don't do kernel preemption checks here, because only
* NMI should be common and it does not enable IRQs and
* cannot get reschedule ticks.
*
* "trace" is 0 for the NMI handler only, because irq-tracing
* is fundamentally NMI-unsafe. (we cannot change the soft and
* hard flags at once, atomically)
*/
/* ebx: no swapgs flag */
ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
DEFAULT_FRAME
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
ftrace/x86: Do not change stacks in DEBUG when calling lockdep When both DYNAMIC_FTRACE and LOCKDEP are set, the TRACE_IRQS_ON/OFF will call into the lockdep code. The lockdep code can call lots of functions that may be traced by ftrace. When ftrace is updating its code and hits a breakpoint, the breakpoint handler will call into lockdep. If lockdep happens to call a function that also has a breakpoint attached, it will jump back into the breakpoint handler resetting the stack to the debug stack and corrupt the contents currently on that stack. The 'do_sym' call that calls do_int3() is protected by modifying the IST table to point to a different location if another breakpoint is hit. But the TRACE_IRQS_OFF/ON are outside that protection, and if a breakpoint is hit from those, the stack will get corrupted, and the kernel will crash: [ 1013.243754] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002 [ 1013.272665] IP: [<ffff880145cc0000>] 0xffff880145cbffff [ 1013.285186] PGD 1401b2067 PUD 14324c067 PMD 0 [ 1013.298832] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1013.310600] CPU 2 [ 1013.317904] Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel microcode usb_debug serio_raw pcspkr iTCO_wdt i2c_i801 iTCO_vendor_support e1000e nfsd nfs_acl auth_rpcgss lockd sunrpc i915 video i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] [ 1013.401848] [ 1013.407399] Pid: 112, comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 3.4.0+ #30 [ 1013.437943] RIP: 8eb8:[<ffff88014630a000>] [<ffff88014630a000>] 0xffff880146309fff [ 1013.459871] RSP: ffffffff8165e919:ffff88014780f408 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 1013.477909] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff81104020 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.499458] RDX: ffff880148008ea8 RSI: ffffffff8131ef40 RDI: ffffffff82203b20 [ 1013.521612] RBP: ffffffff81005751 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.543121] R10: ffffffff82cdc318 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880145cc0000 [ 1013.564614] R13: ffff880148008eb8 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88014780cb40 [ 1013.586108] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880148000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1013.609458] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1013.627420] CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 0000000141f10000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 1013.649051] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.670724] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1013.692376] Process kworker/2:1 (pid: 112, threadinfo ffff88013fe0e000, task ffff88014020a6a0) [ 1013.717028] Stack: [ 1013.724131] ffff88014780f570 ffff880145cc0000 0000400000004000 0000000000000000 [ 1013.745918] cccccccccccccccc ffff88014780cca8 ffffffff811072bb ffffffff81651627 [ 1013.767870] ffffffff8118f8a7 ffffffff811072bb ffffffff81f2b6c5 ffffffff81f11bdb [ 1013.790021] Call Trace: [ 1013.800701] Code: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a <e7> d7 64 81 ff ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 65 d9 64 81 ff [ 1013.861443] RIP [<ffff88014630a000>] 0xffff880146309fff [ 1013.884466] RSP <ffff88014780f408> [ 1013.901507] CR2: 0000000000000002 The solution was to reuse the NMI functions that change the IDT table to make the debug stack keep its current stack (in kernel mode) when hitting a breakpoint: call debug_stack_set_zero TRACE_IRQS_ON call debug_stack_reset If the TRACE_IRQS_ON happens to hit a breakpoint then it will keep the current stack and not crash the box. Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-05-30 15:54:53 +00:00
TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG
testl %ebx,%ebx /* swapgs needed? */
jnz paranoid_restore
testl $3,CS(%rsp)
jnz paranoid_userspace
paranoid_swapgs:
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ 0
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
2009-04-17 12:33:52 +00:00
RESTORE_ALL 8
jmp irq_return
paranoid_restore:
ftrace/x86: Do not change stacks in DEBUG when calling lockdep When both DYNAMIC_FTRACE and LOCKDEP are set, the TRACE_IRQS_ON/OFF will call into the lockdep code. The lockdep code can call lots of functions that may be traced by ftrace. When ftrace is updating its code and hits a breakpoint, the breakpoint handler will call into lockdep. If lockdep happens to call a function that also has a breakpoint attached, it will jump back into the breakpoint handler resetting the stack to the debug stack and corrupt the contents currently on that stack. The 'do_sym' call that calls do_int3() is protected by modifying the IST table to point to a different location if another breakpoint is hit. But the TRACE_IRQS_OFF/ON are outside that protection, and if a breakpoint is hit from those, the stack will get corrupted, and the kernel will crash: [ 1013.243754] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000002 [ 1013.272665] IP: [<ffff880145cc0000>] 0xffff880145cbffff [ 1013.285186] PGD 1401b2067 PUD 14324c067 PMD 0 [ 1013.298832] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1013.310600] CPU 2 [ 1013.317904] Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel microcode usb_debug serio_raw pcspkr iTCO_wdt i2c_i801 iTCO_vendor_support e1000e nfsd nfs_acl auth_rpcgss lockd sunrpc i915 video i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] [ 1013.401848] [ 1013.407399] Pid: 112, comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 3.4.0+ #30 [ 1013.437943] RIP: 8eb8:[<ffff88014630a000>] [<ffff88014630a000>] 0xffff880146309fff [ 1013.459871] RSP: ffffffff8165e919:ffff88014780f408 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 1013.477909] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff81104020 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.499458] RDX: ffff880148008ea8 RSI: ffffffff8131ef40 RDI: ffffffff82203b20 [ 1013.521612] RBP: ffffffff81005751 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.543121] R10: ffffffff82cdc318 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880145cc0000 [ 1013.564614] R13: ffff880148008eb8 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88014780cb40 [ 1013.586108] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880148000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1013.609458] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1013.627420] CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 0000000141f10000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 1013.649051] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1013.670724] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1013.692376] Process kworker/2:1 (pid: 112, threadinfo ffff88013fe0e000, task ffff88014020a6a0) [ 1013.717028] Stack: [ 1013.724131] ffff88014780f570 ffff880145cc0000 0000400000004000 0000000000000000 [ 1013.745918] cccccccccccccccc ffff88014780cca8 ffffffff811072bb ffffffff81651627 [ 1013.767870] ffffffff8118f8a7 ffffffff811072bb ffffffff81f2b6c5 ffffffff81f11bdb [ 1013.790021] Call Trace: [ 1013.800701] Code: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a <e7> d7 64 81 ff ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 65 d9 64 81 ff [ 1013.861443] RIP [<ffff88014630a000>] 0xffff880146309fff [ 1013.884466] RSP <ffff88014780f408> [ 1013.901507] CR2: 0000000000000002 The solution was to reuse the NMI functions that change the IDT table to make the debug stack keep its current stack (in kernel mode) when hitting a breakpoint: call debug_stack_set_zero TRACE_IRQS_ON call debug_stack_reset If the TRACE_IRQS_ON happens to hit a breakpoint then it will keep the current stack and not crash the box. Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-05-30 15:54:53 +00:00
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG 0
RESTORE_ALL 8
jmp irq_return
paranoid_userspace:
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
movl TI_flags(%rcx),%ebx
andl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%ebx
jz paranoid_swapgs
movq %rsp,%rdi /* &pt_regs */
call sync_regs
movq %rax,%rsp /* switch stack for scheduling */
testl $_TIF_NEED_RESCHED,%ebx
jnz paranoid_schedule
movl %ebx,%edx /* arg3: thread flags */
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
xorl %esi,%esi /* arg2: oldset */
movq %rsp,%rdi /* arg1: &pt_regs */
call do_notify_resume
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
jmp paranoid_userspace
paranoid_schedule:
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
SCHEDULE_USER
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
jmp paranoid_userspace
CFI_ENDPROC
END(paranoid_exit)
/*
* Exception entry point. This expects an error code/orig_rax on the stack.
* returns in "no swapgs flag" in %ebx.
*/
ENTRY(error_entry)
XCPT_FRAME
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 15*8
/* oldrax contains error code */
cld
movq_cfi rdi, RDI+8
movq_cfi rsi, RSI+8
movq_cfi rdx, RDX+8
movq_cfi rcx, RCX+8
movq_cfi rax, RAX+8
movq_cfi r8, R8+8
movq_cfi r9, R9+8
movq_cfi r10, R10+8
movq_cfi r11, R11+8
movq_cfi rbx, RBX+8
movq_cfi rbp, RBP+8
movq_cfi r12, R12+8
movq_cfi r13, R13+8
movq_cfi r14, R14+8
movq_cfi r15, R15+8
xorl %ebx,%ebx
testl $3,CS+8(%rsp)
je error_kernelspace
error_swapgs:
SWAPGS
error_sti:
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
ret
/*
* There are two places in the kernel that can potentially fault with
* usergs. Handle them here. The exception handlers after iret run with
* kernel gs again, so don't set the user space flag. B stepping K8s
* sometimes report an truncated RIP for IRET exceptions returning to
* compat mode. Check for these here too.
*/
error_kernelspace:
incl %ebx
leaq irq_return(%rip),%rcx
cmpq %rcx,RIP+8(%rsp)
je error_swapgs
movl %ecx,%eax /* zero extend */
cmpq %rax,RIP+8(%rsp)
je bstep_iret
cmpq $gs_change,RIP+8(%rsp)
je error_swapgs
jmp error_sti
bstep_iret:
/* Fix truncated RIP */
movq %rcx,RIP+8(%rsp)
jmp error_swapgs
CFI_ENDPROC
END(error_entry)
/* ebx: no swapgs flag (1: don't need swapgs, 0: need it) */
ENTRY(error_exit)
DEFAULT_FRAME
movl %ebx,%eax
RESTORE_REST
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
testl %eax,%eax
jne retint_kernel
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT_IRQ
movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx
movl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%edi
andl %edi,%edx
jnz retint_careful
jmp retint_swapgs
CFI_ENDPROC
END(error_exit)
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/*
* Test if a given stack is an NMI stack or not.
*/
.macro test_in_nmi reg stack nmi_ret normal_ret
cmpq %\reg, \stack
ja \normal_ret
subq $EXCEPTION_STKSZ, %\reg
cmpq %\reg, \stack
jb \normal_ret
jmp \nmi_ret
.endm
/* runs on exception stack */
ENTRY(nmi)
INTR_FRAME
PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/*
* We allow breakpoints in NMIs. If a breakpoint occurs, then
* the iretq it performs will take us out of NMI context.
* This means that we can have nested NMIs where the next
* NMI is using the top of the stack of the previous NMI. We
* can't let it execute because the nested NMI will corrupt the
* stack of the previous NMI. NMI handlers are not re-entrant
* anyway.
*
* To handle this case we do the following:
* Check the a special location on the stack that contains
* a variable that is set when NMIs are executing.
* The interrupted task's stack is also checked to see if it
* is an NMI stack.
* If the variable is not set and the stack is not the NMI
* stack then:
* o Set the special variable on the stack
* o Copy the interrupt frame into a "saved" location on the stack
* o Copy the interrupt frame into a "copy" location on the stack
* o Continue processing the NMI
* If the variable is set or the previous stack is the NMI stack:
* o Modify the "copy" location to jump to the repeate_nmi
* o return back to the first NMI
*
* Now on exit of the first NMI, we first clear the stack variable
* The NMI stack will tell any nested NMIs at that point that it is
* nested. Then we pop the stack normally with iret, and if there was
* a nested NMI that updated the copy interrupt stack frame, a
* jump will be made to the repeat_nmi code that will handle the second
* NMI.
*/
/* Use %rdx as out temp variable throughout */
pushq_cfi %rdx
CFI_REL_OFFSET rdx, 0
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/*
* If %cs was not the kernel segment, then the NMI triggered in user
* space, which means it is definitely not nested.
*/
cmpl $__KERNEL_CS, 16(%rsp)
jne first_nmi
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/*
* Check the special variable on the stack to see if NMIs are
* executing.
*/
cmpl $1, -8(%rsp)
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
je nested_nmi
/*
* Now test if the previous stack was an NMI stack.
* We need the double check. We check the NMI stack to satisfy the
* race when the first NMI clears the variable before returning.
* We check the variable because the first NMI could be in a
* breakpoint routine using a breakpoint stack.
*/
lea 6*8(%rsp), %rdx
test_in_nmi rdx, 4*8(%rsp), nested_nmi, first_nmi
CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
nested_nmi:
/*
* Do nothing if we interrupted the fixup in repeat_nmi.
* It's about to repeat the NMI handler, so we are fine
* with ignoring this one.
*/
movq $repeat_nmi, %rdx
cmpq 8(%rsp), %rdx
ja 1f
movq $end_repeat_nmi, %rdx
cmpq 8(%rsp), %rdx
ja nested_nmi_out
1:
/* Set up the interrupted NMIs stack to jump to repeat_nmi */
leaq -1*8(%rsp), %rdx
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
movq %rdx, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 1*8
leaq -10*8(%rsp), %rdx
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
pushq_cfi $__KERNEL_DS
pushq_cfi %rdx
pushfq_cfi
pushq_cfi $__KERNEL_CS
pushq_cfi $repeat_nmi
/* Put stack back */
addq $(6*8), %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -6*8
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
nested_nmi_out:
popq_cfi %rdx
CFI_RESTORE rdx
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/* No need to check faults here */
INTERRUPT_RETURN
CFI_RESTORE_STATE
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
first_nmi:
/*
* Because nested NMIs will use the pushed location that we
* stored in rdx, we must keep that space available.
* Here's what our stack frame will look like:
* +-------------------------+
* | original SS |
* | original Return RSP |
* | original RFLAGS |
* | original CS |
* | original RIP |
* +-------------------------+
* | temp storage for rdx |
* +-------------------------+
* | NMI executing variable |
* +-------------------------+
* | copied SS |
* | copied Return RSP |
* | copied RFLAGS |
* | copied CS |
* | copied RIP |
* +-------------------------+
* | Saved SS |
* | Saved Return RSP |
* | Saved RFLAGS |
* | Saved CS |
* | Saved RIP |
* +-------------------------+
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
* | pt_regs |
* +-------------------------+
*
* The saved stack frame is used to fix up the copied stack frame
* that a nested NMI may change to make the interrupted NMI iret jump
* to the repeat_nmi. The original stack frame and the temp storage
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
* is also used by nested NMIs and can not be trusted on exit.
*/
/* Do not pop rdx, nested NMIs will corrupt that part of the stack */
movq (%rsp), %rdx
CFI_RESTORE rdx
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/* Set the NMI executing variable on the stack. */
pushq_cfi $1
/*
* Leave room for the "copied" frame
*/
subq $(5*8), %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 5*8
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/* Copy the stack frame to the Saved frame */
.rept 5
pushq_cfi 11*8(%rsp)
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
.endr
CFI_DEF_CFA_OFFSET SS+8-RIP
/* Everything up to here is safe from nested NMIs */
/*
* If there was a nested NMI, the first NMI's iret will return
* here. But NMIs are still enabled and we can take another
* nested NMI. The nested NMI checks the interrupted RIP to see
* if it is between repeat_nmi and end_repeat_nmi, and if so
* it will just return, as we are about to repeat an NMI anyway.
* This makes it safe to copy to the stack frame that a nested
* NMI will update.
*/
repeat_nmi:
/*
* Update the stack variable to say we are still in NMI (the update
* is benign for the non-repeat case, where 1 was pushed just above
* to this very stack slot).
*/
movq $1, 10*8(%rsp)
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/* Make another copy, this one may be modified by nested NMIs */
addq $(10*8), %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -10*8
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
.rept 5
pushq_cfi -6*8(%rsp)
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
.endr
subq $(5*8), %rsp
CFI_DEF_CFA_OFFSET SS+8-RIP
end_repeat_nmi:
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/*
* Everything below this point can be preempted by a nested
* NMI if the first NMI took an exception and reset our iret stack
* so that we repeat another NMI.
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
*/
pushq_cfi $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
subq $ORIG_RAX-R15, %rsp
CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET ORIG_RAX-R15
/*
* Use save_paranoid to handle SWAPGS, but no need to use paranoid_exit
* as we should not be calling schedule in NMI context.
* Even with normal interrupts enabled. An NMI should not be
* setting NEED_RESCHED or anything that normal interrupts and
* exceptions might do.
*/
call save_paranoid
DEFAULT_FRAME 0
/*
* Save off the CR2 register. If we take a page fault in the NMI then
* it could corrupt the CR2 value. If the NMI preempts a page fault
* handler before it was able to read the CR2 register, and then the
* NMI itself takes a page fault, the page fault that was preempted
* will read the information from the NMI page fault and not the
* origin fault. Save it off and restore it if it changes.
* Use the r12 callee-saved register.
*/
movq %cr2, %r12
/* paranoidentry do_nmi, 0; without TRACE_IRQS_OFF */
movq %rsp,%rdi
movq $-1,%rsi
call do_nmi
/* Did the NMI take a page fault? Restore cr2 if it did */
movq %cr2, %rcx
cmpq %rcx, %r12
je 1f
movq %r12, %cr2
1:
testl %ebx,%ebx /* swapgs needed? */
jnz nmi_restore
nmi_swapgs:
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
nmi_restore:
/* Pop the extra iret frame at once */
RESTORE_ALL 6*8
x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context. At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will trigger, as only one can be latched at a time). The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write all over the previous NMI's stack. Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem: https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264 "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just make the NMI code itself do something like NMI entry: - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI: - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the "real" NMI iret happens. - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI return stack be invalid and cause a fault - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"): clear the percpu NMI stack pointer Just do the iret. Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI, we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's will stay masked. And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's, and everything is happy." I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this code, a few gotchas showed up. One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler. The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace, we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI. Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality. Two, faulting on the iret. I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took also simplified things. Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context again. The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it. I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI context will not get it back. Here's what is done: When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST. A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code. There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code. Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack? If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the interrupted stack to be the NMI stack. If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first. 1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler 2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame. One copy is used to return on iret The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI. This is what the stack will look like: +-------------------------+ | original SS | | original Return RSP | | original RFLAGS | | original CS | | original RIP | +-------------------------+ | temp storage for rdx | +-------------------------+ | NMI executing variable | +-------------------------+ | Saved SS | | Saved Return RSP | | Saved RFLAGS | | Saved CS | | Saved RIP | +-------------------------+ | copied SS | | copied Return RSP | | copied RFLAGS | | copied CS | | copied RIP | +-------------------------+ | pt_regs | +-------------------------+ The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered the NMI. We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler. The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute the rest of the NMI handler. Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler. If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes, it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location to trigger another NMI. When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back to the copy and execute the nmi handler again. Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason to latch now. To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path. Everything seems to be working fine. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-12-08 17:36:23 +00:00
/* Clear the NMI executing stack variable */
movq $0, 5*8(%rsp)
jmp irq_return
CFI_ENDPROC
END(nmi)
ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
CFI_STARTPROC
mov $-ENOSYS,%eax
sysret
CFI_ENDPROC
END(ignore_sysret)
/*
* End of kprobes section
*/
.popsection