linux/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c

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/*
* Thunderbolt bus support
*
* Copyright (C) 2017, Intel Corporation
* Author: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "tb.h"
static DEFINE_IDA(tb_domain_ida);
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 10:38:34 +00:00
static bool match_service_id(const struct tb_service_id *id,
const struct tb_service *svc)
{
if (id->match_flags & TBSVC_MATCH_PROTOCOL_KEY) {
if (strcmp(id->protocol_key, svc->key))
return false;
}
if (id->match_flags & TBSVC_MATCH_PROTOCOL_ID) {
if (id->protocol_id != svc->prtcid)
return false;
}
if (id->match_flags & TBSVC_MATCH_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
if (id->protocol_version != svc->prtcvers)
return false;
}
if (id->match_flags & TBSVC_MATCH_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
if (id->protocol_revision != svc->prtcrevs)
return false;
}
return true;
}
static const struct tb_service_id *__tb_service_match(struct device *dev,
struct device_driver *drv)
{
struct tb_service_driver *driver;
const struct tb_service_id *ids;
struct tb_service *svc;
svc = tb_to_service(dev);
if (!svc)
return NULL;
driver = container_of(drv, struct tb_service_driver, driver);
if (!driver->id_table)
return NULL;
for (ids = driver->id_table; ids->match_flags != 0; ids++) {
if (match_service_id(ids, svc))
return ids;
}
return NULL;
}
static int tb_service_match(struct device *dev, struct device_driver *drv)
{
return !!__tb_service_match(dev, drv);
}
static int tb_service_probe(struct device *dev)
{
struct tb_service *svc = tb_to_service(dev);
struct tb_service_driver *driver;
const struct tb_service_id *id;
driver = container_of(dev->driver, struct tb_service_driver, driver);
id = __tb_service_match(dev, &driver->driver);
return driver->probe(svc, id);
}
static int tb_service_remove(struct device *dev)
{
struct tb_service *svc = tb_to_service(dev);
struct tb_service_driver *driver;
driver = container_of(dev->driver, struct tb_service_driver, driver);
if (driver->remove)
driver->remove(svc);
return 0;
}
static void tb_service_shutdown(struct device *dev)
{
struct tb_service_driver *driver;
struct tb_service *svc;
svc = tb_to_service(dev);
if (!svc || !dev->driver)
return;
driver = container_of(dev->driver, struct tb_service_driver, driver);
if (driver->shutdown)
driver->shutdown(svc);
}
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
static const char * const tb_security_names[] = {
[TB_SECURITY_NONE] = "none",
[TB_SECURITY_USER] = "user",
[TB_SECURITY_SECURE] = "secure",
[TB_SECURITY_DPONLY] = "dponly",
[TB_SECURITY_USBONLY] = "usbonly",
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
};
static ssize_t boot_acl_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct tb *tb = container_of(dev, struct tb, dev);
uuid_t *uuids;
ssize_t ret;
int i;
uuids = kcalloc(tb->nboot_acl, sizeof(uuid_t), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!uuids)
return -ENOMEM;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tb->lock)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto out;
}
ret = tb->cm_ops->get_boot_acl(tb, uuids, tb->nboot_acl);
if (ret) {
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
goto out;
}
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
for (ret = 0, i = 0; i < tb->nboot_acl; i++) {
if (!uuid_is_null(&uuids[i]))
ret += snprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret, "%pUb",
&uuids[i]);
ret += snprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret, "%s",
i < tb->nboot_acl - 1 ? "," : "\n");
}
out:
kfree(uuids);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t boot_acl_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct tb *tb = container_of(dev, struct tb, dev);
char *str, *s, *uuid_str;
ssize_t ret = 0;
uuid_t *acl;
int i = 0;
/*
* Make sure the value is not bigger than tb->nboot_acl * UUID
* length + commas and optional "\n". Also the smallest allowable
* string is tb->nboot_acl * ",".
*/
if (count > (UUID_STRING_LEN + 1) * tb->nboot_acl + 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (count < tb->nboot_acl - 1)
return -EINVAL;
str = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
acl = kcalloc(tb->nboot_acl, sizeof(uuid_t), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_str;
}
uuid_str = strim(str);
while ((s = strsep(&uuid_str, ",")) != NULL && i < tb->nboot_acl) {
size_t len = strlen(s);
if (len) {
if (len != UUID_STRING_LEN) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free_acl;
}
ret = uuid_parse(s, &acl[i]);
if (ret)
goto err_free_acl;
}
i++;
}
if (s || i < tb->nboot_acl) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free_acl;
}
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tb->lock)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err_free_acl;
}
ret = tb->cm_ops->set_boot_acl(tb, acl, tb->nboot_acl);
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
err_free_acl:
kfree(acl);
err_free_str:
kfree(str);
return ret ?: count;
}
static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(boot_acl);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
static ssize_t security_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct tb *tb = container_of(dev, struct tb, dev);
const char *name = "unknown";
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
if (tb->security_level < ARRAY_SIZE(tb_security_names))
name = tb_security_names[tb->security_level];
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", name);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
}
static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(security);
static struct attribute *domain_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_boot_acl.attr,
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
&dev_attr_security.attr,
NULL,
};
static umode_t domain_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
struct attribute *attr, int n)
{
struct device *dev = container_of(kobj, struct device, kobj);
struct tb *tb = container_of(dev, struct tb, dev);
if (attr == &dev_attr_boot_acl.attr) {
if (tb->nboot_acl &&
tb->cm_ops->get_boot_acl &&
tb->cm_ops->set_boot_acl)
return attr->mode;
return 0;
}
return attr->mode;
}
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
static struct attribute_group domain_attr_group = {
.is_visible = domain_attr_is_visible,
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
.attrs = domain_attrs,
};
static const struct attribute_group *domain_attr_groups[] = {
&domain_attr_group,
NULL,
};
struct bus_type tb_bus_type = {
.name = "thunderbolt",
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 10:38:34 +00:00
.match = tb_service_match,
.probe = tb_service_probe,
.remove = tb_service_remove,
.shutdown = tb_service_shutdown,
};
static void tb_domain_release(struct device *dev)
{
struct tb *tb = container_of(dev, struct tb, dev);
tb_ctl_free(tb->ctl);
destroy_workqueue(tb->wq);
ida_simple_remove(&tb_domain_ida, tb->index);
mutex_destroy(&tb->lock);
kfree(tb);
}
struct device_type tb_domain_type = {
.name = "thunderbolt_domain",
.release = tb_domain_release,
};
/**
* tb_domain_alloc() - Allocate a domain
* @nhi: Pointer to the host controller
* @privsize: Size of the connection manager private data
*
* Allocates and initializes a new Thunderbolt domain. Connection
* managers are expected to call this and then fill in @cm_ops
* accordingly.
*
* Call tb_domain_put() to release the domain before it has been added
* to the system.
*
* Return: allocated domain structure on %NULL in case of error
*/
struct tb *tb_domain_alloc(struct tb_nhi *nhi, size_t privsize)
{
struct tb *tb;
/*
* Make sure the structure sizes map with that the hardware
* expects because bit-fields are being used.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tb_regs_switch_header) != 5 * 4);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tb_regs_port_header) != 8 * 4);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tb_regs_hop) != 2 * 4);
tb = kzalloc(sizeof(*tb) + privsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tb)
return NULL;
tb->nhi = nhi;
mutex_init(&tb->lock);
tb->index = ida_simple_get(&tb_domain_ida, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tb->index < 0)
goto err_free;
tb->wq = alloc_ordered_workqueue("thunderbolt%d", 0, tb->index);
if (!tb->wq)
goto err_remove_ida;
tb->dev.parent = &nhi->pdev->dev;
tb->dev.bus = &tb_bus_type;
tb->dev.type = &tb_domain_type;
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
tb->dev.groups = domain_attr_groups;
dev_set_name(&tb->dev, "domain%d", tb->index);
device_initialize(&tb->dev);
return tb;
err_remove_ida:
ida_simple_remove(&tb_domain_ida, tb->index);
err_free:
kfree(tb);
return NULL;
}
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 10:38:34 +00:00
static bool tb_domain_event_cb(void *data, enum tb_cfg_pkg_type type,
const void *buf, size_t size)
{
struct tb *tb = data;
if (!tb->cm_ops->handle_event) {
tb_warn(tb, "domain does not have event handler\n");
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 10:38:34 +00:00
return true;
}
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 10:38:34 +00:00
switch (type) {
case TB_CFG_PKG_XDOMAIN_REQ:
case TB_CFG_PKG_XDOMAIN_RESP:
return tb_xdomain_handle_request(tb, type, buf, size);
default:
tb->cm_ops->handle_event(tb, type, buf, size);
}
return true;
}
/**
* tb_domain_add() - Add domain to the system
* @tb: Domain to add
*
* Starts the domain and adds it to the system. Hotplugging devices will
* work after this has been returned successfully. In order to remove
* and release the domain after this function has been called, call
* tb_domain_remove().
*
* Return: %0 in case of success and negative errno in case of error
*/
int tb_domain_add(struct tb *tb)
{
int ret;
if (WARN_ON(!tb->cm_ops))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&tb->lock);
tb->ctl = tb_ctl_alloc(tb->nhi, tb_domain_event_cb, tb);
if (!tb->ctl) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_unlock;
}
/*
* tb_schedule_hotplug_handler may be called as soon as the config
* channel is started. Thats why we have to hold the lock here.
*/
tb_ctl_start(tb->ctl);
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
if (tb->cm_ops->driver_ready) {
ret = tb->cm_ops->driver_ready(tb);
if (ret)
goto err_ctl_stop;
}
ret = device_add(&tb->dev);
if (ret)
goto err_ctl_stop;
/* Start the domain */
if (tb->cm_ops->start) {
ret = tb->cm_ops->start(tb);
if (ret)
goto err_domain_del;
}
/* This starts event processing */
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
return 0;
err_domain_del:
device_del(&tb->dev);
err_ctl_stop:
tb_ctl_stop(tb->ctl);
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
return ret;
}
/**
* tb_domain_remove() - Removes and releases a domain
* @tb: Domain to remove
*
* Stops the domain, removes it from the system and releases all
* resources once the last reference has been released.
*/
void tb_domain_remove(struct tb *tb)
{
mutex_lock(&tb->lock);
if (tb->cm_ops->stop)
tb->cm_ops->stop(tb);
/* Stop the domain control traffic */
tb_ctl_stop(tb->ctl);
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
flush_workqueue(tb->wq);
device_unregister(&tb->dev);
}
/**
* tb_domain_suspend_noirq() - Suspend a domain
* @tb: Domain to suspend
*
* Suspends all devices in the domain and stops the control channel.
*/
int tb_domain_suspend_noirq(struct tb *tb)
{
int ret = 0;
/*
* The control channel interrupt is left enabled during suspend
* and taking the lock here prevents any events happening before
* we actually have stopped the domain and the control channel.
*/
mutex_lock(&tb->lock);
if (tb->cm_ops->suspend_noirq)
ret = tb->cm_ops->suspend_noirq(tb);
if (!ret)
tb_ctl_stop(tb->ctl);
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
return ret;
}
/**
* tb_domain_resume_noirq() - Resume a domain
* @tb: Domain to resume
*
* Re-starts the control channel, and resumes all devices connected to
* the domain.
*/
int tb_domain_resume_noirq(struct tb *tb)
{
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&tb->lock);
tb_ctl_start(tb->ctl);
if (tb->cm_ops->resume_noirq)
ret = tb->cm_ops->resume_noirq(tb);
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
return ret;
}
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:16 +00:00
int tb_domain_suspend(struct tb *tb)
{
int ret;
mutex_lock(&tb->lock);
if (tb->cm_ops->suspend) {
ret = tb->cm_ops->suspend(tb);
if (ret) {
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
return ret;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
return 0;
}
void tb_domain_complete(struct tb *tb)
{
mutex_lock(&tb->lock);
if (tb->cm_ops->complete)
tb->cm_ops->complete(tb);
mutex_unlock(&tb->lock);
}
/**
* tb_domain_approve_switch() - Approve switch
* @tb: Domain the switch belongs to
* @sw: Switch to approve
*
* This will approve switch by connection manager specific means. In
* case of success the connection manager will create tunnels for all
* supported protocols.
*/
int tb_domain_approve_switch(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw)
{
struct tb_switch *parent_sw;
if (!tb->cm_ops->approve_switch)
return -EPERM;
/* The parent switch must be authorized before this one */
parent_sw = tb_to_switch(sw->dev.parent);
if (!parent_sw || !parent_sw->authorized)
return -EINVAL;
return tb->cm_ops->approve_switch(tb, sw);
}
/**
* tb_domain_approve_switch_key() - Approve switch and add key
* @tb: Domain the switch belongs to
* @sw: Switch to approve
*
* For switches that support secure connect, this function first adds
* key to the switch NVM using connection manager specific means. If
* adding the key is successful, the switch is approved and connected.
*
* Return: %0 on success and negative errno in case of failure.
*/
int tb_domain_approve_switch_key(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw)
{
struct tb_switch *parent_sw;
int ret;
if (!tb->cm_ops->approve_switch || !tb->cm_ops->add_switch_key)
return -EPERM;
/* The parent switch must be authorized before this one */
parent_sw = tb_to_switch(sw->dev.parent);
if (!parent_sw || !parent_sw->authorized)
return -EINVAL;
ret = tb->cm_ops->add_switch_key(tb, sw);
if (ret)
return ret;
return tb->cm_ops->approve_switch(tb, sw);
}
/**
* tb_domain_challenge_switch_key() - Challenge and approve switch
* @tb: Domain the switch belongs to
* @sw: Switch to approve
*
* For switches that support secure connect, this function generates
* random challenge and sends it to the switch. The switch responds to
* this and if the response matches our random challenge, the switch is
* approved and connected.
*
* Return: %0 on success and negative errno in case of failure.
*/
int tb_domain_challenge_switch_key(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw)
{
u8 challenge[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE];
u8 response[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE];
u8 hmac[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE];
struct tb_switch *parent_sw;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *shash;
int ret;
if (!tb->cm_ops->approve_switch || !tb->cm_ops->challenge_switch_key)
return -EPERM;
/* The parent switch must be authorized before this one */
parent_sw = tb_to_switch(sw->dev.parent);
if (!parent_sw || !parent_sw->authorized)
return -EINVAL;
get_random_bytes(challenge, sizeof(challenge));
ret = tb->cm_ops->challenge_switch_key(tb, sw, challenge, response);
if (ret)
return ret;
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, sw->key, TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE);
if (ret)
goto err_free_tfm;
shash = kzalloc(sizeof(*shash) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!shash) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_tfm;
}
shash->tfm = tfm;
shash->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
memset(hmac, 0, sizeof(hmac));
ret = crypto_shash_digest(shash, challenge, sizeof(hmac), hmac);
if (ret)
goto err_free_shash;
/* The returned HMAC must match the one we calculated */
if (memcmp(response, hmac, sizeof(hmac))) {
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto err_free_shash;
}
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
kfree(shash);
return tb->cm_ops->approve_switch(tb, sw);
err_free_shash:
kfree(shash);
err_free_tfm:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
return ret;
}
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:17 +00:00
/**
* tb_domain_disconnect_pcie_paths() - Disconnect all PCIe paths
* @tb: Domain whose PCIe paths to disconnect
*
* This needs to be called in preparation for NVM upgrade of the host
* controller. Makes sure all PCIe paths are disconnected.
*
* Return %0 on success and negative errno in case of error.
*/
int tb_domain_disconnect_pcie_paths(struct tb *tb)
{
if (!tb->cm_ops->disconnect_pcie_paths)
return -EPERM;
return tb->cm_ops->disconnect_pcie_paths(tb);
}
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 10:38:34 +00:00
/**
* tb_domain_approve_xdomain_paths() - Enable DMA paths for XDomain
* @tb: Domain enabling the DMA paths
* @xd: XDomain DMA paths are created to
*
* Calls connection manager specific method to enable DMA paths to the
* XDomain in question.
*
* Return: 0% in case of success and negative errno otherwise. In
* particular returns %-ENOTSUPP if the connection manager
* implementation does not support XDomains.
*/
int tb_domain_approve_xdomain_paths(struct tb *tb, struct tb_xdomain *xd)
{
if (!tb->cm_ops->approve_xdomain_paths)
return -ENOTSUPP;
return tb->cm_ops->approve_xdomain_paths(tb, xd);
}
/**
* tb_domain_disconnect_xdomain_paths() - Disable DMA paths for XDomain
* @tb: Domain disabling the DMA paths
* @xd: XDomain whose DMA paths are disconnected
*
* Calls connection manager specific method to disconnect DMA paths to
* the XDomain in question.
*
* Return: 0% in case of success and negative errno otherwise. In
* particular returns %-ENOTSUPP if the connection manager
* implementation does not support XDomains.
*/
int tb_domain_disconnect_xdomain_paths(struct tb *tb, struct tb_xdomain *xd)
{
if (!tb->cm_ops->disconnect_xdomain_paths)
return -ENOTSUPP;
return tb->cm_ops->disconnect_xdomain_paths(tb, xd);
}
static int disconnect_xdomain(struct device *dev, void *data)
{
struct tb_xdomain *xd;
struct tb *tb = data;
int ret = 0;
xd = tb_to_xdomain(dev);
if (xd && xd->tb == tb)
ret = tb_xdomain_disable_paths(xd);
return ret;
}
/**
* tb_domain_disconnect_all_paths() - Disconnect all paths for the domain
* @tb: Domain whose paths are disconnected
*
* This function can be used to disconnect all paths (PCIe, XDomain) for
* example in preparation for host NVM firmware upgrade. After this is
* called the paths cannot be established without resetting the switch.
*
* Return: %0 in case of success and negative errno otherwise.
*/
int tb_domain_disconnect_all_paths(struct tb *tb)
{
int ret;
ret = tb_domain_disconnect_pcie_paths(tb);
if (ret)
return ret;
return bus_for_each_dev(&tb_bus_type, NULL, tb, disconnect_xdomain);
}
int tb_domain_init(void)
{
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 10:38:34 +00:00
int ret;
ret = tb_xdomain_init();
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = bus_register(&tb_bus_type);
if (ret)
tb_xdomain_exit();
return ret;
}
void tb_domain_exit(void)
{
bus_unregister(&tb_bus_type);
ida_destroy(&tb_domain_ida);
thunderbolt: Add support for host and device NVM firmware upgrade Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the device identification strings are not enough. The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it is not what is expected. We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and start the upgrade process. We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image and triggering power cycle. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-06 12:25:17 +00:00
tb_switch_exit();
thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol When two hosts are connected over a Thunderbolt cable, there is a protocol they can use to communicate capabilities supported by the host. The discovery protocol uses automatically configured control channel (ring 0) and is build on top of request/response transactions using special XDomain primitives provided by the Thunderbolt base protocol. The capabilities consists of a root directory block of basic properties used for identification of the host, and then there can be zero or more directories each describing a Thunderbolt service and its capabilities. Once both sides have discovered what is supported the two hosts can setup high-speed DMA paths and transfer data to the other side using whatever protocol was agreed based on the properties. The software protocol used to communicate which DMA paths to enable is service specific. This patch adds support for the XDomain discovery protocol to the Thunderbolt bus. We model each remote host connection as a Linux XDomain device. For each Thunderbolt service found supported on the XDomain device, we create Linux Thunderbolt service device which Thunderbolt service drivers can then bind to based on the protocol identification information retrieved from the property directory describing the service. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-02 10:38:34 +00:00
tb_xdomain_exit();
}