Minki/linux
1
0
Fork 1
mirror of https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git synced 2024-12-02 09:01:34 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
11393cc9b9
linux/kernel/bpf/verifier.c

3852 lines
109 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:02 +00:00
/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:02 +00:00
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:02 +00:00
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 09:23:51 +00:00
#include <linux/stringify.h>
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:02 +00:00
/* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
* instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
* All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
*
* The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
* It rejects the following programs:
* - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
* - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
* - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
* - out of bounds or malformed jumps
* The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
* Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
bpf: update the comment about the length of analysis Commit 07016151a446 ("bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning") increased the limit of processed instructions from 32k to 64k, but the comment still mentioned the 32k limit. This commit updates the comment to reflect the change. Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-01 08:25:51 +00:00
* analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:02 +00:00
* insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
* Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
*
* On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
* changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
* If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
* copied to R1.
*
* All registers are 64-bit.
* R0 - return register
* R1-R5 argument passing registers
* R6-R9 callee saved registers
* R10 - frame pointer read-only
*
* At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
* and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
*
* Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
* BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
* BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
* 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
* and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
* that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
* So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
* (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
* Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
*
* Most of the time the registers have UNKNOWN_VALUE type, which
* means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
* (like pointer plus pointer becomes UNKNOWN_VALUE type)
*
* When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
* can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, FRAME_PTR. These are three pointer
* types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
*
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
* and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
*
* registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
* function argument constraints.
*
* ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
* It means that the register type passed to this function must be
* PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
* 'pointer to map element key'
*
* For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
* .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
* .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
* .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
*
* ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
* function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
* 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
* the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
*
* On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
* u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
* {
* struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
* void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
* void *value;
*
* here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
* [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
* the stack of eBPF program.
* }
*
* Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
* BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
* BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
* BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
* BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
* here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
* .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
* Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
*
* Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
* Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
* and were initialized prior to this call.
* If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
* .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
* R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
* returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
*
* When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
* insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
* branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
*
* After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
* are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
*/
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* verifer state is 'st'
* before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
* and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state st;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int insn_idx;
int prev_insn_idx;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
};
bpf: adjust verifier heuristics Current limits with regards to processing program paths do not really reflect today's needs anymore due to programs becoming more complex and verifier smarter, keeping track of more data such as const ALU operations, alignment tracking, spilling of PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ registers, and other features allowing for smarter matching of what LLVM generates. This also comes with the side-effect that we result in fewer opportunities to prune search states and thus often need to do more work to prove safety than in the past due to different register states and stack layout where we mismatch. Generally, it's quite hard to determine what caused a sudden increase in complexity, it could be caused by something as trivial as a single branch somewhere at the beginning of the program where LLVM assigned a stack slot that is marked differently throughout other branches and thus causing a mismatch, where verifier then needs to prove safety for the whole rest of the program. Subsequently, programs with even less than half the insn size limit can get rejected. We noticed that while some programs load fine under pre 4.11, they get rejected due to hitting limits on more recent kernels. We saw that in the vast majority of cases (90+%) pruning failed due to register mismatches. In case of stack mismatches, majority of cases failed due to different stack slot types (invalid, spill, misc) rather than differences in spilled registers. This patch makes pruning more aggressive by also adding markers that sit at conditional jumps as well. Currently, we only mark jump targets for pruning. For example in direct packet access, these are usually error paths where we bail out. We found that adding these markers, it can reduce number of processed insns by up to 30%. Another option is to ignore reg->id in probing PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers, which can help pruning slightly as well by up to 7% observed complexity reduction as stand-alone. Meaning, if a previous path with register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL for map X was found to be safe, then in the current state a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL register for the same map X must be safe as well. Last but not least the patch also adds a scheduling point and bumps the current limit for instructions to be processed to a more adequate value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-18 01:00:06 +00:00
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 98304
bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that a previously walked path with same register and stack contents terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search can skip walking those states. When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096) insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice. This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit due to search pruning not being able to take effect. Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by ~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores, where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal() test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale that these two branches of execution that converge after the label might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often. Hence, we left that as is for now. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-05 20:33:17 +00:00
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
bpf: Fix and simplifications on inline map lookup Fix in verifier: For the same bpf_map_lookup_elem() instruction (i.e. "call 1"), a broken case is "a different type of map could be used for the same lookup instruction". For example, an array in one case and a hashmap in another. We have to resort to the old dynamic call behavior in this case. The fix is to check for collision on insn_aux->map_ptr. If there is collision, don't inline the map lookup. Please see the "do_reg_lookup()" in test_map_in_map_kern.c in the later patch for how-to trigger the above case. Simplifications on array_map_gen_lookup(): 1. Calculate elem_size from map->value_size. It removes the need for 'struct bpf_array' which makes the later map-in-map implementation easier. 2. Remove the 'elem_size == 1' test Fixes: 81ed18ab3098 ("bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:32 +00:00
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)0xeB9F + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
bool raw_mode;
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
bool pkt_access;
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
int regno;
int access_size;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
};
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
* bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
*/
static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
static char *log_buf;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
/* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
* verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
* can figure out what's wrong with the program
*/
bpf, verifier: annotate verbose printer with __printf The verbose() printer dumps the verifier state to user space, so let gcc take care to check calls to verbose() for (future) errors. make with W=1 correctly suggests: function might be possible candidate for 'gnu_printf' format attribute [-Wsuggest-attribute=format]. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-03 10:39:20 +00:00
static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
{
va_list args;
if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
[NOT_INIT] = "?",
[UNKNOWN_VALUE] = "inv",
[PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx",
[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr",
[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value",
[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null",
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ] = "map_value_adj",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
[FRAME_PTR] = "fp",
[PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp",
[CONST_IMM] = "imm",
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
[PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt",
[PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
};
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 09:23:51 +00:00
#define __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN(x) [BPF_FUNC_ ## x] = __stringify(bpf_ ## x)
static const char * const func_id_str[] = {
__BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(__BPF_FUNC_STR_FN)
};
#undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN
static const char *func_id_name(int id)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID);
if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id])
return func_id_str[id];
else
return "unknown";
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
enum bpf_reg_type t;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
reg = &state->regs[i];
t = reg->type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (t == NOT_INIT)
continue;
verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
if (t == CONST_IMM || t == PTR_TO_STACK)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
verbose("%lld", reg->imm);
else if (t == PTR_TO_PACKET)
verbose("(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)",
reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
else if (t == UNKNOWN_VALUE && reg->imm)
verbose("%lld", reg->imm);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
verbose("(ks=%d,vs=%d,id=%u)",
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
reg->map_ptr->key_size,
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
reg->map_ptr->value_size,
reg->id);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
if (reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
verbose(",min_value=%lld",
(long long)reg->min_value);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
if (reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
verbose(",max_value=%llu",
(unsigned long long)reg->max_value);
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
if (reg->min_align)
verbose(",min_align=%u", reg->min_align);
if (reg->aux_off)
verbose(",aux_off=%u", reg->aux_off);
if (reg->aux_off_align)
verbose(",aux_off_align=%u", reg->aux_off_align);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
verbose("\n");
}
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
[BPF_LD] = "ld",
[BPF_LDX] = "ldx",
[BPF_ST] = "st",
[BPF_STX] = "stx",
[BPF_ALU] = "alu",
[BPF_JMP] = "jmp",
[BPF_RET] = "BUG",
[BPF_ALU64] = "alu64",
};
bpf: fix out of bounds access in verifier log when the verifier log is enabled the print_bpf_insn() is doing bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4] and bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4] where BPF_OP is a 4-bit instruction opcode. Malformed insns can cause out of bounds access. Fix it by sizing arrays appropriately. The bug was found by clang address sanitizer with libfuzzer. Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-09-08 20:40:01 +00:00
static const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = {
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
[BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=",
[BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=",
[BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=",
[BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=",
[BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=",
[BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=",
[BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=",
[BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=",
[BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg",
[BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=",
[BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=",
[BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=",
[BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=",
[BPF_END >> 4] = "endian",
};
static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = {
[BPF_W >> 3] = "u32",
[BPF_H >> 3] = "u16",
[BPF_B >> 3] = "u8",
[BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64",
};
bpf: fix out of bounds access in verifier log when the verifier log is enabled the print_bpf_insn() is doing bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4] and bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4] where BPF_OP is a 4-bit instruction opcode. Malformed insns can cause out of bounds access. Fix it by sizing arrays appropriately. The bug was found by clang address sanitizer with libfuzzer. Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-09-08 20:40:01 +00:00
static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = {
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
[BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp",
[BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==",
[BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">",
[BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=",
[BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&",
[BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=",
[BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>",
[BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=",
[BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call",
[BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
};
bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged The patch fixes two things at once: 1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0 as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged. 2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(). Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-07 22:04:09 +00:00
static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged The patch fixes two things at once: 1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0 as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged. 2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(). Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-07 22:04:09 +00:00
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM &&
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
/* At this point, we already made sure that the second
* part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible.
*/
u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
imm = 0;
verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
} else {
verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 09:23:51 +00:00
verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
}
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int insn_idx;
if (env->head == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(&env->cur_state, &env->head->st, sizeof(env->cur_state));
insn_idx = env->head->insn_idx;
if (prev_insn_idx)
*prev_insn_idx = env->head->prev_insn_idx;
elem = env->head->next;
kfree(env->head);
env->head = elem;
env->stack_size--;
return insn_idx;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
elem = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (!elem)
goto err;
memcpy(&elem->st, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
elem->next = env->head;
env->head = elem;
env->stack_size++;
bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that a previously walked path with same register and stack contents terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search can skip walking those states. When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096) insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice. This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit due to search pruning not being able to take effect. Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by ~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores, where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal() test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale that these two branches of execution that converge after the label might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often. Hence, we left that as is for now. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-05 20:33:17 +00:00
if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("BPF program is too complex\n");
goto err;
}
return &elem->st;
err:
/* pop all elements and return */
while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
return NULL;
}
#define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
};
bpf: properly reset caller saved regs after helper call and ld_abs/ind Currently, after performing helper calls, we clear all caller saved registers, that is r0 - r5 and fill r0 depending on struct bpf_func_proto specification. The way we reset these regs can affect pruning decisions in later paths, since we only reset register's imm to 0 and type to NOT_INIT. However, we leave out clearing of other variables such as id, min_value, max_value, etc, which can later on lead to pruning mismatches due to stale data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:06 +00:00
static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
BUG_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG);
memset(&regs[regno], 0, sizeof(regs[regno]));
regs[regno].type = NOT_INIT;
regs[regno].min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
regs[regno].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
int i;
bpf: properly reset caller saved regs after helper call and ld_abs/ind Currently, after performing helper calls, we clear all caller saved registers, that is r0 - r5 and fill r0 depending on struct bpf_func_proto specification. The way we reset these regs can affect pruning decisions in later paths, since we only reset register's imm to 0 and type to NOT_INIT. However, we leave out clearing of other variables such as id, min_value, max_value, etc, which can later on lead to pruning mismatches due to stale data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:06 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
mark_reg_not_init(regs, i);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* frame pointer */
regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = FRAME_PTR;
/* 1st arg to a function */
regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
}
bpf: fix mark_reg_unknown_value for spilled regs on map value marking Martin reported a verifier issue that hit the BUG_ON() for his test case in the mark_reg_unknown_value() function: [ 202.861380] kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:467! [...] [ 203.291109] Call Trace: [ 203.296501] [<ffffffff811364d5>] mark_map_reg+0x45/0x50 [ 203.308225] [<ffffffff81136558>] mark_map_regs+0x78/0x90 [ 203.320140] [<ffffffff8113938d>] do_check+0x226d/0x2c90 [ 203.331865] [<ffffffff8113a6ab>] bpf_check+0x48b/0x780 [ 203.343403] [<ffffffff81134c8e>] bpf_prog_load+0x27e/0x440 [ 203.355705] [<ffffffff8118a38f>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x11af/0x1230 [ 203.369158] [<ffffffff812d8188>] ? security_capable+0x48/0x60 [ 203.382035] [<ffffffff811351a4>] SyS_bpf+0x124/0x960 [ 203.393185] [<ffffffff810515f6>] ? __do_page_fault+0x276/0x490 [ 203.406258] [<ffffffff816db320>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 This issue got uncovered after the fix in a08dd0da5307 ("bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups"). The reason why it wasn't noticed before was, because as mentioned in a08dd0da5307, mark_map_regs() was doing the id matching incorrectly based on the uncached regs[regno].id. So, in the first loop, we walked all regs and as soon as we found regno == i, then this reg's id was cleared when calling mark_reg_unknown_value() thus that every subsequent register was probed against id of 0 (which, in combination with the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL type is an invalid condition that no other register state can hold), and therefore wasn't type transitioned such as in the spilled register case for the second loop. Now since that got fixed, it turned out that 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") used mark_reg_unknown_value() incorrectly for the spilled regs, and thus hitting the BUG_ON() in some cases due to regno >= MAX_BPF_REG. Although spilled regs have the same type as the non-spilled regs for the verifier state, that is, struct bpf_reg_state, they are semantically different from the non-spilled regs. In other words, there can be up to 64 (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) spilled regs in the stack, for example, register R<x> could have been spilled by the program to stack location X, Y, Z, and in mark_map_regs() we need to scan these stack slots of type STACK_SPILL for potential registers that we have to transition from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. Therefore, depending on the location, the spilled_regs regno can be a lot higher than just MAX_BPF_REG's value since we operate on stack instead. The reset in mark_reg_unknown_value() itself is just fine, only that the BUG_ON() was inappropriate for this. Fix it by making a __mark_reg_unknown_value() version that can be called from mark_map_reg() generically; we know for the non-spilled case that the regno is always < MAX_BPF_REG anyway. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 00:52:59 +00:00
static void __mark_reg_unknown_value(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
regs[regno].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
regs[regno].id = 0;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
regs[regno].imm = 0;
}
bpf: fix mark_reg_unknown_value for spilled regs on map value marking Martin reported a verifier issue that hit the BUG_ON() for his test case in the mark_reg_unknown_value() function: [ 202.861380] kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:467! [...] [ 203.291109] Call Trace: [ 203.296501] [<ffffffff811364d5>] mark_map_reg+0x45/0x50 [ 203.308225] [<ffffffff81136558>] mark_map_regs+0x78/0x90 [ 203.320140] [<ffffffff8113938d>] do_check+0x226d/0x2c90 [ 203.331865] [<ffffffff8113a6ab>] bpf_check+0x48b/0x780 [ 203.343403] [<ffffffff81134c8e>] bpf_prog_load+0x27e/0x440 [ 203.355705] [<ffffffff8118a38f>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x11af/0x1230 [ 203.369158] [<ffffffff812d8188>] ? security_capable+0x48/0x60 [ 203.382035] [<ffffffff811351a4>] SyS_bpf+0x124/0x960 [ 203.393185] [<ffffffff810515f6>] ? __do_page_fault+0x276/0x490 [ 203.406258] [<ffffffff816db320>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 This issue got uncovered after the fix in a08dd0da5307 ("bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups"). The reason why it wasn't noticed before was, because as mentioned in a08dd0da5307, mark_map_regs() was doing the id matching incorrectly based on the uncached regs[regno].id. So, in the first loop, we walked all regs and as soon as we found regno == i, then this reg's id was cleared when calling mark_reg_unknown_value() thus that every subsequent register was probed against id of 0 (which, in combination with the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL type is an invalid condition that no other register state can hold), and therefore wasn't type transitioned such as in the spilled register case for the second loop. Now since that got fixed, it turned out that 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") used mark_reg_unknown_value() incorrectly for the spilled regs, and thus hitting the BUG_ON() in some cases due to regno >= MAX_BPF_REG. Although spilled regs have the same type as the non-spilled regs for the verifier state, that is, struct bpf_reg_state, they are semantically different from the non-spilled regs. In other words, there can be up to 64 (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) spilled regs in the stack, for example, register R<x> could have been spilled by the program to stack location X, Y, Z, and in mark_map_regs() we need to scan these stack slots of type STACK_SPILL for potential registers that we have to transition from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. Therefore, depending on the location, the spilled_regs regno can be a lot higher than just MAX_BPF_REG's value since we operate on stack instead. The reset in mark_reg_unknown_value() itself is just fine, only that the BUG_ON() was inappropriate for this. Fix it by making a __mark_reg_unknown_value() version that can be called from mark_map_reg() generically; we know for the non-spilled case that the regno is always < MAX_BPF_REG anyway. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 00:52:59 +00:00
static void mark_reg_unknown_value(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
BUG_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG);
__mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
static void reset_reg_range_values(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
regs[regno].min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
regs[regno].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
regs[regno].min_align = 0;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
}
bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type. The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when generating bpf code from a compiler. Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a restore of a spilled register from stack. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:48 +00:00
static void mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
u32 regno)
{
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
reset_reg_range_values(regs, regno);
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
enum reg_arg_type {
SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */
DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */
DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */
};
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
enum reg_arg_type t)
{
if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (t == SRC_OP) {
/* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) {
verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
return -EACCES;
}
} else {
/* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
verbose("frame pointer is read only\n");
return -EACCES;
}
if (t == DST_OP)
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
}
return 0;
}
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type. The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when generating bpf code from a compiler. Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a restore of a spilled register from stack. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:48 +00:00
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
case PTR_TO_STACK:
case PTR_TO_CTX:
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
case FRAME_PTR:
case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
* stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
int size, int value_regno)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
int i;
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
* so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
*/
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (value_regno >= 0 &&
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
is_spillable_regtype(state->regs[value_regno].type)) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
/* save register state */
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
state->regs[value_regno];
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
} else {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* regular write of data into stack */
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
(struct bpf_reg_state) {};
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int value_regno)
{
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
u8 *slot_type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int i;
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
slot_type = &state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("corrupted spill memory\n");
return -EACCES;
}
}
if (value_regno >= 0)
/* restore register state from stack */
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
state->regs[value_regno] =
state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE];
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return 0;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
if (value_regno >= 0)
/* have read misc data from the stack */
bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type. The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when generating bpf code from a compiler. Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a restore of a spilled register from stack. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:48 +00:00
mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
value_regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return 0;
}
}
/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int size)
{
struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;
bpf: allow helpers access to map element values Enable helpers to directly access a map element value by passing a register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (or PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) to helper arguments ARG_PTR_TO_STACK or ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. This enables several use cases. For example, a typical tracing program might want to capture pathnames passed to sys_open() with: struct trace_data { char pathname[PATHLEN]; }; SEC("kprobe/sys_open") void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) { struct trace_data data; bpf_probe_read(data.pathname, sizeof(data.pathname), ctx->di); /* consume data.pathname, for example via * bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output() */ } Such a program could easily hit the stack limit in case PATHLEN needs to be large or more local variables need to exist, both of which are quite common scenarios. Allowing direct helper access to map element values, one could do: struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") scratch_map = { .type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY, .key_size = sizeof(u32), .value_size = sizeof(struct trace_data), .max_entries = 1, }; SEC("kprobe/sys_open") int bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) { int id = 0; struct trace_data *p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&scratch_map, &id); if (!p) return; bpf_probe_read(p->pathname, sizeof(p->pathname), ctx->di); /* consume p->pathname, for example via * bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output() */ } And wouldn't risk exhausting the stack. Code changes are loosely modeled after commit 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"). Unlike with PTR_TO_PACKET, these changes just work with ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK (not ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ...): adding those would be trivial, but since there is not currently a use case for that, it's reasonable to limit the set of changes. Also, add new tests to make sure accesses to map element values from helpers never go out of boundary, even when adjusted. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:47 +00:00
if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
map->value_size, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:46 +00:00
/* check read/write into an adjusted map element */
static int check_map_access_adj(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
int off, int size)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
int err;
/* We adjusted the register to this map value, so we
* need to change off and size to min_value and max_value
* respectively to make sure our theoretical access will be
* safe.
*/
if (log_level)
print_verifier_state(state);
env->varlen_map_value_access = true;
/* The minimum value is only important with signed
* comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
* value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
* index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
* will have a set floor within our range.
*/
if (reg->min_value < 0) {
verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->min_value + off, size);
if (err) {
verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
regno);
return err;
}
/* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail
* since we can't be sure we won't do bad things.
*/
if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->max_value + off, size);
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-30 16:10:10 +00:00
const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
enum bpf_access_type t)
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-19 19:16:56 +00:00
{
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
switch (env->prog->type) {
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-30 16:10:10 +00:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
/* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */
if (t == BPF_WRITE)
return false;
bpf: reduce compiler warnings by adding fallthrough comments Fixes the following warnings: kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘may_access_direct_pkt_data’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:702:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] if (t == BPF_WRITE) ^ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:704:2: note: here case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max_inv’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2057:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2058:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2068:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2069:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2009:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2010:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2019:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2020:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Alemayhu <alexander@alemayhu.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-13 23:02:35 +00:00
/* fallthrough */
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-19 19:16:56 +00:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-30 16:10:10 +00:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
if (meta)
return meta->pkt_access;
env->seen_direct_write = true;
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-19 19:16:56 +00:00
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
int size)
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
bpf: support decreasing order in direct packet access when packet headers are accessed in 'decreasing' order (like TCP port may be fetched before the program reads IP src) the llvm may generate the following code: [...] // R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=70) r2 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access [...] r7 += 40 // R7=pkt(id=0,off=62,r=70) r8 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access [...] r1 = *(u32 *)(r7 -20) // this one will fail though it's within a safe range // it's doing *(u32*)(skb->data + 42) Fix verifier to recognize such code pattern Alos turned out that 'off > range' condition is not a verifier bug. It's a buggy program that may do something like: if (ptr + 50 > data_end) return 0; ptr += 60; *(u32*)ptr; in such case emit "invalid access to packet, off=0 size=4, R1(id=0,off=60,r=50)" error message, so all information is available for the program author to fix the program. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-20 01:17:13 +00:00
off += reg->off;
bpf, verifier: enforce larger zero range for pkt on overloading stack buffs Current contract for the following two helper argument types is: * ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE: passed argument pair must be (ptr, >0). * ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO: passed argument pair can be either (NULL, 0) or (ptr, >0). With 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), we can pass also raw packet data to helpers, so depending on the argument type being PTR_TO_PACKET, we now either assert memory via check_packet_access() or check_stack_boundary(). As a result, the tests in check_packet_access() currently allow more than intended with regards to reg->imm. Back in 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access"), check_packet_access() was fine to ignore size argument since in check_mem_access() size was bpf_size_to_bytes() derived and prior to the call to check_packet_access() guaranteed to be larger than zero. However, for the above two argument types, it currently means, we can have a <= 0 size and thus breaking current guarantees for helpers. Enforce a check for size <= 0 and bail out if so. check_stack_boundary() doesn't have such an issue since it already tests for access_size <= 0 and bails out, resp. access_size == 0 in case of NULL pointer passed when allowed. Fixes: 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:12 +00:00
if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > reg->range) {
bpf: support decreasing order in direct packet access when packet headers are accessed in 'decreasing' order (like TCP port may be fetched before the program reads IP src) the llvm may generate the following code: [...] // R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=70) r2 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access [...] r7 += 40 // R7=pkt(id=0,off=62,r=70) r8 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access [...] r1 = *(u32 *)(r7 -20) // this one will fail though it's within a safe range // it's doing *(u32*)(skb->data + 42) Fix verifier to recognize such code pattern Alos turned out that 'off > range' condition is not a verifier bug. It's a buggy program that may do something like: if (ptr + 50 > data_end) return 0; ptr += 60; *(u32*)ptr; in such case emit "invalid access to packet, off=0 size=4, R1(id=0,off=60,r=50)" error message, so all information is available for the program author to fix the program. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-20 01:17:13 +00:00
verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size,
bpf: fix matching of data/data_end in verifier The ctx structure passed into bpf programs is different depending on bpf program type. The verifier incorrectly marked ctx->data and ctx->data_end access based on ctx offset only. That caused loads in tracing programs int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { .. ctx->ax .. } to be incorrectly marked as PTR_TO_PACKET which later caused verifier to reject the program that was actually valid in tracing context. Fix this by doing program type specific matching of ctx offsets. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Reported-by: Sasha Goldshtein <goldshtn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-06-16 01:25:38 +00:00
enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {
.reg_type = *reg_type,
};
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:58 +00:00
/* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */
if (env->analyzer_ops)
return 0;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access &&
bpf: possibly avoid extra masking for narrower load in verifier Commit 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields") permits narrower load for certain ctx fields. The commit however will already generate a masking even if the prog-specific ctx conversion produces the result with narrower size. For example, for __sk_buff->protocol, the ctx conversion loads the data into register with 2-byte load. A narrower 2-byte load should not generate masking. For __sk_buff->vlan_present, the conversion function set the result as either 0 or 1, essentially a byte. The narrower 2-byte or 1-byte load should not generate masking. To avoid unnecessary masking, prog-specific *_is_valid_access now passes converted_op_size back to verifier, which indicates the valid data width after perceived future conversion. Based on this information, verifier is able to avoid unnecessary marking. Since we want more information back from prog-specific *_is_valid_access checking, all of them are packed into one data structure for more clarity. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-22 22:07:39 +00:00
env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info)) {
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
/* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a
* candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole
* field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower
* access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size
* will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other
* type of narrower access.
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
*/
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size;
bpf: possibly avoid extra masking for narrower load in verifier Commit 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields") permits narrower load for certain ctx fields. The commit however will already generate a masking even if the prog-specific ctx conversion produces the result with narrower size. For example, for __sk_buff->protocol, the ctx conversion loads the data into register with 2-byte load. A narrower 2-byte load should not generate masking. For __sk_buff->vlan_present, the conversion function set the result as either 0 or 1, essentially a byte. The narrower 2-byte or 1-byte load should not generate masking. To avoid unnecessary masking, prog-specific *_is_valid_access now passes converted_op_size back to verifier, which indicates the valid data width after perceived future conversion. Based on this information, verifier is able to avoid unnecessary marking. Since we want more information back from prog-specific *_is_valid_access checking, all of them are packed into one data structure for more clarity. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-22 22:07:39 +00:00
*reg_type = info.reg_type;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
bpf: sanitize bpf tracepoint access during bpf program loading remember the last byte of ctx access and at the time of attaching the program to tracepoint check that the program doesn't access bytes beyond defined in tracepoint fields This also disallows access to __dynamic_array fields, but can be relaxed in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 01:43:28 +00:00
/* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return 0;
bpf: sanitize bpf tracepoint access during bpf program loading remember the last byte of ctx access and at the time of attaching the program to tracepoint check that the program doesn't access bytes beyond defined in tracepoint fields This also disallows access to __dynamic_array fields, but can be relaxed in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 01:43:28 +00:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
{
if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
return false;
switch (env->cur_state.regs[regno].type) {
case UNKNOWN_VALUE:
case CONST_IMM:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
int off, int size, bool strict)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
{
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
int ip_align;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
int reg_off;
/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
if (!strict || size == 1)
return 0;
reg_off = reg->off;
if (reg->id) {
if (reg->aux_off_align % size) {
verbose("Packet access is only %u byte aligned, %d byte access not allowed\n",
reg->aux_off_align, size);
return -EACCES;
}
reg_off += reg->aux_off;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
}
net: Make IP alignment calulations clearer. The assignmnet: ip_align = strict ? 2 : NET_IP_ALIGN; in compare_pkt_ptr_alignment() trips up Coverity because we can only get to this code when strict is true, therefore ip_align will always be 2 regardless of NET_IP_ALIGN's value. So just assign directly to '2' and explain the situation in the comment above. Reported-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <garsilva@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-22 16:27:07 +00:00
/* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling
* CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of
* NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms
* that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get
* to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate
* the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an
* unconditional IP align value of '2'.
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
*/
net: Make IP alignment calulations clearer. The assignmnet: ip_align = strict ? 2 : NET_IP_ALIGN; in compare_pkt_ptr_alignment() trips up Coverity because we can only get to this code when strict is true, therefore ip_align will always be 2 regardless of NET_IP_ALIGN's value. So just assign directly to '2' and explain the situation in the comment above. Reported-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <garsilva@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-22 16:27:07 +00:00
ip_align = 2;
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
if ((ip_align + reg_off + off) % size != 0) {
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%d+%d size %d\n",
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
ip_align, reg_off, off, size);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
return 0;
}
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
static int check_val_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
int size, bool strict)
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
{
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
if (strict && size != 1) {
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in value access.\n");
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
return 0;
}
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
int off, int size)
{
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size, strict);
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
return check_val_ptr_alignment(reg, size, strict);
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:03 +00:00
default:
if (off % size != 0) {
verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n",
off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
* if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
* if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
* if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
* if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
*/
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, int off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
int value_regno)
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int size, err = 0;
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
off += reg->imm;
ebpf: Allow dereferences of PTR_TO_STACK registers mov %rsp, %r1 ; r1 = rsp add $-8, %r1 ; r1 = rsp - 8 store_q $123, -8(%rsp) ; *(u64*)r1 = 123 <- valid store_q $123, (%r1) ; *(u64*)r1 = 123 <- previously invalid mov $0, %r0 exit ; Always need to exit And we'd get the following error: 0: (bf) r1 = r10 1: (07) r1 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 999 3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = 999 R1 invalid mem access 'fp' Unable to load program We already know that a register is a stack address and the appropriate offset, so we should be able to validate those references as well. Signed-off-by: Alex Gartrell <agartrell@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-23 21:24:40 +00:00
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
if (size < 0)
return size;
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
verbose("R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:46 +00:00
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
err = check_map_access_adj(env, regno, off, size);
else
err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type. The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when generating bpf code from a compiler. Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a restore of a spilled register from stack. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:48 +00:00
mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
value_regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
bpf: fix matching of data/data_end in verifier The ctx structure passed into bpf programs is different depending on bpf program type. The verifier incorrectly marked ctx->data and ctx->data_end access based on ctx offset only. That caused loads in tracing programs int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { .. ctx->ax .. } to be incorrectly marked as PTR_TO_PACKET which later caused verifier to reject the program that was actually valid in tracing context. Fix this by doing program type specific matching of ctx offsets. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Reported-by: Sasha Goldshtein <goldshtn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-06-16 01:25:38 +00:00
enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &reg_type);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type. The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when generating bpf code from a compiler. Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a restore of a spilled register from stack. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:48 +00:00
mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
value_regno);
bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() This prevent future potential pointer leaks when an unprivileged eBPF program will read a pointer value from its context. Even if is_valid_access() returns a pointer type, the eBPF verifier replace it with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register value that contains a kernel address is then allowed to leak. Moreover, this fix allows unprivileged eBPF programs to use functions with (legitimate) pointer arguments. Not an issue currently since reg_type is only set for PTR_TO_PACKET or PTR_TO_PACKET_END in XDP and TC programs that can only be loaded as privileged. For now, the only unprivileged eBPF program allowed is for socket filtering and all the types from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE. However, this fix is important for future unprivileged eBPF programs which could use pointers in their context. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-24 18:01:50 +00:00
/* note that reg.[id|off|range] == 0 */
state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
state->regs[value_regno].aux_off = 0;
state->regs[value_regno].aux_off_align = 0;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
} else if (reg->type == FRAME_PTR || reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: teach verifier to track stack depth teach verifier to track bpf program stack depth Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-30 20:31:29 +00:00
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL &&
size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
} else {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
} else if (state->regs[regno].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-30 16:10:10 +00:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
verbose("cannot write into packet\n");
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-19 19:16:56 +00:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type. The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when generating bpf code from a compiler. Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a restore of a spilled register from stack. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:48 +00:00
mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
value_regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else {
verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
if (!err && size <= 2 && value_regno >= 0 && env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
state->regs[value_regno].type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
/* 1 or 2 byte load zero-extends, determine the number of
* zero upper bits. Not doing it fo 4 byte load, since
* such values cannot be added to ptr_to_packet anyway.
*/
state->regs[value_regno].imm = 64 - size * 8;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return err;
}
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int err;
if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
insn->imm != 0) {
verbose("BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged Leaking kernel addresses on unpriviledged is generally disallowed, for example, verifier rejects the following: 0: (b7) r0 = 0 1: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r2 R2 leaks addr into ctx Doing pointer arithmetic on them is also forbidden, so that they don't turn into unknown value and then get leaked out. However, there's xadd as a special case, where we don't check the src reg for being a pointer register, e.g. the following will pass: 0: (b7) r0 = 0 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r0 2: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 ; map 4: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r1 +48) += r2 5: (95) exit We could store the pointer into skb->cb, loose the type context, and then read it out from there again to leak it eventually out of a map value. Or more easily in a different variant, too: 0: (bf) r6 = r1 1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x0 6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp 8: (b7) r3 = 0 9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = r3 10: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r0 +0) += r6 11: (b7) r0 = 0 12: (95) exit from 7 to 11: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp 11: (b7) r0 = 0 12: (95) exit Prevent this by checking xadd src reg for pointer types. Also add a couple of test cases related to this. Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-29 01:04:59 +00:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose("R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
if (err)
return err;
/* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1);
}
/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
* bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
* and all elements of stack are initialized
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int off, i;
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-19 22:05:22 +00:00
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
regs[regno].type == CONST_IMM &&
regs[regno].imm == 0)
return 0;
verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return -EACCES;
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-19 22:05:22 +00:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
off = regs[regno].imm;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size <= 0) {
verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: teach verifier to track stack depth teach verifier to track bpf program stack depth Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-30 20:31:29 +00:00
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:49 +00:00
static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
switch (regs[regno].type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
return check_packet_access(env, regno, 0, access_size);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
return check_map_access(env, regno, 0, access_size);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
return check_map_access_adj(env, regno, 0, access_size);
default: /* const_imm|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
zero_size_allowed, meta);
}
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
enum bpf_reg_type expected_type, type = reg->type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int err = 0;
ebpf: verifier: check that call reg with ARG_ANYTHING is initialized I noticed that a helper function with argument type ARG_ANYTHING does not need to have an initialized value (register). This can worst case lead to unintented stack memory leakage in future helper functions if they are not carefully designed, or unintended application behaviour in case the application developer was not careful enough to match a correct helper function signature in the API. The underlying issue is that ARG_ANYTHING should actually be split into two different semantics: 1) ARG_DONTCARE for function arguments that the helper function does not care about (in other words: the default for unused function arguments), and 2) ARG_ANYTHING that is an argument actually being used by a helper function and *guaranteed* to be an initialized register. The current risk is low: ARG_ANYTHING is only used for the 'flags' argument (r4) in bpf_map_update_elem() that internally does strict checking. Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-12 16:21:42 +00:00
if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return 0;
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
if (type == NOT_INIT) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
verbose("R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", regno);
return -EACCES;
}
ebpf: verifier: check that call reg with ARG_ANYTHING is initialized I noticed that a helper function with argument type ARG_ANYTHING does not need to have an initialized value (register). This can worst case lead to unintented stack memory leakage in future helper functions if they are not carefully designed, or unintended application behaviour in case the application developer was not careful enough to match a correct helper function signature in the API. The underlying issue is that ARG_ANYTHING should actually be split into two different semantics: 1) ARG_DONTCARE for function arguments that the helper function does not care about (in other words: the default for unused function arguments), and 2) ARG_ANYTHING that is an argument actually being used by a helper function and *guaranteed* to be an initialized register. The current risk is low: ARG_ANYTHING is only used for the 'flags' argument (r4) in bpf_map_update_elem() that internally does strict checking. Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-12 16:21:42 +00:00
return 0;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
}
ebpf: verifier: check that call reg with ARG_ANYTHING is initialized I noticed that a helper function with argument type ARG_ANYTHING does not need to have an initialized value (register). This can worst case lead to unintented stack memory leakage in future helper functions if they are not carefully designed, or unintended application behaviour in case the application developer was not careful enough to match a correct helper function signature in the API. The underlying issue is that ARG_ANYTHING should actually be split into two different semantics: 1) ARG_DONTCARE for function arguments that the helper function does not care about (in other words: the default for unused function arguments), and 2) ARG_ANYTHING that is an argument actually being used by a helper function and *guaranteed* to be an initialized register. The current risk is low: ARG_ANYTHING is only used for the 'flags' argument (r4) in bpf_map_update_elem() that internally does strict checking. Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-12 16:21:42 +00:00
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-30 16:10:10 +00:00
if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
verbose("helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-19 22:05:22 +00:00
if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
expected_type = CONST_IMM;
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:49 +00:00
/* One exception. Allow UNKNOWN_VALUE registers when the
* boundaries are known and don't cause unsafe memory accesses
*/
if (type != UNKNOWN_VALUE && type != expected_type)
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
goto err_type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
if (type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
tc: bpf: generalize pedit action existing TC action 'pedit' can munge any bits of the packet. Generalize it for use in bpf programs attached as cls_bpf and act_bpf via bpf_skb_store_bytes() helper function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-27 02:53:57 +00:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX;
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
if (type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) {
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-19 22:05:22 +00:00
expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
/* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
* passed in as argument, it's a CONST_IMM type. Final test
* happens during stack boundary checking.
*/
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
if (type == CONST_IMM && reg->imm == 0)
/* final test in check_stack_boundary() */;
bpf: allow helpers access to map element values Enable helpers to directly access a map element value by passing a register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (or PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) to helper arguments ARG_PTR_TO_STACK or ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. This enables several use cases. For example, a typical tracing program might want to capture pathnames passed to sys_open() with: struct trace_data { char pathname[PATHLEN]; }; SEC("kprobe/sys_open") void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) { struct trace_data data; bpf_probe_read(data.pathname, sizeof(data.pathname), ctx->di); /* consume data.pathname, for example via * bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output() */ } Such a program could easily hit the stack limit in case PATHLEN needs to be large or more local variables need to exist, both of which are quite common scenarios. Allowing direct helper access to map element values, one could do: struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") scratch_map = { .type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY, .key_size = sizeof(u32), .value_size = sizeof(struct trace_data), .max_entries = 1, }; SEC("kprobe/sys_open") int bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) { int id = 0; struct trace_data *p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&scratch_map, &id); if (!p) return; bpf_probe_read(p->pathname, sizeof(p->pathname), ctx->di); /* consume p->pathname, for example via * bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output() */ } And wouldn't risk exhausting the stack. Code changes are loosely modeled after commit 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"). Unlike with PTR_TO_PACKET, these changes just work with ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK (not ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ...): adding those would be trivial, but since there is not currently a use case for that, it's reasonable to limit the set of changes. Also, add new tests to make sure accesses to map element values from helpers never go out of boundary, even when adjusted. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:47 +00:00
else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ && type != expected_type)
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
goto err_type;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else {
verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
/* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
* check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
* stack limits and initialized
*/
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
if (!meta->map_ptr) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
* map_key, so that it's verified and known before
* we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
* that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
*/
verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
err = check_packet_access(env, regno, 0,
meta->map_ptr->key_size);
else
err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
meta->map_ptr->key_size,
false, NULL);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
* check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
*/
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
if (!meta->map_ptr) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
err = check_packet_access(env, regno, 0,
meta->map_ptr->value_size);
else
err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
meta->map_ptr->value_size,
false, NULL);
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes
* from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it
* note: regno == len, regno - 1 == buf
*/
if (regno == 0) {
/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
verbose("ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:49 +00:00
/* If the register is UNKNOWN_VALUE, the access check happens
* using its boundaries. Otherwise, just use its imm
*/
if (type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
/* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
* mode so that the program is required to
* initialize all the memory that the helper could
* just partially fill up.
*/
meta = NULL;
if (reg->min_value < 0) {
verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
if (reg->min_value == 0) {
err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
zero_size_allowed,
meta);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
reg->max_value,
zero_size_allowed, meta);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
/* register is CONST_IMM */
err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, reg->imm,
zero_size_allowed, meta);
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
return err;
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 01:17:16 +00:00
err_type:
verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]);
return -EACCES;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the Hardware PMU counter value. Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-06 07:02:35 +00:00
static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
{
if (!map)
return 0;
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 01:56:21 +00:00
/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
switch (map->map_type) {
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
goto error;
break;
cgroup: bpf: Add BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY Add a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and its bpf_map_ops's implementations. To update an element, the caller is expected to obtain a cgroup2 backed fd by open(cgroup2_dir) and then update the array with that fd. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-06-30 17:28:43 +00:00
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net Minor overlapping changes for both merge conflicts. Resolution work done by Stephen Rothwell was used as a reference. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-18 05:17:32 +00:00
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
bpf: Add bpf_current_task_under_cgroup helper This adds a bpf helper that's similar to the skb_in_cgroup helper to check whether the probe is currently executing in the context of a specific subset of the cgroupsv2 hierarchy. It does this based on membership test for a cgroup arraymap. It is invalid to call this in an interrupt, and it'll return an error. The helper is primarily to be used in debugging activities for containers, where you may have multiple programs running in a given top-level "container". Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 15:56:52 +00:00
func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto Adds a bpf helper, bpf_skb_in_cgroup, to decide if a skb->sk belongs to a descendant of a cgroup2. It is similar to the feature added in netfilter: commit c38c4597e4bf ("netfilter: implement xt_cgroup cgroup2 path match") The user is expected to populate a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY which will be used by the bpf_skb_in_cgroup. Modifications to the bpf verifier is to ensure BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and bpf_skb_in_cgroup() are always used together. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-06-30 17:28:44 +00:00
goto error;
break;
bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references Device map (devmap) is a BPF map, primarily useful for networking applications, that uses a key to lookup a reference to a netdevice. The map provides a clean way for BPF programs to build virtual port to physical port maps. Additionally, it provides a scoping function for the redirect action itself allowing multiple optimizations. Future patches will leverage the map to provide batching at the XDP layer. Another optimization/feature, that is not yet implemented, would be to support multiple netdevices per key to support efficient multicast and broadcast support. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-17 16:28:56 +00:00
/* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot
* allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements
* for now.
*/
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
goto error;
break;
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:33 +00:00
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
bpf: Add hash of maps support This patch adds hash of maps support (hashmap->bpf_map). BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS is added. A map-in-map contains a pointer to another map and lets call this pointer 'inner_map_ptr'. Notes on deleting inner_map_ptr from a hash map: 1. For BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC map-in-map, when deleting an inner_map_ptr, the htab_elem itself will go through a rcu grace period and the inner_map_ptr resides in the htab_elem. 2. For pre-allocated htab_elem (!BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC), when deleting an inner_map_ptr, the htab_elem may get reused immediately. This situation is similar to the existing prealloc-ated use cases. However, the bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() calls bpf_map_put() which calls inner_map->ops->map_free(inner_map) which will go through a rcu grace period (i.e. all bpf_map's map_free currently goes through a rcu grace period). Hence, the inner_map_ptr is still safe for the rcu reader side. This patch also includes BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS to the check_map_prealloc() in the verifier. preallocation is a must for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT. Hence, even we don't expect heavy updates to map-in-map, enforcing BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC for map-in-map is impossible without disallowing BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT from using map-in-map first. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:34 +00:00
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:33 +00:00
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
goto error;
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 01:56:21 +00:00
default:
break;
}
/* ... and second from the function itself. */
switch (func_id) {
case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
goto error;
break;
bpf: Add bpf_current_task_under_cgroup helper This adds a bpf helper that's similar to the skb_in_cgroup helper to check whether the probe is currently executing in the context of a specific subset of the cgroupsv2 hierarchy. It does this based on membership test for a cgroup arraymap. It is invalid to call this in an interrupt, and it'll return an error. The helper is primarily to be used in debugging activities for containers, where you may have multiple programs running in a given top-level "container". Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 15:56:52 +00:00
case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
bpf: fix bpf_skb_in_cgroup helper naming While hashing out BPF's current_task_under_cgroup helper bits, it came to discussion that the skb_in_cgroup helper name was suboptimally chosen. Tejun says: So, I think in_cgroup should mean that the object is in that particular cgroup while under_cgroup in the subhierarchy of that cgroup. Let's rename the other subhierarchy test to under too. I think that'd be a lot less confusing going forward. [...] It's more intuitive and gives us the room to implement the real "in" test if ever necessary in the future. Since this touches uapi bits, we need to change this as long as v4.8 is not yet officially released. Thus, change the helper enum and rename related bits. Fixes: 4a482f34afcc ("cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/658500/ Suggested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2016-08-12 20:17:17 +00:00
case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto Adds a bpf helper, bpf_skb_in_cgroup, to decide if a skb->sk belongs to a descendant of a cgroup2. It is similar to the feature added in netfilter: commit c38c4597e4bf ("netfilter: implement xt_cgroup cgroup2 path match") The user is expected to populate a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY which will be used by the bpf_skb_in_cgroup. Modifications to the bpf verifier is to ensure BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and bpf_skb_in_cgroup() are always used together. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-06-30 17:28:44 +00:00
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
bpf: add bpf_redirect_map helper routine BPF programs can use the devmap with a bpf_redirect_map() helper routine to forward packets to netdevice in map. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-17 16:29:18 +00:00
case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP)
goto error;
break;
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 01:56:21 +00:00
default:
break;
bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the Hardware PMU counter value. Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-06 07:02:35 +00:00
}
return 0;
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 01:56:21 +00:00
error:
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 09:23:51 +00:00
verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 01:56:21 +00:00
return -EINVAL;
bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the Hardware PMU counter value. Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-06 07:02:35 +00:00
}
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
{
int count = 0;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
count++;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
count++;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
count++;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
count++;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-09 18:19:50 +00:00
if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
count++;
return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, i);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET &&
reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
continue;
bpf: reset id on spilled regs in clear_all_pkt_pointers Right now, we don't reset the id of spilled registers in case of clear_all_pkt_pointers(). Given pkt_pointers are highly likely to contain an id, do so by reusing __mark_reg_unknown_value(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-10 22:50:43 +00:00
__mark_reg_unknown_value(state->spilled_regs,
i / BPF_REG_SIZE);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
}
}
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:42 +00:00
static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
bool changes_data;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int i, err;
/* find function prototype */
if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 09:23:51 +00:00
verbose("invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto)
fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
if (!fn) {
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 09:23:51 +00:00
verbose("unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
ebpf: move read-only fields to bpf_prog and shrink bpf_prog_aux is_gpl_compatible and prog_type should be moved directly into bpf_prog as they stay immutable during bpf_prog's lifetime, are core attributes and they can be locked as read-only later on via bpf_prog_select_runtime(). With a bit of rearranging, this also allows us to shrink bpf_prog_aux to exactly 1 cacheline. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-01 11:31:47 +00:00
if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: xdp: Allow head adjustment in XDP prog This patch allows XDP prog to extend/remove the packet data at the head (like adding or removing header). It is done by adding a new XDP helper bpf_xdp_adjust_head(). It also renames bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() to bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() to better reflect that XDP prog does not work on skb. This patch adds one "xdp_adjust_head" bit to bpf_prog for the XDP-capable driver to check if the XDP prog requires bpf_xdp_adjust_head() support. The driver can then decide to error out during XDP_SETUP_PROG. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-07 23:53:11 +00:00
changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
* is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
*/
err = check_raw_mode(fn);
if (err) {
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 09:23:51 +00:00
verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
return err;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check args */
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
* is inferred from register state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:51 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* reset caller saved regs */
bpf: properly reset caller saved regs after helper call and ld_abs/ind Currently, after performing helper calls, we clear all caller saved registers, that is r0 - r5 and fill r0 depending on struct bpf_func_proto specification. The way we reset these regs can affect pruning decisions in later paths, since we only reset register's imm to 0 and type to NOT_INIT. However, we leave out clearing of other variables such as id, min_value, max_value, etc, which can later on lead to pruning mismatches due to stale data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:06 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++)
mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* update return register */
if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
bpf: Fix and simplifications on inline map lookup Fix in verifier: For the same bpf_map_lookup_elem() instruction (i.e. "call 1"), a broken case is "a different type of map could be used for the same lookup instruction". For example, an array in one case and a hashmap in another. We have to resort to the old dynamic call behavior in this case. The fix is to check for collision on insn_aux->map_ptr. If there is collision, don't inline the map lookup. Please see the "do_reg_lookup()" in test_map_in_map_kern.c in the later patch for how-to trigger the above case. Simplifications on array_map_gen_lookup(): 1. Calculate elem_size from map->value_size. It removes the need for 'struct bpf_array' which makes the later map-in-map implementation easier. 2. Remove the 'elem_size == 1' test Fixes: 81ed18ab3098 ("bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:32 +00:00
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
regs[BPF_REG_0].max_value = regs[BPF_REG_0].min_value = 0;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
* can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
* to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
*/
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
bpf: Fix and simplifications on inline map lookup Fix in verifier: For the same bpf_map_lookup_elem() instruction (i.e. "call 1"), a broken case is "a different type of map could be used for the same lookup instruction". For example, an array in one case and a hashmap in another. We have to resort to the old dynamic call behavior in this case. The fix is to check for collision on insn_aux->map_ptr. If there is collision, don't inline the map lookup. Please see the "do_reg_lookup()" in test_map_in_map_kern.c in the later patch for how-to trigger the above case. Simplifications on array_map_gen_lookup(): 1. Calculate elem_size from map->value_size. It removes the need for 'struct bpf_array' which makes the later map-in-map implementation easier. 2. Remove the 'elem_size == 1' test Fixes: 81ed18ab3098 ("bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:32 +00:00
insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
if (!insn_aux->map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else {
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 09:23:51 +00:00
verbose("unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-19 23:59:03 +00:00
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 22:10:50 +00:00
err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id);
bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the Hardware PMU counter value. Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-06 07:02:35 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-19 23:59:03 +00:00
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
if (changes_data)
clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
return 0;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_packet_ptr_add(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
struct bpf_reg_state tmp_reg;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
s32 imm;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
/* pkt_ptr += imm */
imm = insn->imm;
add_imm:
bpf: enable verifier to add 0 to packet ptr The patch fixes the case when adding a zero value to the packet pointer. The zero value could come from src_reg equals type BPF_K or CONST_IMM. The patch fixes both, otherwise the verifer reports the following error: [...] R0=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=4) R2=pkt_end R3=fp-12 R4=imm4,min_value=4,max_value=4 R5=pkt(id=0,off=4,r=4) 269: (bf) r2 = r0 // r2 becomes imm0 270: (77) r2 >>= 3 271: (bf) r4 = r1 // r4 becomes pkt ptr 272: (0f) r4 += r2 // r4 += 0 addition of negative constant to packet pointer is not allowed Signed-off-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mihai Budiu <mbudiu@vmware.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-04 16:37:29 +00:00
if (imm < 0) {
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
verbose("addition of negative constant to packet pointer is not allowed\n");
return -EACCES;
}
if (imm >= MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
imm + dst_reg->off >= MAX_PACKET_OFF) {
verbose("constant %d is too large to add to packet pointer\n",
imm);
return -EACCES;
}
/* a constant was added to pkt_ptr.
* Remember it while keeping the same 'id'
*/
dst_reg->off += imm;
} else {
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
bool had_id;
bpf: teach verifier to recognize imm += ptr pattern Humans don't write C code like: u8 *ptr = skb->data; int imm = 4; imm += ptr; but from llvm backend point of view 'imm' and 'ptr' are registers and imm += ptr may be preferred vs ptr += imm depending which register value will be used further in the code, while verifier can only recognize ptr += imm. That caused small unrelated changes in the C code of the bpf program to trigger rejection by the verifier. Therefore teach the verifier to recognize both ptr += imm and imm += ptr. For example: when R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=imm22 after r7 += r6 instruction will be R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=62) Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-20 01:17:14 +00:00
if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
/* R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=imm22; r7 += r6 */
tmp_reg = *dst_reg; /* save r7 state */
*dst_reg = *src_reg; /* copy pkt_ptr state r6 into r7 */
src_reg = &tmp_reg; /* pretend it's src_reg state */
/* if the checks below reject it, the copy won't matter,
* since we're rejecting the whole program. If all ok,
* then imm22 state will be added to r7
* and r7 will be pkt(id=0,off=22,r=62) while
* r6 will stay as pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62)
*/
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
if (src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
/* pkt_ptr += reg where reg is known constant */
imm = src_reg->imm;
goto add_imm;
}
/* disallow pkt_ptr += reg
* if reg is not uknown_value with guaranteed zero upper bits
* otherwise pkt_ptr may overflow and addition will become
* subtraction which is not allowed
*/
if (src_reg->type != UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
verbose("cannot add '%s' to ptr_to_packet\n",
reg_type_str[src_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
}
if (src_reg->imm < 48) {
verbose("cannot add integer value with %lld upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet\n",
src_reg->imm);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
had_id = (dst_reg->id != 0);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
/* dst_reg stays as pkt_ptr type and since some positive
* integer value was added to the pointer, increment its 'id'
*/
bpf: fix method of PTR_TO_PACKET reg id generation Using per-register incrementing ID can lead to find_good_pkt_pointers() confusing registers which have completely different values. Consider example: 0: (bf) r6 = r1 1: (61) r8 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 2: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 3: (bf) r7 = r8 4: (07) r8 += 32 5: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+9 R0=pkt_end R1=ctx R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=0,off=32,r=32) R10=fp 6: (bf) r8 = r7 7: (bf) r9 = r7 8: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +0) 9: (0f) r8 += r1 10: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +1) 11: (0f) r9 += r1 12: (07) r8 += 32 13: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt_end R1=inv56 R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=1,off=32,r=32) R9=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=32) R10=fp 14: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r9 +16) 15: (b7) r7 = 0 16: (bf) r0 = r7 17: (95) exit We need to get a UNKNOWN_VALUE with imm to force id generation so lines 0-5 make r7 a valid packet pointer. We then read two different bytes from the packet and add them to copies of the constructed packet pointer. r8 (line 9) and r9 (line 11) will get the same id of 1, independently. When either of them is validated (line 13) - find_good_pkt_pointers() will also mark the other as safe. This leads to access on line 14 being mistakenly considered safe. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-02 15:12:14 +00:00
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
bpf: Handle multiple variable additions into packet pointers in verifier. We must accumulate into reg->aux_off rather than use a plain assignment. Add a test for this situation to test_align. Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-12 02:30:02 +00:00
dst_reg->aux_off += dst_reg->off;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
dst_reg->off = 0;
dst_reg->range = 0;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
if (had_id)
dst_reg->aux_off_align = min(dst_reg->aux_off_align,
src_reg->min_align);
else
dst_reg->aux_off_align = src_reg->min_align;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int evaluate_reg_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
s64 imm_log2;
/* for type == UNKNOWN_VALUE:
* imm > 0 -> number of zero upper bits
* imm == 0 -> don't track which is the same as all bits can be non-zero
*/
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
if (src_reg->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE && src_reg->imm > 0 &&
dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
/* dreg += sreg
* where both have zero upper bits. Adding them
* can only result making one more bit non-zero
* in the larger value.
* Ex. 0xffff (imm=48) + 1 (imm=63) = 0x10000 (imm=47)
* 0xffff (imm=48) + 0xffff = 0x1fffe (imm=47)
*/
dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, src_reg->imm);
dst_reg->imm--;
return 0;
}
if (src_reg->type == CONST_IMM && src_reg->imm > 0 &&
dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
/* dreg += sreg
* where dreg has zero upper bits and sreg is const.
* Adding them can only result making one more bit
* non-zero in the larger value.
*/
imm_log2 = __ilog2_u64((long long)src_reg->imm);
dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
dst_reg->imm--;
return 0;
}
/* all other cases non supported yet, just mark dst_reg */
dst_reg->imm = 0;
return 0;
}
/* sign extend 32-bit imm into 64-bit to make sure that
* negative values occupy bit 63. Note ilog2() would have
* been incorrect, since sizeof(insn->imm) == 4
*/
imm_log2 = __ilog2_u64((long long)insn->imm);
if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_LSH) {
/* reg <<= imm
* if reg was a result of 2 byte load, then its imm == 48
* which means that upper 48 bits are zero and shifting this reg
* left by 4 would mean that upper 44 bits are still zero
*/
dst_reg->imm -= insn->imm;
} else if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_MUL) {
/* reg *= imm
* if multiplying by 14 subtract 4
* This is conservative calculation of upper zero bits.
* It's not trying to special case insn->imm == 1 or 0 cases
*/
dst_reg->imm -= imm_log2 + 1;
} else if (opcode == BPF_AND) {
/* reg &= imm */
dst_reg->imm = 63 - imm_log2;
} else if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
/* reg += imm */
dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
dst_reg->imm--;
} else if (opcode == BPF_RSH) {
/* reg >>= imm
* which means that after right shift, upper bits will be zero
* note that verifier already checked that
* 0 <= imm < 64 for shift insn
*/
dst_reg->imm += insn->imm;
if (unlikely(dst_reg->imm > 64))
/* some dumb code did:
* r2 = *(u32 *)mem;
* r2 >>= 32;
* and all bits are zero now */
dst_reg->imm = 64;
} else {
/* all other alu ops, means that we don't know what will
* happen to the value, mark it with unknown number of zero bits
*/
dst_reg->imm = 0;
}
if (dst_reg->imm < 0) {
/* all 64 bits of the register can contain non-zero bits
* and such value cannot be added to ptr_to_packet, since it
* may overflow, mark it as unknown to avoid further eval
*/
dst_reg->imm = 0;
}
return 0;
}
bpf, verifier: add additional patterns to evaluate_reg_imm_alu Currently the verifier does not track imm across alu operations when the source register is of unknown type. This adds additional pattern matching to catch this and track imm. We've seen LLVM generating this pattern while working on cilium. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:30 +00:00
static int evaluate_reg_imm_alu_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
s64 imm_log2 = __ilog2_u64((long long)dst_reg->imm);
/* BPF_X code with src_reg->type UNKNOWN_VALUE here. */
if (src_reg->imm > 0 && dst_reg->imm) {
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
/* dreg += sreg
* where both have zero upper bits. Adding them
* can only result making one more bit non-zero
* in the larger value.
* Ex. 0xffff (imm=48) + 1 (imm=63) = 0x10000 (imm=47)
* 0xffff (imm=48) + 0xffff = 0x1fffe (imm=47)
*/
dst_reg->imm = min(src_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
dst_reg->imm--;
break;
case BPF_AND:
/* dreg &= sreg
* AND can not extend zero bits only shrink
* Ex. 0x00..00ffffff
* & 0x0f..ffffffff
* ----------------
* 0x00..00ffffff
*/
dst_reg->imm = max(src_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
break;
case BPF_OR:
/* dreg |= sreg
* OR can only extend zero bits
* Ex. 0x00..00ffffff
* | 0x0f..ffffffff
* ----------------
* 0x0f..00ffffff
*/
dst_reg->imm = min(src_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
case BPF_MUL:
case BPF_RSH:
case BPF_LSH:
/* These may be flushed out later */
default:
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
}
} else {
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
}
dst_reg->type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
return 0;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int evaluate_reg_imm_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bpf: enable verifier to better track const alu ops William reported couple of issues in relation to direct packet access. Typical scheme is to check for data + [off] <= data_end, where [off] can be either immediate or coming from a tracked register that contains an immediate, depending on the branch, we can then access the data. However, in case of calculating [off] for either the mentioned test itself or for access after the test in a more "complex" way, then the verifier will stop tracking the CONST_IMM marked register and will mark it as UNKNOWN_VALUE one. Adding that UNKNOWN_VALUE typed register to a pkt() marked register, the verifier then bails out in check_packet_ptr_add() as it finds the registers imm value below 48. In the first below example, that is due to evaluate_reg_imm_alu() not handling right shifts and thus marking the register as UNKNOWN_VALUE via helper __mark_reg_unknown_value() that resets imm to 0. In the second case the same happens at the time when r4 is set to r4 &= r5, where it transitions to UNKNOWN_VALUE from evaluate_reg_imm_alu(). Later on r4 we shift right by 3 inside evaluate_reg_alu(), where the register's imm turns into 3. That is, for registers with type UNKNOWN_VALUE, imm of 0 means that we don't know what value the register has, and for imm > 0 it means that the value has [imm] upper zero bits. F.e. when shifting an UNKNOWN_VALUE register by 3 to the right, no matter what value it had, we know that the 3 upper most bits must be zero now. This is to make sure that ALU operations with unknown registers don't overflow. Meaning, once we know that we have more than 48 upper zero bits, or, in other words cannot go beyond 0xffff offset with ALU ops, such an addition will track the target register as a new pkt() register with a new id, but 0 offset and 0 range, so for that a new data/data_end test will be required. Is the source register a CONST_IMM one that is to be added to the pkt() register, or the source instruction is an add instruction with immediate value, then it will get added if it stays within max 0xffff bounds. >From there, pkt() type, can be accessed should reg->off + imm be within the access range of pkt(). [...] from 28 to 30: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=22) R2=pkt_end R3=imm144,min_value=144,max_value=144 R4=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0 R5=inv48,min_value=2054,max_value=2054 R10=fp 30: (bf) r5 = r3 31: (07) r5 += 23 32: (77) r5 >>= 3 33: (bf) r6 = r1 34: (0f) r6 += r5 cannot add integer value with 0 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet [...] from 52 to 80: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=34) R2=pkt_end R3=inv R4=imm272 R5=inv56,min_value=17,max_value=17 R6=pkt(id=0,off=26,r=34) R10=fp 80: (07) r4 += 71 81: (18) r5 = 0xfffffff8 83: (5f) r4 &= r5 84: (77) r4 >>= 3 85: (0f) r1 += r4 cannot add integer value with 3 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet Thus to get above use-cases working, evaluate_reg_imm_alu() has been extended for further ALU ops. This is fine, because we only operate strictly within realm of CONST_IMM types, so here we don't care about overflows as they will happen in the simulated but also real execution and interaction with pkt() in check_packet_ptr_add() will check actual imm value once added to pkt(), but it's irrelevant before. With regards to 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") that works on UNKNOWN_VALUE registers, the verifier becomes now a bit smarter as it can better resolve ALU ops, so we need to adapt two test cases there, as min/max bound tracking only becomes necessary when registers were spilled to stack. So while mask was set before to track upper bound for UNKNOWN_VALUE case, it's now resolved directly as CONST_IMM, and such contructs are only necessary when f.e. registers are spilled. For commit 6b17387307ba ("bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts") that initially enabled dw load tracking only for nfp jit/ analyzer, I did couple of tests on large, complex programs and we don't increase complexity badly (my tests were in ~3% range on avg). I've added a couple of tests similar to affected code above, and it works fine with verifier now. Reported-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Cc: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-24 00:06:30 +00:00
u64 dst_imm = dst_reg->imm;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
bpf, verifier: add additional patterns to evaluate_reg_imm_alu Currently the verifier does not track imm across alu operations when the source register is of unknown type. This adds additional pattern matching to catch this and track imm. We've seen LLVM generating this pattern while working on cilium. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:30 +00:00
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && src_reg->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE)
return evaluate_reg_imm_alu_unknown(env, insn);
bpf: enable verifier to better track const alu ops William reported couple of issues in relation to direct packet access. Typical scheme is to check for data + [off] <= data_end, where [off] can be either immediate or coming from a tracked register that contains an immediate, depending on the branch, we can then access the data. However, in case of calculating [off] for either the mentioned test itself or for access after the test in a more "complex" way, then the verifier will stop tracking the CONST_IMM marked register and will mark it as UNKNOWN_VALUE one. Adding that UNKNOWN_VALUE typed register to a pkt() marked register, the verifier then bails out in check_packet_ptr_add() as it finds the registers imm value below 48. In the first below example, that is due to evaluate_reg_imm_alu() not handling right shifts and thus marking the register as UNKNOWN_VALUE via helper __mark_reg_unknown_value() that resets imm to 0. In the second case the same happens at the time when r4 is set to r4 &= r5, where it transitions to UNKNOWN_VALUE from evaluate_reg_imm_alu(). Later on r4 we shift right by 3 inside evaluate_reg_alu(), where the register's imm turns into 3. That is, for registers with type UNKNOWN_VALUE, imm of 0 means that we don't know what value the register has, and for imm > 0 it means that the value has [imm] upper zero bits. F.e. when shifting an UNKNOWN_VALUE register by 3 to the right, no matter what value it had, we know that the 3 upper most bits must be zero now. This is to make sure that ALU operations with unknown registers don't overflow. Meaning, once we know that we have more than 48 upper zero bits, or, in other words cannot go beyond 0xffff offset with ALU ops, such an addition will track the target register as a new pkt() register with a new id, but 0 offset and 0 range, so for that a new data/data_end test will be required. Is the source register a CONST_IMM one that is to be added to the pkt() register, or the source instruction is an add instruction with immediate value, then it will get added if it stays within max 0xffff bounds. >From there, pkt() type, can be accessed should reg->off + imm be within the access range of pkt(). [...] from 28 to 30: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=22) R2=pkt_end R3=imm144,min_value=144,max_value=144 R4=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0 R5=inv48,min_value=2054,max_value=2054 R10=fp 30: (bf) r5 = r3 31: (07) r5 += 23 32: (77) r5 >>= 3 33: (bf) r6 = r1 34: (0f) r6 += r5 cannot add integer value with 0 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet [...] from 52 to 80: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=34) R2=pkt_end R3=inv R4=imm272 R5=inv56,min_value=17,max_value=17 R6=pkt(id=0,off=26,r=34) R10=fp 80: (07) r4 += 71 81: (18) r5 = 0xfffffff8 83: (5f) r4 &= r5 84: (77) r4 >>= 3 85: (0f) r1 += r4 cannot add integer value with 3 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet Thus to get above use-cases working, evaluate_reg_imm_alu() has been extended for further ALU ops. This is fine, because we only operate strictly within realm of CONST_IMM types, so here we don't care about overflows as they will happen in the simulated but also real execution and interaction with pkt() in check_packet_ptr_add() will check actual imm value once added to pkt(), but it's irrelevant before. With regards to 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") that works on UNKNOWN_VALUE registers, the verifier becomes now a bit smarter as it can better resolve ALU ops, so we need to adapt two test cases there, as min/max bound tracking only becomes necessary when registers were spilled to stack. So while mask was set before to track upper bound for UNKNOWN_VALUE case, it's now resolved directly as CONST_IMM, and such contructs are only necessary when f.e. registers are spilled. For commit 6b17387307ba ("bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts") that initially enabled dw load tracking only for nfp jit/ analyzer, I did couple of tests on large, complex programs and we don't increase complexity badly (my tests were in ~3% range on avg). I've added a couple of tests similar to affected code above, and it works fine with verifier now. Reported-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Cc: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-24 00:06:30 +00:00
/* dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM here. Simulate execution of insns
* containing ALU ops. Don't care about overflow or negative
* values, just add/sub/... them; registers are in u64.
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
*/
bpf: enable verifier to better track const alu ops William reported couple of issues in relation to direct packet access. Typical scheme is to check for data + [off] <= data_end, where [off] can be either immediate or coming from a tracked register that contains an immediate, depending on the branch, we can then access the data. However, in case of calculating [off] for either the mentioned test itself or for access after the test in a more "complex" way, then the verifier will stop tracking the CONST_IMM marked register and will mark it as UNKNOWN_VALUE one. Adding that UNKNOWN_VALUE typed register to a pkt() marked register, the verifier then bails out in check_packet_ptr_add() as it finds the registers imm value below 48. In the first below example, that is due to evaluate_reg_imm_alu() not handling right shifts and thus marking the register as UNKNOWN_VALUE via helper __mark_reg_unknown_value() that resets imm to 0. In the second case the same happens at the time when r4 is set to r4 &= r5, where it transitions to UNKNOWN_VALUE from evaluate_reg_imm_alu(). Later on r4 we shift right by 3 inside evaluate_reg_alu(), where the register's imm turns into 3. That is, for registers with type UNKNOWN_VALUE, imm of 0 means that we don't know what value the register has, and for imm > 0 it means that the value has [imm] upper zero bits. F.e. when shifting an UNKNOWN_VALUE register by 3 to the right, no matter what value it had, we know that the 3 upper most bits must be zero now. This is to make sure that ALU operations with unknown registers don't overflow. Meaning, once we know that we have more than 48 upper zero bits, or, in other words cannot go beyond 0xffff offset with ALU ops, such an addition will track the target register as a new pkt() register with a new id, but 0 offset and 0 range, so for that a new data/data_end test will be required. Is the source register a CONST_IMM one that is to be added to the pkt() register, or the source instruction is an add instruction with immediate value, then it will get added if it stays within max 0xffff bounds. >From there, pkt() type, can be accessed should reg->off + imm be within the access range of pkt(). [...] from 28 to 30: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=22) R2=pkt_end R3=imm144,min_value=144,max_value=144 R4=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0 R5=inv48,min_value=2054,max_value=2054 R10=fp 30: (bf) r5 = r3 31: (07) r5 += 23 32: (77) r5 >>= 3 33: (bf) r6 = r1 34: (0f) r6 += r5 cannot add integer value with 0 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet [...] from 52 to 80: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=34) R2=pkt_end R3=inv R4=imm272 R5=inv56,min_value=17,max_value=17 R6=pkt(id=0,off=26,r=34) R10=fp 80: (07) r4 += 71 81: (18) r5 = 0xfffffff8 83: (5f) r4 &= r5 84: (77) r4 >>= 3 85: (0f) r1 += r4 cannot add integer value with 3 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet Thus to get above use-cases working, evaluate_reg_imm_alu() has been extended for further ALU ops. This is fine, because we only operate strictly within realm of CONST_IMM types, so here we don't care about overflows as they will happen in the simulated but also real execution and interaction with pkt() in check_packet_ptr_add() will check actual imm value once added to pkt(), but it's irrelevant before. With regards to 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") that works on UNKNOWN_VALUE registers, the verifier becomes now a bit smarter as it can better resolve ALU ops, so we need to adapt two test cases there, as min/max bound tracking only becomes necessary when registers were spilled to stack. So while mask was set before to track upper bound for UNKNOWN_VALUE case, it's now resolved directly as CONST_IMM, and such contructs are only necessary when f.e. registers are spilled. For commit 6b17387307ba ("bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts") that initially enabled dw load tracking only for nfp jit/ analyzer, I did couple of tests on large, complex programs and we don't increase complexity badly (my tests were in ~3% range on avg). I've added a couple of tests similar to affected code above, and it works fine with verifier now. Reported-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Cc: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-24 00:06:30 +00:00
if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
dst_imm += insn->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
dst_imm += src_reg->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_SUB && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
dst_imm -= insn->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_SUB && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
dst_imm -= src_reg->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MUL && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
dst_imm *= insn->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MUL && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
dst_imm *= src_reg->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_OR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
dst_imm |= insn->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_OR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
dst_imm |= src_reg->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_AND && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
dst_imm &= insn->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_AND && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
dst_imm &= src_reg->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_RSH && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
dst_imm >>= insn->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_RSH && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
dst_imm >>= src_reg->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_LSH && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
dst_imm <<= insn->imm;
} else if (opcode == BPF_LSH && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
dst_imm <<= src_reg->imm;
} else {
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf: enable verifier to better track const alu ops William reported couple of issues in relation to direct packet access. Typical scheme is to check for data + [off] <= data_end, where [off] can be either immediate or coming from a tracked register that contains an immediate, depending on the branch, we can then access the data. However, in case of calculating [off] for either the mentioned test itself or for access after the test in a more "complex" way, then the verifier will stop tracking the CONST_IMM marked register and will mark it as UNKNOWN_VALUE one. Adding that UNKNOWN_VALUE typed register to a pkt() marked register, the verifier then bails out in check_packet_ptr_add() as it finds the registers imm value below 48. In the first below example, that is due to evaluate_reg_imm_alu() not handling right shifts and thus marking the register as UNKNOWN_VALUE via helper __mark_reg_unknown_value() that resets imm to 0. In the second case the same happens at the time when r4 is set to r4 &= r5, where it transitions to UNKNOWN_VALUE from evaluate_reg_imm_alu(). Later on r4 we shift right by 3 inside evaluate_reg_alu(), where the register's imm turns into 3. That is, for registers with type UNKNOWN_VALUE, imm of 0 means that we don't know what value the register has, and for imm > 0 it means that the value has [imm] upper zero bits. F.e. when shifting an UNKNOWN_VALUE register by 3 to the right, no matter what value it had, we know that the 3 upper most bits must be zero now. This is to make sure that ALU operations with unknown registers don't overflow. Meaning, once we know that we have more than 48 upper zero bits, or, in other words cannot go beyond 0xffff offset with ALU ops, such an addition will track the target register as a new pkt() register with a new id, but 0 offset and 0 range, so for that a new data/data_end test will be required. Is the source register a CONST_IMM one that is to be added to the pkt() register, or the source instruction is an add instruction with immediate value, then it will get added if it stays within max 0xffff bounds. >From there, pkt() type, can be accessed should reg->off + imm be within the access range of pkt(). [...] from 28 to 30: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=22) R2=pkt_end R3=imm144,min_value=144,max_value=144 R4=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0 R5=inv48,min_value=2054,max_value=2054 R10=fp 30: (bf) r5 = r3 31: (07) r5 += 23 32: (77) r5 >>= 3 33: (bf) r6 = r1 34: (0f) r6 += r5 cannot add integer value with 0 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet [...] from 52 to 80: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1 R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=34) R2=pkt_end R3=inv R4=imm272 R5=inv56,min_value=17,max_value=17 R6=pkt(id=0,off=26,r=34) R10=fp 80: (07) r4 += 71 81: (18) r5 = 0xfffffff8 83: (5f) r4 &= r5 84: (77) r4 >>= 3 85: (0f) r1 += r4 cannot add integer value with 3 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet Thus to get above use-cases working, evaluate_reg_imm_alu() has been extended for further ALU ops. This is fine, because we only operate strictly within realm of CONST_IMM types, so here we don't care about overflows as they will happen in the simulated but also real execution and interaction with pkt() in check_packet_ptr_add() will check actual imm value once added to pkt(), but it's irrelevant before. With regards to 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") that works on UNKNOWN_VALUE registers, the verifier becomes now a bit smarter as it can better resolve ALU ops, so we need to adapt two test cases there, as min/max bound tracking only becomes necessary when registers were spilled to stack. So while mask was set before to track upper bound for UNKNOWN_VALUE case, it's now resolved directly as CONST_IMM, and such contructs are only necessary when f.e. registers are spilled. For commit 6b17387307ba ("bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts") that initially enabled dw load tracking only for nfp jit/ analyzer, I did couple of tests on large, complex programs and we don't increase complexity badly (my tests were in ~3% range on avg). I've added a couple of tests similar to affected code above, and it works fine with verifier now. Reported-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Cc: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-24 00:06:30 +00:00
goto out;
}
dst_reg->imm = dst_imm;
out:
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return 0;
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
static void check_reg_overflow(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
if (reg->max_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
if (reg->min_value < BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE ||
reg->min_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
}
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
static u32 calc_align(u32 imm)
{
if (!imm)
return 1U << 31;
return imm - ((imm - 1) & imm);
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
static void adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
s64 min_val = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
u64 max_val = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
u32 dst_align, src_align;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
src_align = 0;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
check_reg_overflow(&regs[insn->src_reg]);
min_val = regs[insn->src_reg].min_value;
max_val = regs[insn->src_reg].max_value;
/* If the source register is a random pointer then the
* min_value/max_value values represent the range of the known
* accesses into that value, not the actual min/max value of the
* register itself. In this case we have to reset the reg range
* values so we know it is not safe to look at.
*/
if (regs[insn->src_reg].type != CONST_IMM &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type != UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
min_val = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
max_val = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
src_align = 0;
} else {
src_align = regs[insn->src_reg].min_align;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
}
} else if (insn->imm < BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE &&
(s64)insn->imm > BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE) {
min_val = max_val = insn->imm;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
src_align = calc_align(insn->imm);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
}
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
dst_align = dst_reg->min_align;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
/* We don't know anything about what was done to this register, mark it
* as unknown.
*/
if (min_val == BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE &&
max_val == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
return;
}
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
/* If one of our values was at the end of our ranges then we can't just
* do our normal operations to the register, we need to set the values
* to the min/max since they are undefined.
*/
if (min_val == BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
if (max_val == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
dst_reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
dst_reg->min_value += min_val;
if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
dst_reg->max_value += max_val;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
dst_reg->min_align = min(src_align, dst_align);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
break;
case BPF_SUB:
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
dst_reg->min_value -= min_val;
if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
dst_reg->max_value -= max_val;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
dst_reg->min_align = min(src_align, dst_align);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
break;
case BPF_MUL:
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
dst_reg->min_value *= min_val;
if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
dst_reg->max_value *= max_val;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
dst_reg->min_align = max(src_align, dst_align);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
break;
case BPF_AND:
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
/* Disallow AND'ing of negative numbers, ain't nobody got time
* for that. Otherwise the minimum is 0 and the max is the max
* value we could AND against.
*/
if (min_val < 0)
dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
else
dst_reg->min_value = 0;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
dst_reg->max_value = max_val;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
dst_reg->min_align = max(src_align, dst_align);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
break;
case BPF_LSH:
/* Gotta have special overflow logic here, if we're shifting
* more than MAX_RANGE then just assume we have an invalid
* range.
*/
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
if (min_val > ilog2(BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)) {
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
dst_reg->min_align = 1;
} else {
if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
dst_reg->min_value <<= min_val;
if (!dst_reg->min_align)
dst_reg->min_align = 1;
dst_reg->min_align <<= min_val;
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
if (max_val > ilog2(BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE))
dst_reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
else if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
dst_reg->max_value <<= max_val;
break;
case BPF_RSH:
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
/* RSH by a negative number is undefined, and the BPF_RSH is an
* unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts.
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
*/
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
if (min_val < 0 || dst_reg->min_value < 0) {
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
} else {
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
dst_reg->min_value =
(u64)(dst_reg->min_value) >> min_val;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
}
if (min_val < 0) {
dst_reg->min_align = 1;
} else {
dst_reg->min_align >>= (u64) min_val;
if (!dst_reg->min_align)
dst_reg->min_align = 1;
}
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-14 20:45:36 +00:00
if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
dst_reg->max_value >>= max_val;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
break;
default:
reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
check_reg_overflow(dst_reg);
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64)) {
verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
/* we are setting our register to something new, we need to
* reset its range values.
*/
reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
} else {
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = insn->imm;
bpf: reset id on CONST_IMM transition Whenever we set the register to the type CONST_IMM, we currently don't reset the id to 0. id member is not used in CONST_IMM case, so don't let it become stale, where pruning won't be able to match later on. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-10 22:50:42 +00:00
regs[insn->dst_reg].id = 0;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
regs[insn->dst_reg].max_value = insn->imm;
regs[insn->dst_reg].min_value = insn->imm;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:22:52 +00:00
regs[insn->dst_reg].min_align = calc_align(insn->imm);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose("div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
net: bpf: reject invalid shifts On ARM64, a BUG() is triggered in the eBPF JIT if a filter with a constant shift that can't be encoded in the immediate field of the UBFM/SBFM instructions is passed to the JIT. Since these shifts amounts, which are negative or >= regsize, are invalid, reject them in the eBPF verifier and the classic BPF filter checker, for all architectures. Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-01-12 19:17:08 +00:00
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
/* first we want to adjust our ranges. */
adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* pattern match 'bpf_add Rx, imm' instruction */
if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
dst_reg->type == FRAME_PTR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_STACK;
dst_reg->imm = insn->imm;
return 0;
bpf: enhance verifier to understand stack pointer arithmetic llvm 4.0 and above generates the code like below: .... 440: (b7) r1 = 15 441: (05) goto pc+73 515: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r10 -152) 516: (bf) r7 = r10 517: (07) r7 += -112 518: (bf) r2 = r7 519: (0f) r2 += r1 520: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r8 +0) 521: (73) *(u8 *)(r2 +45) = r1 .... and the verifier complains "R2 invalid mem access 'inv'" for insn #521. This is because verifier marks register r2 as unknown value after #519 where r2 is a stack pointer and r1 holds a constant value. Teach verifier to recognize "stack_ptr + imm" and "stack_ptr + reg with const val" as valid stack_ptr with new offset. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-30 05:52:42 +00:00
} else if (opcode == BPF_ADD &&
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
((BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == CONST_IMM) ||
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
dst_reg->imm += regs[insn->src_reg].imm;
else
dst_reg->imm += insn->imm;
return 0;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
} else if (opcode == BPF_ADD &&
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
bpf: teach verifier to recognize imm += ptr pattern Humans don't write C code like: u8 *ptr = skb->data; int imm = 4; imm += ptr; but from llvm backend point of view 'imm' and 'ptr' are registers and imm += ptr may be preferred vs ptr += imm depending which register value will be used further in the code, while verifier can only recognize ptr += imm. That caused small unrelated changes in the C code of the bpf program to trigger rejection by the verifier. Therefore teach the verifier to recognize both ptr += imm and imm += ptr. For example: when R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=imm22 after r7 += r6 instruction will be R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=62) Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-20 01:17:14 +00:00
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
(BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
/* ptr_to_packet += K|X */
return check_packet_ptr_add(env, insn);
} else if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
dst_reg->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE &&
env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
/* unknown += K|X */
return evaluate_reg_alu(env, insn);
} else if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM &&
env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
/* reg_imm += K|X */
return evaluate_reg_imm_alu(env, insn);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
} else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
/* If we did pointer math on a map value then just set it to our
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ type so we can deal with any stores or
* loads to this register appropriately, otherwise just mark the
* register as unknown.
*/
if (env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types While looking into map_value_adj, I noticed that alu operations directly on the map_value() resp. map_value_adj() register (any alu operation on a map_value() register will turn it into a map_value_adj() typed register) are not sufficiently protected against some of the operations. Two non-exhaustive examples are provided that the verifier needs to reject: i) BPF_AND on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0xbf842a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (57) r0 &= 8 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 22 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=8 R10=fp 9: (95) exit from 6 to 9: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 9: (95) exit processed 10 insns ii) BPF_ADD in 32 bit mode on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0xc24eee00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (04) (u32) r0 += (u32) 0 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 22 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 9: (95) exit from 6 to 9: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 9: (95) exit processed 10 insns Issue is, while min_value / max_value boundaries for the access are adjusted appropriately, we change the pointer value in a way that cannot be sufficiently tracked anymore from its origin. Operations like BPF_{AND,OR,DIV,MUL,etc} on a destination register that is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} was probably unintended, in fact, all the test cases coming with 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") perform BPF_ADD only on the destination register that is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ. Only for UNKNOWN_VALUE register types such operations make sense, f.e. with unknown memory content fetched initially from a constant offset from the map value memory into a register. That register is then later tested against lower / upper bounds, so that the verifier can then do the tracking of min_value / max_value, and properly check once that UNKNOWN_VALUE register is added to the destination register with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ}. This is also what the original use-case is solving. Note, tracking on what is being added is done through adjust_reg_min_max_vals() and later access to the map value enforced with these boundaries and the given offset from the insn through check_map_access_adj(). Tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic, in particular in check_alu_op(), we bail out on the is_pointer_value() check on the dst_reg (which is false in root case as we allow for pointer arithmetic via env->allow_ptr_leaks). Similarly to PTR_TO_PACKET, one way to fix it is to restrict the allowed operations on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} registers to 64 bit mode BPF_ADD. The test_verifier suite runs fine after the patch and it also rejects mentioned test cases. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 00:24:02 +00:00
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 && opcode == BPF_ADD &&
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ))
dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ;
else
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
int i;
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-07 23:03:42 +00:00
/* LLVM can generate two kind of checks:
*
* Type 1:
*
* r2 = r3;
* r2 += 8;
* if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
* <access okay>
*
* Where:
* r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
* r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
* r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
*
* Type 2:
*
* r2 = r3;
* r2 += 8;
* if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
* <handle exception>
*
* Where:
* pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
* r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
* r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
*
* Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
* so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access.
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
*/
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-07 23:03:42 +00:00
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
bpf: improve verifier packet range checks llvm can optimize the 'if (ptr > data_end)' checks to be in the order slightly different than the original C code which will confuse verifier. Like: if (ptr + 16 > data_end) return TC_ACT_SHOT; // may be followed by if (ptr + 14 > data_end) return TC_ACT_SHOT; while llvm can see that 'ptr' is valid for all 16 bytes, the verifier could not. Fix verifier logic to account for such case and add a test. Reported-by: Huapeng Zhou <hzhou@fb.com> Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 22:57:33 +00:00
/* keep the maximum range already checked */
regs[i].range = max(regs[i].range, dst_reg->off);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
bpf: improve verifier packet range checks llvm can optimize the 'if (ptr > data_end)' checks to be in the order slightly different than the original C code which will confuse verifier. Like: if (ptr + 16 > data_end) return TC_ACT_SHOT; // may be followed by if (ptr + 14 > data_end) return TC_ACT_SHOT; while llvm can see that 'ptr' is valid for all 16 bytes, the verifier could not. Fix verifier logic to account for such case and add a test. Reported-by: Huapeng Zhou <hzhou@fb.com> Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 22:57:33 +00:00
reg->range = max(reg->range, dst_reg->off);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
}
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
* variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
* simply doing a BPF_K check.
*/
static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
u8 opcode)
{
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_JEQ:
/* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
* true then we know for sure.
*/
true_reg->max_value = true_reg->min_value = val;
break;
case BPF_JNE:
/* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
* we know the value for sure;
*/
false_reg->max_value = false_reg->min_value = val;
break;
case BPF_JGT:
/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
false_reg->min_value = 0;
bpf: reduce compiler warnings by adding fallthrough comments Fixes the following warnings: kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘may_access_direct_pkt_data’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:702:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] if (t == BPF_WRITE) ^ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:704:2: note: here case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max_inv’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2057:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2058:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2068:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2069:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2009:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2010:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2019:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2020:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Alemayhu <alexander@alemayhu.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-13 23:02:35 +00:00
/* fallthrough */
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
case BPF_JSGT:
/* If this is false then we know the maximum val is val,
* otherwise we know the min val is val+1.
*/
false_reg->max_value = val;
true_reg->min_value = val + 1;
break;
case BPF_JGE:
/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
false_reg->min_value = 0;
bpf: reduce compiler warnings by adding fallthrough comments Fixes the following warnings: kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘may_access_direct_pkt_data’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:702:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] if (t == BPF_WRITE) ^ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:704:2: note: here case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max_inv’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2057:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2058:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2068:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2069:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2009:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2010:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2019:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2020:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Alemayhu <alexander@alemayhu.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-13 23:02:35 +00:00
/* fallthrough */
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
case BPF_JSGE:
/* If this is false then we know the maximum value is val - 1,
* otherwise we know the mimimum value is val.
*/
false_reg->max_value = val - 1;
true_reg->min_value = val;
break;
default:
break;
}
check_reg_overflow(false_reg);
check_reg_overflow(true_reg);
}
/* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg is a CONST_IMM reg and src_reg
* is the variable reg.
*/
static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
u8 opcode)
{
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_JEQ:
/* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
* true then we know for sure.
*/
true_reg->max_value = true_reg->min_value = val;
break;
case BPF_JNE:
/* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
* we know the value for sure;
*/
false_reg->max_value = false_reg->min_value = val;
break;
case BPF_JGT:
/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
true_reg->min_value = 0;
bpf: reduce compiler warnings by adding fallthrough comments Fixes the following warnings: kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘may_access_direct_pkt_data’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:702:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] if (t == BPF_WRITE) ^ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:704:2: note: here case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max_inv’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2057:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2058:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2068:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2069:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2009:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2010:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2019:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2020:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Alemayhu <alexander@alemayhu.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-13 23:02:35 +00:00
/* fallthrough */
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
case BPF_JSGT:
/*
* If this is false, then the val is <= the register, if it is
* true the register <= to the val.
*/
false_reg->min_value = val;
true_reg->max_value = val - 1;
break;
case BPF_JGE:
/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
true_reg->min_value = 0;
bpf: reduce compiler warnings by adding fallthrough comments Fixes the following warnings: kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘may_access_direct_pkt_data’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:702:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] if (t == BPF_WRITE) ^ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:704:2: note: here case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max_inv’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2057:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2058:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2068:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2069:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2009:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2010:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2019:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2020:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Alemayhu <alexander@alemayhu.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-13 23:02:35 +00:00
/* fallthrough */
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
case BPF_JSGE:
/* If this is false then constant < register, if it is true then
* the register < constant.
*/
false_reg->min_value = val + 1;
true_reg->max_value = val;
break;
default:
break;
}
check_reg_overflow(false_reg);
check_reg_overflow(true_reg);
}
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id,
enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) {
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:33 +00:00
if (type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
__mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
} else if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) {
reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta;
} else {
reg->type = type;
}
bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups Commit 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit, whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected program has roughly 2k instructions. What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0a416 is incorrect per se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the same program with regards to involved map lookups. Since commit 57a09bf0a416 is only about tracking registers with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types. For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(), but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call return with RET_INTEGER return type. states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state; note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of that since d2a4dd37f6b4 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect pointed already to 57a09bf0a416, where we really reach beyond complexity limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a pruning decision. We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus a different scenario. Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE, it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states. A test case for this is added here, too. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-15 00:30:06 +00:00
/* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we
* should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances
* to take effect.
*/
reg->id = 0;
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
}
}
/* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
* be folded together at some point.
*/
static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno,
enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups Commit 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit, whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected program has roughly 2k instructions. What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0a416 is incorrect per se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the same program with regards to involved map lookups. Since commit 57a09bf0a416 is only about tracking registers with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types. For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(), but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call return with RET_INTEGER return type. states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state; note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of that since d2a4dd37f6b4 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect pointed already to 57a09bf0a416, where we really reach beyond complexity limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a pruning decision. We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus a different scenario. Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE, it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states. A test case for this is added here, too. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-15 00:30:06 +00:00
u32 id = regs[regno].id;
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups Commit 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit, whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected program has roughly 2k instructions. What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0a416 is incorrect per se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the same program with regards to involved map lookups. Since commit 57a09bf0a416 is only about tracking registers with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types. For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(), but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call return with RET_INTEGER return type. states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state; note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of that since d2a4dd37f6b4 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect pointed already to 57a09bf0a416, where we really reach beyond complexity limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a pruning decision. We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus a different scenario. Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE, it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states. A test case for this is added here, too. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-15 00:30:06 +00:00
mark_map_reg(regs, i, id, type);
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups Commit 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit, whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected program has roughly 2k instructions. What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0a416 is incorrect per se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the same program with regards to involved map lookups. Since commit 57a09bf0a416 is only about tracking registers with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types. For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(), but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call return with RET_INTEGER return type. states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state; note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of that since d2a4dd37f6b4 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect pointed already to 57a09bf0a416, where we really reach beyond complexity limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a pruning decision. We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus a different scenario. Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE, it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states. A test case for this is added here, too. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-15 00:30:06 +00:00
mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE, id, type);
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
}
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch, *this_branch = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->regs, *dst_reg;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode > BPF_EXIT) {
verbose("invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0) {
verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
(opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM && dst_reg->imm == insn->imm) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) {
/* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off;
* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through
*/
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
} else {
/* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off;
* only follow fall-through branch, since
* that's where the program will go
*/
return 0;
}
}
other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
if (!other_branch)
return -EFAULT;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
/* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
* our min/max values for our dst register.
*/
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (regs[insn->src_reg].type == CONST_IMM)
reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].imm,
opcode);
else if (dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM)
reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
&regs[insn->src_reg], dst_reg->imm,
opcode);
} else {
reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
/* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-18 17:51:19 +00:00
/* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either
* safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
*/
mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
opcode == BPF_JEQ ? PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE : UNKNOWN_VALUE);
mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
opcode == BPF_JEQ ? UNKNOWN_VALUE : PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-07 23:03:42 +00:00
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg]);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
} else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
if (log_level)
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-07 23:03:42 +00:00
print_verifier_state(this_branch);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return 0;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
/* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;
return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int err;
if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
verbose("invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts When running as parser interpret BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW instructions as loading CONST_IMM with the value stored in imm. The verifier will continue not recognizing those due to concerns about search space/program complexity increase. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:59 +00:00
if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = imm;
bpf: reset id on CONST_IMM transition Whenever we set the register to the type CONST_IMM, we currently don't reset the id to 0. id member is not used in CONST_IMM case, so don't let it become stale, where pruning won't be able to match later on. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-10 22:50:42 +00:00
regs[insn->dst_reg].id = 0;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return 0;
bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts When running as parser interpret BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW instructions as loading CONST_IMM with the value stored in imm. The verifier will continue not recognizing those due to concerns about search space/program complexity increase. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:59 +00:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */
BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD);
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn);
return 0;
}
ebpf: add sched_cls_type and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops As discussed recently and at netconf/netdev01, we want to prevent making bpf_verifier_ops registration available for modules, but have them at a controlled place inside the kernel instead. The reason for this is, that out-of-tree modules can go crazy and define and register any verfifier ops they want, doing all sorts of crap, even bypassing available GPLed eBPF helper functions. We don't want to offer such a shiny playground, of course, but keep strict control to ourselves inside the core kernel. This also encourages us to design eBPF user helpers carefully and generically, so they can be shared among various subsystems using eBPF. For the eBPF traffic classifier (cls_bpf), it's a good start to share the same helper facilities as we currently do in eBPF for socket filters. That way, we have BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS look like it's own type, thus one day if there's a good reason to diverge the set of helper functions from the set available to socket filters, we keep ABI compatibility. In future, we could place all bpf_prog_type_list at a central place, perhaps. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-01 11:31:46 +00:00
static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
ebpf: add sched_act_type and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops In order to prepare eBPF support for tc action, we need to add sched_act_type, so that the eBPF verifier is aware of what helper function act_bpf may use, that it can load skb data and read out currently available skb fields. This is bascially analogous to 96be4325f443 ("ebpf: add sched_cls_type and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops"). BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT need to be separate since both will have a different set of functionality in future (classifier vs action), thus we won't run into ABI troubles when the point in time comes to diverge functionality from the classifier. The future plan for act_bpf would be that it will be able to write into skb->data and alter selected fields mirrored in struct __sk_buff. For an initial support, it's sufficient to map it to sk_filter_ops. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-20 14:11:11 +00:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
ebpf: add sched_cls_type and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops As discussed recently and at netconf/netdev01, we want to prevent making bpf_verifier_ops registration available for modules, but have them at a controlled place inside the kernel instead. The reason for this is, that out-of-tree modules can go crazy and define and register any verfifier ops they want, doing all sorts of crap, even bypassing available GPLed eBPF helper functions. We don't want to offer such a shiny playground, of course, but keep strict control to ourselves inside the core kernel. This also encourages us to design eBPF user helpers carefully and generically, so they can be shared among various subsystems using eBPF. For the eBPF traffic classifier (cls_bpf), it's a good start to share the same helper facilities as we currently do in eBPF for socket filters. That way, we have BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS look like it's own type, thus one day if there's a good reason to diverge the set of helper functions from the set available to socket filters, we keep ABI compatibility. In future, we could place all bpf_prog_type_list at a central place, perhaps. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-01 11:31:46 +00:00
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-01 23:06:34 +00:00
/* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
* - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
* - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
* preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
*
* Implicit input:
* ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
*
* Explicit input:
* SRC == any register
* IMM == 32-bit immediate
*
* Output:
* R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-01 23:06:34 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-01 23:06:34 +00:00
u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
int i, err;
ebpf: move read-only fields to bpf_prog and shrink bpf_prog_aux is_gpl_compatible and prog_type should be moved directly into bpf_prog as they stay immutable during bpf_prog's lifetime, are core attributes and they can be locked as read-only later on via bpf_prog_select_runtime(). With a bit of rearranging, this also allows us to shrink bpf_prog_aux to exactly 1 cacheline. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-01 11:31:47 +00:00
if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-01 23:06:34 +00:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
bpf/verifier: reject invalid LD_ABS | BPF_DW instruction verifier must check for reserved size bits in instruction opcode and reject BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_DW and BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_DW instructions, otherwise interpreter will WARN_RATELIMIT on them during execution. Fixes: ddd872bc3098 ("bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-12 17:26:19 +00:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-01 23:06:34 +00:00
(mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-01 23:06:34 +00:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (mode == BPF_IND) {
/* check explicit source operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
bpf: properly reset caller saved regs after helper call and ld_abs/ind Currently, after performing helper calls, we clear all caller saved registers, that is r0 - r5 and fill r0 depending on struct bpf_func_proto specification. The way we reset these regs can affect pruning decisions in later paths, since we only reset register's imm to 0 and type to NOT_INIT. However, we leave out clearing of other variables such as id, min_value, max_value, etc, which can later on lead to pruning mismatches due to stale data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:06 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++)
mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]);
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-01 23:06:34 +00:00
/* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
* the value fetched from the packet
*/
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
return 0;
}
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
/* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
* 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
* 2 label v as discovered
* 3 let S be a stack
* 4 S.push(v)
* 5 while S is not empty
* 6 t <- S.pop()
* 7 if t is what we're looking for:
* 8 return t
* 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
* 10 if edge e is already labelled
* 11 continue with the next edge
* 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
* 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
* 14 label e as tree-edge
* 15 label w as discovered
* 16 S.push(w)
* 17 continue at 5
* 18 else if vertex w is discovered
* 19 label e as back-edge
* 20 else
* 21 // vertex w is explored
* 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge
* 23 label t as explored
* 24 S.pop()
*
* convention:
* 0x10 - discovered
* 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
* 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
* 0x20 - explored
*/
enum {
DISCOVERED = 0x10,
EXPLORED = 0x20,
FALLTHROUGH = 1,
BRANCH = 2,
};
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
#define STATE_LIST_MARK ((struct bpf_verifier_state_list *) -1L)
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
static int *insn_stack; /* stack of insns to process */
static int cur_stack; /* current stack index */
static int *insn_state;
/* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
* t - index of current instruction
* w - next instruction
* e - edge
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
{
if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
return 0;
if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
return 0;
if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
if (e == BRANCH)
/* mark branch target for state pruning */
env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
/* tree-edge */
insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
return -E2BIG;
insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
return 1;
} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
return -EINVAL;
} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
/* forward- or cross-edge */
insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
} else {
verbose("insn state internal bug\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
/* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
* loop == back-edge in directed graph
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
{
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int ret = 0;
int i, t;
insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
return -ENOMEM;
insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_stack) {
kfree(insn_state);
return -ENOMEM;
}
insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
cur_stack = 1;
peek_stack:
if (cur_stack == 0)
goto check_state;
t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
goto mark_explored;
} else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that a previously walked path with same register and stack contents terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search can skip walking those states. When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096) insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice. This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit due to search pruning not being able to take effect. Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by ~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores, where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal() test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale that these two branches of execution that converge after the label might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often. Hence, we left that as is for now. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-05 20:33:17 +00:00
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
/* unconditional jump with single edge */
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
* after every call and jump
*/
bpf: fix verifier memory corruption Due to missing bounds check the DAG pass of the BPF verifier can corrupt the memory which can cause random crashes during program loading: [8.449451] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffffff [8.451293] IP: [<ffffffff811de33d>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x8d/0x2f0 [8.452329] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [8.452329] Call Trace: [8.452329] [<ffffffff8116cc82>] bpf_check+0x852/0x2000 [8.452329] [<ffffffff8116b7e4>] bpf_prog_load+0x1e4/0x310 [8.452329] [<ffffffff811b190f>] ? might_fault+0x5f/0xb0 [8.452329] [<ffffffff8116c206>] SyS_bpf+0x806/0xa30 Fixes: f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-14 22:57:13 +00:00
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
} else {
/* conditional jump with two edges */
bpf: adjust verifier heuristics Current limits with regards to processing program paths do not really reflect today's needs anymore due to programs becoming more complex and verifier smarter, keeping track of more data such as const ALU operations, alignment tracking, spilling of PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ registers, and other features allowing for smarter matching of what LLVM generates. This also comes with the side-effect that we result in fewer opportunities to prune search states and thus often need to do more work to prove safety than in the past due to different register states and stack layout where we mismatch. Generally, it's quite hard to determine what caused a sudden increase in complexity, it could be caused by something as trivial as a single branch somewhere at the beginning of the program where LLVM assigned a stack slot that is marked differently throughout other branches and thus causing a mismatch, where verifier then needs to prove safety for the whole rest of the program. Subsequently, programs with even less than half the insn size limit can get rejected. We noticed that while some programs load fine under pre 4.11, they get rejected due to hitting limits on more recent kernels. We saw that in the vast majority of cases (90+%) pruning failed due to register mismatches. In case of stack mismatches, majority of cases failed due to different stack slot types (invalid, spill, misc) rather than differences in spilled registers. This patch makes pruning more aggressive by also adding markers that sit at conditional jumps as well. Currently, we only mark jump targets for pruning. For example in direct packet access, these are usually error paths where we bail out. We found that adding these markers, it can reduce number of processed insns by up to 30%. Another option is to ignore reg->id in probing PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers, which can help pruning slightly as well by up to 7% observed complexity reduction as stand-alone. Meaning, if a previous path with register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL for map X was found to be safe, then in the current state a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL register for the same map X must be safe as well. Last but not least the patch also adds a scheduling point and bumps the current limit for instructions to be processed to a more adequate value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-18 01:00:06 +00:00
env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
} else {
/* all other non-branch instructions with single
* fall-through edge
*/
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
mark_explored:
insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
verbose("pop stack internal bug\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_free;
}
goto peek_stack;
check_state:
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
}
ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
err_free:
kfree(insn_state);
kfree(insn_stack);
return ret;
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
/* the following conditions reduce the number of explored insns
* from ~140k to ~80k for ultra large programs that use a lot of ptr_to_packet
*/
bpf: fix incorrect pruning decision when alignment must be tracked Currently, when we enforce alignment tracking on direct packet access, the verifier lets the following program pass despite doing a packet write with unaligned access: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (bf) r0 = r2 4: (07) r0 += 14 5: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 6: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 7: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 6 to 8: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 5 to 10: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R10=fp 10: (07) r0 += 1 11: (05) goto pc-6 6: safe <----- here, wrongly found safe processed 15 insns However, if we enforce a pruning mismatch by adding state into r8 which is then being mismatched in states_equal(), we find that for the otherwise same program, the verifier detects a misaligned packet access when actually walking that path: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r0 = r2 5: (07) r0 += 14 6: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 7 to 9: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 6 to 11: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (07) r0 += 1 12: (b7) r8 = 0 13: (05) goto pc-7 <----- mismatch due to r8 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=15) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=15) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 misaligned packet access off 2+15+-4 size 4 The reason why we fail to see it in states_equal() is that the third test in compare_ptrs_to_packet() ... if (old->off <= cur->off && old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range) return true; ... will let the above pass. The situation we run into is that old->off <= cur->off (14 <= 15), meaning that prior walked paths went with smaller offset, which was later used in the packet access after successful packet range check and found to be safe already. For example: Given is R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0). Adding offset 14 as in above program to it, results in R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) before the packet range test. Now, testing this against R3=pkt_end with 'if r0 > r3 goto out' will transform R0 into R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) for the case when we're within bounds. A write into the packet at offset *(u32 *)(r0 -4), that is, 2 + 14 -4, is valid and aligned (2 is for NET_IP_ALIGN). After processing this with all fall-through paths, we later on check paths from branches. When the above skb->mark test is true, then we jump near the end of the program, perform r0 += 1, and jump back to the 'if r0 > r3 goto out' test we've visited earlier already. This time, R0 is of type R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=0), and we'll prune that part because this time we'll have a larger safe packet range, and we already found that with off=14 all further insn were already safe, so it's safe as well with a larger off. However, the problem is that the subsequent write into the packet with 2 + 15 -4 is then unaligned, and not caught by the alignment tracking. Note that min_align, aux_off, and aux_off_align were all 0 in this example. Since we cannot tell at this time what kind of packet access was performed in the prior walk and what minimal requirements it has (we might do so in the future, but that requires more complexity), fix it to disable this pruning case for strict alignment for now, and let the verifier do check such paths instead. With that applied, the test cases pass and reject the program due to misalignment. Fixes: d1174416747d ("bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier.") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/761909/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:05 +00:00
static bool compare_ptrs_to_packet(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *old,
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
{
if (old->id != cur->id)
return false;
/* old ptr_to_packet is more conservative, since it allows smaller
* range. Ex:
* old(off=0,r=10) is equal to cur(off=0,r=20), because
* old(off=0,r=10) means that with range=10 the verifier proceeded
* further and found no issues with the program. Now we're in the same
* spot with cur(off=0,r=20), so we're safe too, since anything further
* will only be looking at most 10 bytes after this pointer.
*/
if (old->off == cur->off && old->range < cur->range)
return true;
/* old(off=20,r=10) is equal to cur(off=22,re=22 or 5 or 0)
* since both cannot be used for packet access and safe(old)
* pointer has smaller off that could be used for further
* 'if (ptr > data_end)' check
* Ex:
* old(off=20,r=10) and cur(off=22,r=22) and cur(off=22,r=0) mean
* that we cannot access the packet.
* The safe range is:
* [ptr, ptr + range - off)
* so whenever off >=range, it means no safe bytes from this pointer.
* When comparing old->off <= cur->off, it means that older code
* went with smaller offset and that offset was later
* used to figure out the safe range after 'if (ptr > data_end)' check
* Say, 'old' state was explored like:
* ... R3(off=0, r=0)
* R4 = R3 + 20
* ... now R4(off=20,r=0) <-- here
* if (R4 > data_end)
* ... R4(off=20,r=20), R3(off=0,r=20) and R3 can be used to access.
* ... the code further went all the way to bpf_exit.
* Now the 'cur' state at the mark 'here' has R4(off=30,r=0).
* old_R4(off=20,r=0) equal to cur_R4(off=30,r=0), since if the verifier
* goes further, such cur_R4 will give larger safe packet range after
* 'if (R4 > data_end)' and all further insn were already good with r=20,
* so they will be good with r=30 and we can prune the search.
*/
bpf: fix incorrect pruning decision when alignment must be tracked Currently, when we enforce alignment tracking on direct packet access, the verifier lets the following program pass despite doing a packet write with unaligned access: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (bf) r0 = r2 4: (07) r0 += 14 5: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 6: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 7: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 6 to 8: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 5 to 10: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R10=fp 10: (07) r0 += 1 11: (05) goto pc-6 6: safe <----- here, wrongly found safe processed 15 insns However, if we enforce a pruning mismatch by adding state into r8 which is then being mismatched in states_equal(), we find that for the otherwise same program, the verifier detects a misaligned packet access when actually walking that path: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r0 = r2 5: (07) r0 += 14 6: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 7 to 9: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 6 to 11: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (07) r0 += 1 12: (b7) r8 = 0 13: (05) goto pc-7 <----- mismatch due to r8 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=15) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=15) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 misaligned packet access off 2+15+-4 size 4 The reason why we fail to see it in states_equal() is that the third test in compare_ptrs_to_packet() ... if (old->off <= cur->off && old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range) return true; ... will let the above pass. The situation we run into is that old->off <= cur->off (14 <= 15), meaning that prior walked paths went with smaller offset, which was later used in the packet access after successful packet range check and found to be safe already. For example: Given is R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0). Adding offset 14 as in above program to it, results in R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) before the packet range test. Now, testing this against R3=pkt_end with 'if r0 > r3 goto out' will transform R0 into R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) for the case when we're within bounds. A write into the packet at offset *(u32 *)(r0 -4), that is, 2 + 14 -4, is valid and aligned (2 is for NET_IP_ALIGN). After processing this with all fall-through paths, we later on check paths from branches. When the above skb->mark test is true, then we jump near the end of the program, perform r0 += 1, and jump back to the 'if r0 > r3 goto out' test we've visited earlier already. This time, R0 is of type R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=0), and we'll prune that part because this time we'll have a larger safe packet range, and we already found that with off=14 all further insn were already safe, so it's safe as well with a larger off. However, the problem is that the subsequent write into the packet with 2 + 15 -4 is then unaligned, and not caught by the alignment tracking. Note that min_align, aux_off, and aux_off_align were all 0 in this example. Since we cannot tell at this time what kind of packet access was performed in the prior walk and what minimal requirements it has (we might do so in the future, but that requires more complexity), fix it to disable this pruning case for strict alignment for now, and let the verifier do check such paths instead. With that applied, the test cases pass and reject the program due to misalignment. Fixes: d1174416747d ("bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier.") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/761909/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:05 +00:00
if (!env->strict_alignment && old->off <= cur->off &&
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range)
return true;
return false;
}
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
/* compare two verifier states
*
* all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
* verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
*
* this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
* execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
* more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
* branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
* concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
*
* Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
* and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
* Example:
* explored current
* (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
* (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
*
* In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
* valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
* the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
*
* Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
* whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
* the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
*/
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
{
bpf: fix states equal logic for varlen access If we have a branch that looks something like this int foo = map->value; if (condition) { foo += blah; } else { foo = bar; } map->array[foo] = baz; We will incorrectly assume that the !condition branch is equal to the condition branch as the register for foo will be UNKNOWN_VALUE in both cases. We need to adjust this logic to only do this if we didn't do a varlen access after we processed the !condition branch, otherwise we have different ranges and need to check the other branch as well. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-29 17:27:09 +00:00
bool varlen_map_access = env->varlen_map_value_access;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *rold, *rcur;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
rold = &old->regs[i];
rcur = &cur->regs[i];
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, sizeof(*rold)) == 0)
continue;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
/* If the ranges were not the same, but everything else was and
* we didn't do a variable access into a map then we are a-ok.
*/
bpf: fix states equal logic for varlen access If we have a branch that looks something like this int foo = map->value; if (condition) { foo += blah; } else { foo = bar; } map->array[foo] = baz; We will incorrectly assume that the !condition branch is equal to the condition branch as the register for foo will be UNKNOWN_VALUE in both cases. We need to adjust this logic to only do this if we didn't do a varlen access after we processed the !condition branch, otherwise we have different ranges and need to check the other branch as well. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-29 17:27:09 +00:00
if (!varlen_map_access &&
bpf: fix state equivalence Commmits 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") and 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") by themselves are correct, but in combination they make state equivalence ignore 'id' field of the register state which can lead to accepting invalid program. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-07 18:57:59 +00:00
memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetofend(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0)
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
continue;
bpf: fix states equal logic for varlen access If we have a branch that looks something like this int foo = map->value; if (condition) { foo += blah; } else { foo = bar; } map->array[foo] = baz; We will incorrectly assume that the !condition branch is equal to the condition branch as the register for foo will be UNKNOWN_VALUE in both cases. We need to adjust this logic to only do this if we didn't do a varlen access after we processed the !condition branch, otherwise we have different ranges and need to check the other branch as well. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-29 17:27:09 +00:00
/* If we didn't map access then again we don't care about the
* mismatched range values and it's ok if our old type was
* UNKNOWN and we didn't go to a NOT_INIT'ed reg.
*/
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
if (rold->type == NOT_INIT ||
bpf: fix states equal logic for varlen access If we have a branch that looks something like this int foo = map->value; if (condition) { foo += blah; } else { foo = bar; } map->array[foo] = baz; We will incorrectly assume that the !condition branch is equal to the condition branch as the register for foo will be UNKNOWN_VALUE in both cases. We need to adjust this logic to only do this if we didn't do a varlen access after we processed the !condition branch, otherwise we have different ranges and need to check the other branch as well. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-29 17:27:09 +00:00
(!varlen_map_access && rold->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE &&
rcur->type != NOT_INIT))
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
continue;
bpf: adjust verifier heuristics Current limits with regards to processing program paths do not really reflect today's needs anymore due to programs becoming more complex and verifier smarter, keeping track of more data such as const ALU operations, alignment tracking, spilling of PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ registers, and other features allowing for smarter matching of what LLVM generates. This also comes with the side-effect that we result in fewer opportunities to prune search states and thus often need to do more work to prove safety than in the past due to different register states and stack layout where we mismatch. Generally, it's quite hard to determine what caused a sudden increase in complexity, it could be caused by something as trivial as a single branch somewhere at the beginning of the program where LLVM assigned a stack slot that is marked differently throughout other branches and thus causing a mismatch, where verifier then needs to prove safety for the whole rest of the program. Subsequently, programs with even less than half the insn size limit can get rejected. We noticed that while some programs load fine under pre 4.11, they get rejected due to hitting limits on more recent kernels. We saw that in the vast majority of cases (90+%) pruning failed due to register mismatches. In case of stack mismatches, majority of cases failed due to different stack slot types (invalid, spill, misc) rather than differences in spilled registers. This patch makes pruning more aggressive by also adding markers that sit at conditional jumps as well. Currently, we only mark jump targets for pruning. For example in direct packet access, these are usually error paths where we bail out. We found that adding these markers, it can reduce number of processed insns by up to 30%. Another option is to ignore reg->id in probing PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers, which can help pruning slightly as well by up to 7% observed complexity reduction as stand-alone. Meaning, if a previous path with register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL for map X was found to be safe, then in the current state a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL register for the same map X must be safe as well. Last but not least the patch also adds a scheduling point and bumps the current limit for instructions to be processed to a more adequate value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-18 01:00:06 +00:00
/* Don't care about the reg->id in this case. */
if (rold->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL &&
rcur->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL &&
rold->map_ptr == rcur->map_ptr)
continue;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
if (rold->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && rcur->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
bpf: fix incorrect pruning decision when alignment must be tracked Currently, when we enforce alignment tracking on direct packet access, the verifier lets the following program pass despite doing a packet write with unaligned access: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (bf) r0 = r2 4: (07) r0 += 14 5: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 6: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 7: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 6 to 8: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 5 to 10: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R10=fp 10: (07) r0 += 1 11: (05) goto pc-6 6: safe <----- here, wrongly found safe processed 15 insns However, if we enforce a pruning mismatch by adding state into r8 which is then being mismatched in states_equal(), we find that for the otherwise same program, the verifier detects a misaligned packet access when actually walking that path: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r0 = r2 5: (07) r0 += 14 6: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 7 to 9: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 6 to 11: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (07) r0 += 1 12: (b7) r8 = 0 13: (05) goto pc-7 <----- mismatch due to r8 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=15) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=15) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 misaligned packet access off 2+15+-4 size 4 The reason why we fail to see it in states_equal() is that the third test in compare_ptrs_to_packet() ... if (old->off <= cur->off && old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range) return true; ... will let the above pass. The situation we run into is that old->off <= cur->off (14 <= 15), meaning that prior walked paths went with smaller offset, which was later used in the packet access after successful packet range check and found to be safe already. For example: Given is R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0). Adding offset 14 as in above program to it, results in R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) before the packet range test. Now, testing this against R3=pkt_end with 'if r0 > r3 goto out' will transform R0 into R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) for the case when we're within bounds. A write into the packet at offset *(u32 *)(r0 -4), that is, 2 + 14 -4, is valid and aligned (2 is for NET_IP_ALIGN). After processing this with all fall-through paths, we later on check paths from branches. When the above skb->mark test is true, then we jump near the end of the program, perform r0 += 1, and jump back to the 'if r0 > r3 goto out' test we've visited earlier already. This time, R0 is of type R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=0), and we'll prune that part because this time we'll have a larger safe packet range, and we already found that with off=14 all further insn were already safe, so it's safe as well with a larger off. However, the problem is that the subsequent write into the packet with 2 + 15 -4 is then unaligned, and not caught by the alignment tracking. Note that min_align, aux_off, and aux_off_align were all 0 in this example. Since we cannot tell at this time what kind of packet access was performed in the prior walk and what minimal requirements it has (we might do so in the future, but that requires more complexity), fix it to disable this pruning case for strict alignment for now, and let the verifier do check such paths instead. With that applied, the test cases pass and reject the program due to misalignment. Fixes: d1174416747d ("bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier.") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/761909/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:05 +00:00
compare_ptrs_to_packet(env, rold, rcur))
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:10 +00:00
continue;
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
return false;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID)
continue;
if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i])
/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
* this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
* this verifier states are not equivalent,
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
return false;
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
continue;
bpf: don't check spilled reg state for non-STACK_SPILLed type slots spilled_regs[] state is only used for stack slots of type STACK_SPILL, never for STACK_MISC. Right now, in states_equal(), even if we have old and current stack state of type STACK_MISC, we compare spilled_regs[] for that particular offset. Just skip these like we do everywhere else. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-10 22:50:41 +00:00
if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
if (memcmp(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
&cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
sizeof(old->spilled_regs[0])))
/* when explored and current stack slot types are
* the same, check that stored pointers types
* are the same as well.
* Ex: explored safe path could have stored
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -8}
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
* but current path has stored:
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -16}
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-28 22:11:41 +00:00
* such verifier states are not equivalent.
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
return false;
else
continue;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
}
return true;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
if (!sl)
/* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
* be doing state search here
*/
return 0;
while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, &env->cur_state))
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
* prune the search
*/
return 1;
sl = sl->next;
}
/* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
* technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
* but it will either reach bpf_exit (which means it's safe) or
* it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be
* seeing this 'insn_idx' instruction again on the way to bpf_exit
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
new_sl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_USER);
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
if (!new_sl)
return -ENOMEM;
/* add new state to the head of linked list */
memcpy(&new_sl->state, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl;
return 0;
}
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:58 +00:00
static int ext_analyzer_insn_hook(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
{
if (!env->analyzer_ops || !env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook)
return 0;
return env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0;
int insn_processed = 0;
bool do_print_state = false;
init_reg_state(regs);
insn_idx = 0;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
env->varlen_map_value_access = false;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
for (;;) {
struct bpf_insn *insn;
u8 class;
int err;
if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
verbose("invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
insn_idx, insn_cnt);
return -EFAULT;
}
insn = &insns[insn_idx];
class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that a previously walked path with same register and stack contents terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search can skip walking those states. When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096) insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice. This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit due to search pruning not being able to take effect. Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by ~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores, where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal() test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale that these two branches of execution that converge after the label might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often. Hence, we left that as is for now. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-05 20:33:17 +00:00
if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
bpf: fix spelling mistake: "proccessed" -> "processed" trivial fix to spelling mistake in verbose log message Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-23 00:20:53 +00:00
verbose("BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
insn_processed);
return -E2BIG;
}
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 1) {
/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
if (log_level) {
if (do_print_state)
verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
else
verbose("%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
}
goto process_bpf_exit;
}
bpf: adjust verifier heuristics Current limits with regards to processing program paths do not really reflect today's needs anymore due to programs becoming more complex and verifier smarter, keeping track of more data such as const ALU operations, alignment tracking, spilling of PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ registers, and other features allowing for smarter matching of what LLVM generates. This also comes with the side-effect that we result in fewer opportunities to prune search states and thus often need to do more work to prove safety than in the past due to different register states and stack layout where we mismatch. Generally, it's quite hard to determine what caused a sudden increase in complexity, it could be caused by something as trivial as a single branch somewhere at the beginning of the program where LLVM assigned a stack slot that is marked differently throughout other branches and thus causing a mismatch, where verifier then needs to prove safety for the whole rest of the program. Subsequently, programs with even less than half the insn size limit can get rejected. We noticed that while some programs load fine under pre 4.11, they get rejected due to hitting limits on more recent kernels. We saw that in the vast majority of cases (90+%) pruning failed due to register mismatches. In case of stack mismatches, majority of cases failed due to different stack slot types (invalid, spill, misc) rather than differences in spilled registers. This patch makes pruning more aggressive by also adding markers that sit at conditional jumps as well. Currently, we only mark jump targets for pruning. For example in direct packet access, these are usually error paths where we bail out. We found that adding these markers, it can reduce number of processed insns by up to 30%. Another option is to ignore reg->id in probing PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers, which can help pruning slightly as well by up to 7% observed complexity reduction as stand-alone. Meaning, if a previous path with register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL for map X was found to be safe, then in the current state a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL register for the same map X must be safe as well. Last but not least the patch also adds a scheduling point and bumps the current limit for instructions to be processed to a more adequate value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-18 01:00:06 +00:00
if (need_resched())
cond_resched();
bpf: Do per-instruction state dumping in verifier when log_level > 1. If log_level > 1, do a state dump every instruction and emit it in a more compact way (without a leading newline). This will facilitate more sophisticated test cases which inspect the verifier log for register state. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:25:17 +00:00
if (log_level > 1 || (log_level && do_print_state)) {
if (log_level > 1)
verbose("%d:", insn_idx);
else
verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:",
prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 02:49:09 +00:00
print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
do_print_state = false;
}
if (log_level) {
verbose("%d: ", insn_idx);
bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged The patch fixes two things at once: 1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0 as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged. 2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(). Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-07 22:04:09 +00:00
print_bpf_insn(env, insn);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
}
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:58 +00:00
err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
/* check for reserved fields is already done */
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: fix two bugs in verification logic when accessing 'ctx' pointer 1. first bug is a silly mistake. It broke tracing examples and prevented simple bpf programs from loading. In the following code: if (insn->imm == 0 && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_W) { } else if (...) { // this part should have been executed when // insn->code == BPF_W and insn->imm != 0 } Obviously it's not doing that. So simple instructions like: r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8) will be rejected. Note the comments in the code around these branches were and still valid and indicate the true intent. Replace it with: if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W) continue; if (insn->imm == 0) { } else if (...) { // now this code will be executed when // insn->code == BPF_W and insn->imm != 0 } 2. second bug is more subtle. If malicious code is using the same dest register as source register, the checks designed to prevent the same instruction to be used with different pointer types will fail to trigger, since we were assigning src_reg_type when it was already overwritten by check_mem_access(). The fix is trivial. Just move line: src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; before check_mem_access(). Add new 'access skb fields bad4' test to check this case. Fixes: 9bac3d6d548e ("bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-15 23:19:33 +00:00
src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
* the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
*/
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
insn->dst_reg);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
/* saw a valid insn
* dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
* save type to validate intersecting paths
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
*/
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
*prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
} else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type &&
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
(src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
*prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
/* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
* dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
* with different pointer types:
* src_reg == ctx in one branch and
* src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
* Reject it.
*/
verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
insn_idx++;
continue;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
insn->src_reg);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
*prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
} else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
(dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
*prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose("BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
-1);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->off != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose("BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:42 +00:00
err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->imm != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose("BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
continue;
} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->imm != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose("BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
* to return the value from eBPF program.
* Make sure that it's readable at this time
* of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
* something into it earlier
*/
err = check_reg_arg(regs, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
verbose("R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
process_bpf_exit:
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
insn_idx = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx);
if (insn_idx < 0) {
break;
} else {
do_print_state = true;
continue;
}
} else {
err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
}
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-01 23:06:34 +00:00
err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
if (err)
return err;
insn_idx++;
} else {
verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 14:54:32 +00:00
reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
} else {
verbose("unknown insn class %d\n", class);
return -EINVAL;
}
insn_idx++;
}
bpf: teach verifier to track stack depth teach verifier to track bpf program stack depth Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-30 20:31:29 +00:00
verbose("processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n",
insn_processed, env->prog->aux->stack_depth);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
return 0;
}
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:33 +00:00
static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map)
{
return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH &&
bpf: Add hash of maps support This patch adds hash of maps support (hashmap->bpf_map). BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS is added. A map-in-map contains a pointer to another map and lets call this pointer 'inner_map_ptr'. Notes on deleting inner_map_ptr from a hash map: 1. For BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC map-in-map, when deleting an inner_map_ptr, the htab_elem itself will go through a rcu grace period and the inner_map_ptr resides in the htab_elem. 2. For pre-allocated htab_elem (!BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC), when deleting an inner_map_ptr, the htab_elem may get reused immediately. This situation is similar to the existing prealloc-ated use cases. However, the bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() calls bpf_map_put() which calls inner_map->ops->map_free(inner_map) which will go through a rcu grace period (i.e. all bpf_map's map_free currently goes through a rcu grace period). Hence, the inner_map_ptr is still safe for the rcu reader side. This patch also includes BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS to the check_map_prealloc() in the verifier. preallocation is a must for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT. Hence, even we don't expect heavy updates to map-in-map, enforcing BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC for map-in-map is impossible without disallowing BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT from using map-in-map first. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:34 +00:00
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) ||
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:33 +00:00
!(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
}
bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 01:37:23 +00:00
static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map,
struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:33 +00:00
/* Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use
* preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation
* in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got
* triggered.
*/
if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) {
verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (map->inner_map_meta &&
!check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) {
verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 01:37:23 +00:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
/* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and
* replace them with actual map pointers
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 01:37:23 +00:00
int i, j, err;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-13 22:38:15 +00:00
err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
bpf: dynamically allocate digest scratch buffer Geert rightfully complained that 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") added a too large allocation of variable 'raw' from bss section, and should instead be done dynamically: # ./scripts/bloat-o-meter kernel/bpf/core.o.1 kernel/bpf/core.o.2 add/remove: 3/0 grow/shrink: 0/0 up/down: 33291/0 (33291) function old new delta raw - 32832 +32832 [...] Since this is only relevant during program creation path, which can be considered slow-path anyway, lets allocate that dynamically and be not implicitly dependent on verifier mutex. Move bpf_prog_calc_digest() at the beginning of replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() and also error handling stays straight forward. Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 00:52:57 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
bpf: align and clean bpf_{map,prog}_get helpers Add a bpf_map_get() function that we're going to use later on and align/clean the remaining helpers a bit so that we have them a bit more consistent: - __bpf_map_get() and __bpf_prog_get() that both work on the fd struct, check whether the descriptor is eBPF and return the pointer to the map/prog stored in the private data. Also, we can return f.file->private_data directly, the function signature is enough of a documentation already. - bpf_map_get() and bpf_prog_get() that both work on u32 user fd, call their respective __bpf_map_get()/__bpf_prog_get() variants, and take a reference. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-29 13:58:07 +00:00
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 01:37:23 +00:00
err = check_map_prog_compatibility(map, env->prog);
if (err) {
fdput(f);
return err;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf: fix refcnt overflow On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt. It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system. Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes. Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 01:56:20 +00:00
map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
/* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++)
bpf_map_put(env->used_maps[i]);
}
/* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++)
if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
insn->src_reg = 0;
}
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:41 +00:00
/* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
* insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
* [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
*/
static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
u32 off, u32 cnt)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
if (cnt == 1)
return 0;
new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
if (!new_data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
vfree(old_data);
return 0;
}
static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
{
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
if (!new_prog)
return NULL;
if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
return NULL;
return new_prog;
}
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
* into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
{
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->prog->aux->ops;
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
enum bpf_access_type type;
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
bool is_narrower_load;
u32 target_size;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
if (ops->gen_prologue) {
cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
env->prog);
if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
return -EINVAL;
} else if (cnt) {
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:41 +00:00
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:41 +00:00
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
env->prog = new_prog;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
delta += cnt - 1;
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
}
}
if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
return 0;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-19 22:26:13 +00:00
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
bpf: allow b/h/w/dw access for bpf's cb in ctx When structs are used to store temporary state in cb[] buffer that is used with programs and among tail calls, then the generated code will not always access the buffer in bpf_w chunks. We can ease programming of it and let this act more natural by allowing for aligned b/h/w/dw sized access for cb[] ctx member. Various test cases are attached as well for the selftest suite. Potentially, this can also be reused for other program types to pass data around. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-12 10:51:33 +00:00
if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
bpf: support 8-byte metafield access The verifier supported only 4-byte metafields in struct __sk_buff and struct xdp_md. The metafields in upcoming struct bpf_perf_event are 8-byte to match register width in struct pt_regs. Teach verifier to recognize 8-byte metafield access. The patch doesn't affect safety of sockets and xdp programs. They check for 4-byte only ctx access before these conditions are hit. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 01:37:21 +00:00
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
type = BPF_READ;
bpf: allow b/h/w/dw access for bpf's cb in ctx When structs are used to store temporary state in cb[] buffer that is used with programs and among tail calls, then the generated code will not always access the buffer in bpf_w chunks. We can ease programming of it and let this act more natural by allowing for aligned b/h/w/dw sized access for cb[] ctx member. Various test cases are attached as well for the selftest suite. Potentially, this can also be reused for other program types to pass data around. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-12 10:51:33 +00:00
else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
bpf: support 8-byte metafield access The verifier supported only 4-byte metafields in struct __sk_buff and struct xdp_md. The metafields in upcoming struct bpf_perf_event are 8-byte to match register width in struct pt_regs. Teach verifier to recognize 8-byte metafield access. The patch doesn't affect safety of sockets and xdp programs. They check for 4-byte only ctx access before these conditions are hit. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 01:37:21 +00:00
insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-04 17:11:54 +00:00
type = BPF_WRITE;
else
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
continue;
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:41 +00:00
if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
continue;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
/* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
* convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
* convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
* we will apply proper mask to the result.
*/
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
if (is_narrower_load) {
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
u32 off = insn->off;
u8 size_code;
if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
verbose("bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
size_code = BPF_H;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
if (ctx_field_size == 4)
size_code = BPF_W;
else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
size_code = BPF_DW;
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
insn->off = off & ~(ctx_field_size - 1);
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
}
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
target_size = 0;
cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
&target_size);
if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
(ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
if (ctx_field_size <= 4)
insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
(1 << size * 8) - 1);
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
else
insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 00:13:27 +00:00
(1 << size * 8) - 1);
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-13 22:52:13 +00:00
}
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:41 +00:00
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
delta += cnt - 1;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
env->prog = new_prog;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:42 +00:00
* and inline eligible helpers as explicit sequence of BPF instructions
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
*
* this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
*/
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
{
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:42 +00:00
struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
int i, cnt, delta = 0;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
continue;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
prog->dst_needed = 1;
if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net A function in kernel/bpf/syscall.c which got a bug fix in 'net' was moved to kernel/bpf/verifier.c in 'net-next'. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-20 14:35:33 +00:00
/* If we tail call into other programs, we
* cannot make any assumptions since they can
* be replaced dynamically during runtime in
* the program array.
*/
prog->cb_access = 1;
bpf: reconcile bpf_tail_call and stack_depth The next set of patches will take advantage of stack_depth tracking, so make sure that the program that does bpf_tail_call() has stack depth large enough for the callee. We could have tracked the stack depth of the prog_array owner program and only allow insertion of the programs with stack depth less than the owner, but it will break existing applications. Some of them have trivial root bpf program that only does multiple bpf_tail_calls and at init time the prog array is empty. In the future we may add a flag to do such tracking optionally, but for now play simple and safe. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-30 20:31:30 +00:00
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net A function in kernel/bpf/syscall.c which got a bug fix in 'net' was moved to kernel/bpf/verifier.c in 'net-next'. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-20 14:35:33 +00:00
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
/* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
* conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
* call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
* that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
*/
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
insn->imm = 0;
bpf: free up BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL | BPF_X opcode free up BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL | BPF_X opcode to be used by actual indirect call by register and use kernel internal opcode to mark call instruction into bpf_tail_call() helper. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-30 20:31:27 +00:00
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
continue;
}
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:42 +00:00
if (ebpf_jit_enabled() && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) {
map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
bpf: Fix and simplifications on inline map lookup Fix in verifier: For the same bpf_map_lookup_elem() instruction (i.e. "call 1"), a broken case is "a different type of map could be used for the same lookup instruction". For example, an array in one case and a hashmap in another. We have to resort to the old dynamic call behavior in this case. The fix is to check for collision on insn_aux->map_ptr. If there is collision, don't inline the map lookup. Please see the "do_reg_lookup()" in test_map_in_map_kern.c in the later patch for how-to trigger the above case. Simplifications on array_map_gen_lookup(): 1. Calculate elem_size from map->value_size. It removes the need for 'struct bpf_array' which makes the later map-in-map implementation easier. 2. Remove the 'elem_size == 1' test Fixes: 81ed18ab3098 ("bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-22 17:00:32 +00:00
if (map_ptr == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ||
!map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup)
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:42 +00:00
goto patch_call_imm;
cnt = map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
delta += cnt - 1;
/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
env->prog = prog = new_prog;
insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
continue;
}
patch_call_imm:
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
/* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
* programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
*/
if (!fn->func) {
verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
return -EFAULT;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
}
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
}
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
return 0;
}
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
int i;
if (!env->explored_states)
return;
for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
sl = env->explored_states[i];
if (sl)
while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
sln = sl->next;
kfree(sl);
sl = sln;
}
}
kfree(env->explored_states);
}
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:02 +00:00
{
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
char __user *log_ubuf = NULL;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:02 +00:00
int ret = -EINVAL;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
/* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
* allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
if (!env)
return -ENOMEM;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
(*prog)->len);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->insn_aux_data)
goto err_free_env;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
env->prog = *prog;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
/* user requested verbose verifier output
* and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
*/
log_level = attr->log_level;
log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
log_size = attr->log_size;
log_len = 0;
ret = -EINVAL;
/* log_* values have to be sane */
if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
goto err_unlock;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
ret = -ENOMEM;
log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
if (!log_buf)
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
goto err_unlock;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
} else {
log_level = 0;
}
bpf: fix incorrect pruning decision when alignment must be tracked Currently, when we enforce alignment tracking on direct packet access, the verifier lets the following program pass despite doing a packet write with unaligned access: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (bf) r0 = r2 4: (07) r0 += 14 5: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 6: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 7: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 6 to 8: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 5 to 10: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R10=fp 10: (07) r0 += 1 11: (05) goto pc-6 6: safe <----- here, wrongly found safe processed 15 insns However, if we enforce a pruning mismatch by adding state into r8 which is then being mismatched in states_equal(), we find that for the otherwise same program, the verifier detects a misaligned packet access when actually walking that path: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r0 = r2 5: (07) r0 += 14 6: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 7 to 9: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 6 to 11: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (07) r0 += 1 12: (b7) r8 = 0 13: (05) goto pc-7 <----- mismatch due to r8 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=15) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=15) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 misaligned packet access off 2+15+-4 size 4 The reason why we fail to see it in states_equal() is that the third test in compare_ptrs_to_packet() ... if (old->off <= cur->off && old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range) return true; ... will let the above pass. The situation we run into is that old->off <= cur->off (14 <= 15), meaning that prior walked paths went with smaller offset, which was later used in the packet access after successful packet range check and found to be safe already. For example: Given is R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0). Adding offset 14 as in above program to it, results in R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) before the packet range test. Now, testing this against R3=pkt_end with 'if r0 > r3 goto out' will transform R0 into R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) for the case when we're within bounds. A write into the packet at offset *(u32 *)(r0 -4), that is, 2 + 14 -4, is valid and aligned (2 is for NET_IP_ALIGN). After processing this with all fall-through paths, we later on check paths from branches. When the above skb->mark test is true, then we jump near the end of the program, perform r0 += 1, and jump back to the 'if r0 > r3 goto out' test we've visited earlier already. This time, R0 is of type R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=0), and we'll prune that part because this time we'll have a larger safe packet range, and we already found that with off=14 all further insn were already safe, so it's safe as well with a larger off. However, the problem is that the subsequent write into the packet with 2 + 15 -4 is then unaligned, and not caught by the alignment tracking. Note that min_align, aux_off, and aux_off_align were all 0 in this example. Since we cannot tell at this time what kind of packet access was performed in the prior walk and what minimal requirements it has (we might do so in the future, but that requires more complexity), fix it to disable this pruning case for strict alignment for now, and let the verifier do check such paths instead. With that applied, the test cases pass and reject the program due to misalignment. Fixes: d1174416747d ("bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier.") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/761909/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:05 +00:00
env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
env->strict_alignment = true;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:57 +00:00
sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
GFP_USER);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->explored_states)
goto skip_full_check;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:05 +00:00
ret = check_cfg(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 05:23:21 +00:00
env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
ret = do_check(env);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
skip_full_check:
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:06 +00:00
while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 01:50:01 +00:00
free_states(env);
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
if (ret == 0)
/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
if (ret == 0)
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:40 +00:00
ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 01:26:39 +00:00
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
ret = -ENOSPC;
/* fall through to return what was recorded */
}
/* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_log_buf;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) {
/* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
GFP_KERNEL);
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_log_buf;
}
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
/* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
* bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
*/
convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
}
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
free_log_buf:
if (log_level)
vfree(log_buf);
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:04 +00:00
/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
* them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
*/
release_maps(env);
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 18:57:42 +00:00
*prog = env->prog;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
err_unlock:
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:03 +00:00
mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:56 +00:00
vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
err_free_env:
kfree(env);
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 07:17:02 +00:00
return ret;
}
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:58 +00:00
int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
void *priv)
{
struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
int ret;
env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!env)
return -ENOMEM;
env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
prog->len);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->insn_aux_data)
goto err_free_env;
env->prog = prog;
env->analyzer_ops = ops;
env->analyzer_priv = priv;
/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
log_level = 0;
bpf: fix incorrect pruning decision when alignment must be tracked Currently, when we enforce alignment tracking on direct packet access, the verifier lets the following program pass despite doing a packet write with unaligned access: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (bf) r0 = r2 4: (07) r0 += 14 5: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 6: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 7: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 6 to 8: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 5 to 10: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R10=fp 10: (07) r0 += 1 11: (05) goto pc-6 6: safe <----- here, wrongly found safe processed 15 insns However, if we enforce a pruning mismatch by adding state into r8 which is then being mismatched in states_equal(), we find that for the otherwise same program, the verifier detects a misaligned packet access when actually walking that path: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r0 = r2 5: (07) r0 += 14 6: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 7 to 9: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 6 to 11: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (07) r0 += 1 12: (b7) r8 = 0 13: (05) goto pc-7 <----- mismatch due to r8 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=15) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=15) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 misaligned packet access off 2+15+-4 size 4 The reason why we fail to see it in states_equal() is that the third test in compare_ptrs_to_packet() ... if (old->off <= cur->off && old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range) return true; ... will let the above pass. The situation we run into is that old->off <= cur->off (14 <= 15), meaning that prior walked paths went with smaller offset, which was later used in the packet access after successful packet range check and found to be safe already. For example: Given is R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0). Adding offset 14 as in above program to it, results in R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) before the packet range test. Now, testing this against R3=pkt_end with 'if r0 > r3 goto out' will transform R0 into R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) for the case when we're within bounds. A write into the packet at offset *(u32 *)(r0 -4), that is, 2 + 14 -4, is valid and aligned (2 is for NET_IP_ALIGN). After processing this with all fall-through paths, we later on check paths from branches. When the above skb->mark test is true, then we jump near the end of the program, perform r0 += 1, and jump back to the 'if r0 > r3 goto out' test we've visited earlier already. This time, R0 is of type R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=0), and we'll prune that part because this time we'll have a larger safe packet range, and we already found that with off=14 all further insn were already safe, so it's safe as well with a larger off. However, the problem is that the subsequent write into the packet with 2 + 15 -4 is then unaligned, and not caught by the alignment tracking. Note that min_align, aux_off, and aux_off_align were all 0 in this example. Since we cannot tell at this time what kind of packet access was performed in the prior walk and what minimal requirements it has (we might do so in the future, but that requires more complexity), fix it to disable this pruning case for strict alignment for now, and let the verifier do check such paths instead. With that applied, the test cases pass and reject the program due to misalignment. Fixes: d1174416747d ("bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier.") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/761909/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:05 +00:00
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
env->strict_alignment = false;
bpf: fix incorrect pruning decision when alignment must be tracked Currently, when we enforce alignment tracking on direct packet access, the verifier lets the following program pass despite doing a packet write with unaligned access: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (bf) r0 = r2 4: (07) r0 += 14 5: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 6: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 7: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 6 to 8: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 5 to 10: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R10=fp 10: (07) r0 += 1 11: (05) goto pc-6 6: safe <----- here, wrongly found safe processed 15 insns However, if we enforce a pruning mismatch by adding state into r8 which is then being mismatched in states_equal(), we find that for the otherwise same program, the verifier detects a misaligned packet access when actually walking that path: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r0 = r2 5: (07) r0 += 14 6: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 7 to 9: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 6 to 11: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (07) r0 += 1 12: (b7) r8 = 0 13: (05) goto pc-7 <----- mismatch due to r8 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=15) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=15) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 misaligned packet access off 2+15+-4 size 4 The reason why we fail to see it in states_equal() is that the third test in compare_ptrs_to_packet() ... if (old->off <= cur->off && old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range) return true; ... will let the above pass. The situation we run into is that old->off <= cur->off (14 <= 15), meaning that prior walked paths went with smaller offset, which was later used in the packet access after successful packet range check and found to be safe already. For example: Given is R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0). Adding offset 14 as in above program to it, results in R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) before the packet range test. Now, testing this against R3=pkt_end with 'if r0 > r3 goto out' will transform R0 into R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) for the case when we're within bounds. A write into the packet at offset *(u32 *)(r0 -4), that is, 2 + 14 -4, is valid and aligned (2 is for NET_IP_ALIGN). After processing this with all fall-through paths, we later on check paths from branches. When the above skb->mark test is true, then we jump near the end of the program, perform r0 += 1, and jump back to the 'if r0 > r3 goto out' test we've visited earlier already. This time, R0 is of type R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=0), and we'll prune that part because this time we'll have a larger safe packet range, and we already found that with off=14 all further insn were already safe, so it's safe as well with a larger off. However, the problem is that the subsequent write into the packet with 2 + 15 -4 is then unaligned, and not caught by the alignment tracking. Note that min_align, aux_off, and aux_off_align were all 0 in this example. Since we cannot tell at this time what kind of packet access was performed in the prior walk and what minimal requirements it has (we might do so in the future, but that requires more complexity), fix it to disable this pruning case for strict alignment for now, and let the verifier do check such paths instead. With that applied, the test cases pass and reject the program due to misalignment. Fixes: d1174416747d ("bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier.") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/761909/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 23:05:05 +00:00
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
env->strict_alignment = true;
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 10:43:58 +00:00
env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
GFP_KERNEL);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->explored_states)
goto skip_full_check;
ret = check_cfg(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ret = do_check(env);
skip_full_check:
while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
free_states(env);
mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
err_free_env:
kfree(env);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_analyzer);
Reference in New Issue Copy Permalink