linux/fs/crypto/fname.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* This contains functions for filename crypto management
*
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility
*
* Written by Uday Savagaonkar, 2014.
* Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
*
* This has not yet undergone a rigorous security audit.
*/
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
static inline bool fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(const struct qstr *str)
{
if (str->len == 1 && str->name[0] == '.')
return true;
if (str->len == 2 && str->name[0] == '.' && str->name[1] == '.')
return true;
return false;
}
/**
* fname_encrypt() - encrypt a filename
*
* The output buffer must be at least as large as the input buffer.
* Any extra space is filled with NUL padding before encryption.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
u8 *out, unsigned int olen)
{
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = inode->i_crypt_info->ci_ctfm;
int res = 0;
char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
struct scatterlist sg;
/*
* Copy the filename to the output buffer for encrypting in-place and
* pad it with the needed number of NUL bytes.
*/
if (WARN_ON(olen < iname->len))
fscrypt: new helper functions for ->symlink() Currently, filesystems supporting fscrypt need to implement some tricky logic when creating encrypted symlinks, including handling a peculiar on-disk format (struct fscrypt_symlink_data) and correctly calculating the size of the encrypted symlink. Introduce helper functions to make things a bit easier: - fscrypt_prepare_symlink() computes and validates the size the symlink target will require on-disk. - fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() creates the encrypted target if needed. The new helpers actually fix some subtle bugs. First, when checking whether the symlink target was too long, filesystems didn't account for the fact that the NUL padding is meant to be truncated if it would cause the maximum length to be exceeded, as is done for filenames in directories. Consequently users would receive ENAMETOOLONG when creating symlinks close to what is supposed to be the maximum length. For example, with EXT4 with a 4K block size, the maximum symlink target length in an encrypted directory is supposed to be 4093 bytes (in comparison to 4095 in an unencrypted directory), but in FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32-mode only up to 4064 bytes were accepted. Second, symlink targets of "." and ".." were not being encrypted, even though they should be, as these names are special in *directory entries* but not in symlink targets. Fortunately, we can fix this simply by starting to encrypt them, as old kernels already accept them in encrypted form. Third, the output string length the filesystems were providing when doing the actual encryption was incorrect, as it was forgotten to exclude 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Fortunately though, this bug didn't make a difference. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-01-05 18:45:01 +00:00
return -ENOBUFS;
memcpy(out, iname->name, iname->len);
memset(out + iname->len, 0, olen - iname->len);
/* Initialize the IV */
memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Set up the encryption request */
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
sg_init_one(&sg, out, olen);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, olen, iv);
/* Do the encryption */
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
skcipher_request_free(req);
if (res < 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
return res;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* fname_decrypt() - decrypt a filename
*
* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
int res = 0;
char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned lim;
lim = inode->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(inode);
if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > lim)
return -EIO;
/* Allocate request */
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
/* Initialize IV */
memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Create decryption request */
sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len);
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, oname->name, oname->len);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, iv);
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
skcipher_request_free(req);
if (res < 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
return res;
}
oname->len = strnlen(oname->name, iname->len);
return 0;
}
static const char *lookup_table =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+,";
#define BASE64_CHARS(nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3)
/**
* digest_encode() -
*
* Encodes the input digest using characters from the set [a-zA-Z0-9_+].
* The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string.
*/
static int digest_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
{
int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
char *cp = dst;
while (i < len) {
ac += (((unsigned char) src[i]) << bits);
bits += 8;
do {
*cp++ = lookup_table[ac & 0x3f];
ac >>= 6;
bits -= 6;
} while (bits >= 6);
i++;
}
if (bits)
*cp++ = lookup_table[ac & 0x3f];
return cp - dst;
}
static int digest_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
{
int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
const char *p;
char *cp = dst;
while (i < len) {
p = strchr(lookup_table, src[i]);
if (p == NULL || src[i] == 0)
return -2;
ac += (p - lookup_table) << bits;
bits += 6;
if (bits >= 8) {
*cp++ = ac & 0xff;
ac >>= 8;
bits -= 8;
}
i++;
}
if (ac)
return -1;
return cp - dst;
}
bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 orig_len,
u32 max_len, u32 *encrypted_len_ret)
{
int padding = 4 << (inode->i_crypt_info->ci_flags &
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
u32 encrypted_len;
if (orig_len > max_len)
return false;
encrypted_len = max(orig_len, (u32)FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
encrypted_len = round_up(encrypted_len, padding);
*encrypted_len_ret = min(encrypted_len, max_len);
return true;
}
/**
* fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer - allocate a buffer for presented filenames
*
* Allocate a buffer that is large enough to hold any decrypted or encoded
* filename (null-terminated), for the given maximum encrypted filename length.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *inode,
u32 max_encrypted_len,
struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
{
const u32 max_encoded_len =
max_t(u32, BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE),
1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)));
u32 max_presented_len;
max_presented_len = max(max_encoded_len, max_encrypted_len);
crypto_str->name = kmalloc(max_presented_len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
if (!crypto_str->name)
return -ENOMEM;
crypto_str->len = max_presented_len;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer);
/**
* fscrypt_fname_free_buffer - free the buffer for presented filenames
*
* Free the buffer allocated by fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer().
*/
void fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
{
if (!crypto_str)
return;
kfree(crypto_str->name);
crypto_str->name = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_free_buffer);
/**
* fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() - converts a filename from disk space to user
* space
*
* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
*
* If the key is available, we'll decrypt the disk name; otherwise, we'll encode
* it for presentation. Short names are directly base64-encoded, while long
* names are encoded in fscrypt_digested_name format.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
u32 hash, u32 minor_hash,
const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
const struct qstr qname = FSTR_TO_QSTR(iname);
struct fscrypt_digested_name digested_name;
if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(&qname)) {
oname->name[0] = '.';
oname->name[iname->len - 1] = '.';
oname->len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
if (iname->len < FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE)
return -EUCLEAN;
if (inode->i_crypt_info)
return fname_decrypt(inode, iname, oname);
if (iname->len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) {
oname->len = digest_encode(iname->name, iname->len,
oname->name);
return 0;
}
if (hash) {
digested_name.hash = hash;
digested_name.minor_hash = minor_hash;
} else {
digested_name.hash = 0;
digested_name.minor_hash = 0;
}
memcpy(digested_name.digest,
FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(iname->name, iname->len),
FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE);
oname->name[0] = '_';
oname->len = 1 + digest_encode((const char *)&digested_name,
sizeof(digested_name), oname->name + 1);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr);
/**
* fscrypt_setup_filename() - prepare to search a possibly encrypted directory
* @dir: the directory that will be searched
* @iname: the user-provided filename being searched for
* @lookup: 1 if we're allowed to proceed without the key because it's
* ->lookup() or we're finding the dir_entry for deletion; 0 if we cannot
* proceed without the key because we're going to create the dir_entry.
* @fname: the filename information to be filled in
*
* Given a user-provided filename @iname, this function sets @fname->disk_name
* to the name that would be stored in the on-disk directory entry, if possible.
* If the directory is unencrypted this is simply @iname. Else, if we have the
* directory's encryption key, then @iname is the plaintext, so we encrypt it to
* get the disk_name.
*
* Else, for keyless @lookup operations, @iname is the presented ciphertext, so
* we decode it to get either the ciphertext disk_name (for short names) or the
* fscrypt_digested_name (for long names). Non-@lookup operations will be
* impossible in this case, so we fail them with ENOKEY.
*
* If successful, fscrypt_free_filename() must be called later to clean up.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
int ret;
int digested;
memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
fname->usr_fname = iname;
if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-21 23:07:11 +00:00
ret = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir);
if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
return ret;
if (dir->i_crypt_info) {
if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, iname->len,
dir->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(dir),
&fname->crypto_buf.len))
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(fname->crypto_buf.len,
GFP_NOFS);
if (!fname->crypto_buf.name)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = fname_encrypt(dir, iname, fname->crypto_buf.name,
fname->crypto_buf.len);
if (ret)
goto errout;
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
return 0;
}
if (!lookup)
return -ENOKEY;
/*
* We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
* user-supplied name
*/
if (iname->name[0] == '_') {
if (iname->len !=
1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)))
return -ENOENT;
digested = 1;
} else {
if (iname->len >
BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE))
return -ENOENT;
digested = 0;
}
fname->crypto_buf.name =
kmalloc(max_t(size_t, FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE,
sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = digest_decode(iname->name + digested, iname->len - digested,
fname->crypto_buf.name);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto errout;
}
fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
if (digested) {
const struct fscrypt_digested_name *n =
(const void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->hash = n->hash;
fname->minor_hash = n->minor_hash;
} else {
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
}
return 0;
errout:
kfree(fname->crypto_buf.name);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_setup_filename);