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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
#
# Makefile for the kernel security code
#
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC, and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires an absolute minimum of application support and a very small amount of configuration data. Smack uses extended attributes and provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of system Smack attributes. The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script, and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on http://www.schaufler-ca.com Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine environment and on an old Sony laptop. Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not include "/". A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it. Smack defines and uses these labels: "*" - pronounced "star" "_" - pronounced "floor" "^" - pronounced "hat" "?" - pronounced "huh" The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order: 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" is permitted. 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" is permitted. 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same label is permitted. 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded rule set is permitted. 7. Any other access is denied. Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access triples to /smack/load. Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time of day. Some practical use cases: Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack to support this, these rules could be defined: C Unclass rx S C rx S Unclass rx TS S rx TS C rx TS Unclass rx A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it. An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it has to be explicitly stated. Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a subject cannot access an object with a different label no access rules are required to implement compartmentalization. A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated with this Smack access rule: A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does: ESPN ABC r ABC ESPN r On my portable video device I have two applications, one that shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which is just as well all things considered. Another case that I especially like: SatData Guard w Guard Publish w A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label. The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label. This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish file system object because file system semanitic require read as well as write. The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least for a while. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 06:29:50 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
Kconfig and Makefile TOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 08:18:17 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 21:48:08 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
security: Yama LSM This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-12-21 20:17:04 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-20 22:46:28 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-16 15:46:06 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid
security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20 00:17:39 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown
bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks * The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h. * The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 00:43:53 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf
landlock: Add object management A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e. subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain). Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes. Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls. The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock, this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference objects. A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:11 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
security: remove dummy module Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default. Compile and boot tested. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-03 18:56:05 +00:00
# always enable default capabilities
NOMMU: Optimise away the {dac_,}mmap_min_addr tests In NOMMU mode clamp dac_mmap_min_addr to zero to cause the tests on it to be skipped by the compiler. We do this as the minimum mmap address doesn't make any sense in NOMMU mode. mmap_min_addr and round_hint_to_min() can be discarded entirely in NOMMU mode. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-12-15 19:27:45 +00:00
obj-y += commoncap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
# Object file lists
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 22:11:42 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o
securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY Add a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support but does not require CONFIG_SECURITY. The only current user of securityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the full LSM needs to be built to build this fs. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-22 15:35:57 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directories The Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way to specify sub-directories for building. Fix it up so the normal (and documented) approach is used. Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-02-15 21:49:30 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/
security: only build lsm_audit if CONFIG_SECURITY=y The lsm_audit code is only required when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled. It does not have a build dependency on CONFIG_AUDIT since audit.h provides trivial static inlines for audit_log*() when CONFIG_AUDIT is disabled. Hence, the Makefile should only add lsm_audit to the obj lists based on CONFIG_SECURITY, not CONFIG_AUDIT. Fixes: 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown") Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-12-10 16:55:41 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += lsm_audit.o
security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directories The Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way to specify sub-directories for building. Fix it up so the normal (and documented) approach is used. Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-02-15 21:49:30 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-20 22:46:28 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-16 15:46:06 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/
security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20 00:17:39 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/
device_cgroup: Cleanup cgroup eBPF device filter code Original cgroup v2 eBPF code for filtering device access made it possible to compile with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n and still use the eBPF filtering. Change commit 4b7d4d453fc4 ("device_cgroup: Export devcgroup_check_permission") reverted this, making it required to set it to y. Since the device filtering (and all the docs) for cgroup v2 is no longer a "device controller" like it was in v1, someone might compile their kernel with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n. Then (for linux 5.5+) the eBPF filter will not be invoked, and all processes will be allowed access to all devices, no matter what the eBPF filter says. Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal <odin@ugedal.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2020-04-03 17:55:28 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o
bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks * The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h. * The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 00:43:53 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/
landlock: Add object management A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e. subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain). Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes. Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls. The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock, this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference objects. A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:11 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/
integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
# Object integrity file lists
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-03-09 19:13:22 +00:00
subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity
security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directories The Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way to specify sub-directories for building. Fix it up so the normal (and documented) approach is used. Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-02-15 21:49:30 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
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