Mount failure issue happens under the scenario: Application forked dozens
of threads to mount the same number of cramfs images separately in docker,
but several mounts failed with high probability. Mount failed due to the
checking result of the page(read from the superblock of loop dev) is not
uptodate after wait_on_page_locked(page) returned in function cramfs_read:
wait_on_page_locked(page);
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
...
}
The reason of the checking result of the page not uptodate: systemd-udevd
read the loopX dev before mount, because the status of loopX is Lo_unbound
at this time, so loop_make_request directly trigger the calling of io_end
handler end_buffer_async_read, which called SetPageError(page). So It
caused the page can't be set to uptodate in function
end_buffer_async_read:
if(page_uptodate && !PageError(page)) {
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
Then mount operation is performed, it used the same page which is just
accessed by systemd-udevd above, Because this page is not uptodate, it
will launch a actual read via submit_bh, then wait on this page by calling
wait_on_page_locked(page). When the I/O of the page done, io_end handler
end_buffer_async_read is called, because no one cleared the page
error(during the whole read path of mount), which is caused by
systemd-udevd reading, so this page is still in "PageError" status, which
can't be set to uptodate in function end_buffer_async_read, then caused
mount failure.
But sometimes mount succeed even through systemd-udeved read loopX dev
just before, The reason is systemd-udevd launched other loopX read just
between step 3.1 and 3.2, the steps as below:
1, loopX dev default status is Lo_unbound;
2, systemd-udved read loopX dev (page is set to PageError);
3, mount operation
1) set loopX status to Lo_bound;
==>systemd-udevd read loopX dev<==
2) read loopX dev(page has no error)
3) mount succeed
As the loopX dev status is set to Lo_bound after step 3.1, so the other
loopX dev read by systemd-udevd will go through the whole I/O stack, part
of the call trace as below:
SYS_read
vfs_read
do_sync_read
blkdev_aio_read
generic_file_aio_read
do_generic_file_read:
ClearPageError(page);
mapping->a_ops->readpage(filp, page);
here, mapping->a_ops->readpage() is blkdev_readpage. In latest kernel,
some function name changed, the call trace as below:
blkdev_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
generic_file_buffered_read:
/*
* A previous I/O error may have been due to temporary
* failures, eg. mutipath errors.
* Pg_error will be set again if readpage fails.
*/
ClearPageError(page);
/* Start the actual read. The read will unlock the page*/
error=mapping->a_ops->readpage(flip, page);
We can see ClearPageError(page) is called before the actual read,
then the read in step 3.2 succeed.
This patch is to add the calling of ClearPageError just before the actual
read of read path of cramfs mount. Without the patch, the call trace as
below when performing cramfs mount:
do_mount
cramfs_read
cramfs_blkdev_read
read_cache_page
do_read_cache_page:
filler(data, page);
or
mapping->a_ops->readpage(data, page);
With the patch, the call trace as below when performing mount:
do_mount
cramfs_read
cramfs_blkdev_read
read_cache_page:
do_read_cache_page:
ClearPageError(page); <== new add
filler(data, page);
or
mapping->a_ops->readpage(data, page);
With the patch, mount operation trigger the calling of
ClearPageError(page) before the actual read, the page has no error if no
additional page error happen when I/O done.
Signed-off-by: Xianting Tian <xianting_tian@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <yubin@h3c.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583318844-22971-1-git-send-email-xianting_tian@126.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There used to be a 'retry' label in between the two (identical) checks
when first introduced in commit f446daaea9 ("mm: implement writeback
livelock avoidance using page tagging"), and later modified/updated in
commit 6e6938b6d3 ("writeback: introduce .tagged_writepages for the
WB_SYNC_NONE sync stage").
The label has been removed in commit 64081362e8 ("mm/page-writeback.c:
fix range_cyclic writeback vs writepages deadlock"), and the (identical)
checks are now present / performed immediately one after another.
So, remove/deduplicate the latter check, moving tag_pages_for_writeback()
into the former check before the 'tag' variable assignment, so it's clear
that it's not used in this (similarly-named) function call but only later
in pagevec_lookup_range_tag().
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200218221716.1648-1-mfo@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When handling a page fault, we drop mmap_sem to start async readahead so
that we don't block on IO submission with mmap_sem held. However there's
no point to drop mmap_sem in case readahead is disabled. Handle that case
to avoid pointless dropping of mmap_sem and retrying the fault. This was
actually reported to block mlockall(MCL_CURRENT) indefinitely.
Fixes: 6b4c9f4469 ("filemap: drop the mmap_sem for all blocking operations")
Reported-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Robert Stupp <snazy@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200212101356.30759-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kmemleak could scan task stacks while plain writes happens to those stack
variables which could results in data races. For example, in
sys_rt_sigaction and do_sigaction(), it could have plain writes in a
32-byte size. Since the kmemleak does not care about the actual values of
a non-pointer and all do_sigaction() call sites only copy to stack
variables, just disable KCSAN for kmemleak to avoid annotating anything
outside Kmemleak just because Kmemleak scans everything.
Suggested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583263716-25150-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Clang warns:
mm/kmemleak.c:1955:28: warning: array comparison always evaluates to a constant [-Wtautological-compare]
if (__start_ro_after_init < _sdata || __end_ro_after_init > _edata)
^
mm/kmemleak.c:1955:60: warning: array comparison always evaluates to a constant [-Wtautological-compare]
if (__start_ro_after_init < _sdata || __end_ro_after_init > _edata)
These are not true arrays, they are linker defined symbols, which are just
addresses. Using the address of operator silences the warning and does
not change the resulting assembly with either clang/ld.lld or gcc/ld
(tested with diff + objdump -Dr).
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/895
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220051551.44000-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In a recent discussion[1] with Vitaly Nikolenko and Silvio Cesare, it
became clear that moving the freelist pointer away from the edge of
allocations would likely improve the overall defensive posture of the
inline freelist pointer. My benchmarks show no meaningful change to
performance (they seem to show it being faster), so this looks like a
reasonable change to make.
Instead of having the freelist pointer at the very beginning of an
allocation (offset 0) or at the very end of an allocation (effectively
offset -sizeof(void *) from the next allocation), move it away from the
edges of the allocation and into the middle. This provides some
protection against small-sized neighboring overflows (or underflows), for
which the freelist pointer is commonly the target. (Large or well
controlled overwrites are much more likely to attack live object contents,
instead of attempting freelist corruption.)
The vaunted kernel build benchmark, across 5 runs. Before:
Mean: 250.05
Std Dev: 1.85
and after, which appears mysteriously faster:
Mean: 247.13
Std Dev: 0.76
Attempts at running "sysbench --test=memory" show the change to be well in
the noise (sysbench seems to be pretty unstable here -- it's not really
measuring allocation).
Hackbench is more allocation-heavy, and while the std dev is above the
difference, it looks like may manifest as an improvement as well:
20 runs of "hackbench -g 20 -l 1000", before:
Mean: 36.322
Std Dev: 0.577
and after:
Mean: 36.056
Std Dev: 0.598
[1] https://twitter.com/vnik5287/status/1235113523098685440
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Vitaly Nikolenko <vnik@duasynt.com>
Cc: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/202003051624.AAAC9AECC@keescook
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Under CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y, the obfuscation was relatively weak
in that the ptr and ptr address were usually so close that the first XOR
would result in an almost entirely 0-byte value[1], leaving most of the
"secret" number ultimately being stored after the third XOR. A single
blind memory content exposure of the freelist was generally sufficient to
learn the secret.
Add a swab() call to mix bits a little more. This is a cheap way (1
cycle) to make attacks need more than a single exposure to learn the
secret (or to know _where_ the exposure is in memory).
kmalloc-32 freelist walk, before:
ptr ptr_addr stored value secret
ffff90c22e019020@ffff90c22e019000 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019040@ffff90c22e019020 is 86528eb656b3b5fd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019060@ffff90c22e019040 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e019080@ffff90c22e019060 is 86528eb656b3b57d (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff90c22e0190a0@ffff90c22e019080 is 86528eb656b3b5bd (86528eb656b3b59d)
...
after:
ptr ptr_addr stored value secret
ffff9eed6e019020@ffff9eed6e019000 is 793d1135d52cda42 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019040@ffff9eed6e019020 is 593d1135d52cda22 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019060@ffff9eed6e019040 is 393d1135d52cda02 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e019080@ffff9eed6e019060 is 193d1135d52cdae2 (86528eb656b3b59d)
ffff9eed6e0190a0@ffff9eed6e019080 is f93d1135d52cdac2 (86528eb656b3b59d)
[1] https://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2020/03/weaknesses-in-linux-kernel-heap.html
Fixes: 2482ddec67 ("mm: add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation")
Reported-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/202003051623.AF4F8CB@keescook
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Under some conditions, the directory cannot be deleted. The specific
scenarios are as follows: (for example, /mnt/ocfs2 is the mount point)
1. Create the /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir directory. At this time, the i_nlink
corresponding to the inode of the /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir directory is equal
to 2.
2. During the process of creating the /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir/s_dir
directory, if the call to the inc_nlink function in ocfs2_mknod
succeeds, the functions such as ocfs2_init_acl,
ocfs2_init_security_set, and ocfs2_dentry_attach_lock fail. At this
time, the i_nlink corresponding to the inode of the /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir
directory is equal to 3, but /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir/s_dir is not added to the
/mnt/ocfs2/p_dir directory entry.
3. Delete the /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir directory (rm -rf /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir).
At this time, it is found that the i_nlink corresponding to the inode
corresponding to the /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir directory is equal to 3.
Therefore, the /mnt/ocfs2/p_dir directory cannot be deleted.
Signed-off-by: Jian wang <wangjian161@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a44f6666-bbc4-405e-0e6c-0f4e922eeef6@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language extension
to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo array[];
};
By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning in
case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which will
help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.
Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by this
change:
"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]
This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 7649773293 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200213160244.GA6088@embeddedor
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change a header to mandatory-y if both of the following are met:
[1] At least one architecture (except um) specifies it as generic-y in
arch/*/include/asm/Kbuild
[2] Every architecture (except um) either has its own implementation
(arch/*/include/asm/*.h) or specifies it as generic-y in
arch/*/include/asm/Kbuild
This commit was generated by the following shell script.
----------------------------------->8-----------------------------------
arches=$(cd arch; ls -1 | sed -e '/Kconfig/d' -e '/um/d')
tmpfile=$(mktemp)
grep "^mandatory-y +=" include/asm-generic/Kbuild > $tmpfile
find arch -path 'arch/*/include/asm/Kbuild' |
xargs sed -n 's/^generic-y += \(.*\)/\1/p' | sort -u |
while read header
do
mandatory=yes
for arch in $arches
do
if ! grep -q "generic-y += $header" arch/$arch/include/asm/Kbuild &&
! [ -f arch/$arch/include/asm/$header ]; then
mandatory=no
break
fi
done
if [ "$mandatory" = yes ]; then
echo "mandatory-y += $header" >> $tmpfile
for arch in $arches
do
sed -i "/generic-y += $header/d" arch/$arch/include/asm/Kbuild
done
fi
done
sed -i '/^mandatory-y +=/d' include/asm-generic/Kbuild
LANG=C sort $tmpfile >> include/asm-generic/Kbuild
----------------------------------->8-----------------------------------
One obvious benefit is the diff stat:
25 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 557 deletions(-)
It is tedious to list generic-y for each arch that needs it.
So, mandatory-y works like a fallback default (by just wrapping
asm-generic one) when arch does not have a specific header
implementation.
See the following commits:
def3f7cefea1b39bae16
It is tedious to convert headers one by one, so I processed by a shell
script.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200210175452.5030-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
bio_alloc() can fail when we use GFP_NORETRY. If it does, allocate
a bio large enough for a single page like mpage_readpages() does.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Qian Cai reports seemingly random buffer read verifier errors during
filesystem writeback. This was isolated to a recent patch that
factored out some inode cluster freeing code and happened to cast an
unsigned inode number type to a signed value. If the inode number
value overflows, we can skip marking in-core inodes associated with
the underlying buffer stale at the time the physical inodes are
freed. If such an inode happens to be dirty, xfsaild will eventually
attempt to write it back over non-inode blocks. The invalidation of
the underlying inode buffer causes writeback to read the buffer from
disk. This fails the read verifier (preventing eventual corruption)
if the buffer no longer looks like an inode cluster. Analysis by
Dave Chinner.
Fix up the helper to use the proper type for inode number values.
Fixes: 5806165a66 ("xfs: factor inode lookup from xfs_ifree_cluster")
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
We have both vhost and virtio drivers that depend on vdpa.
It's easier to locate it at a top level directory otherwise
we run into issues e.g. if vhost is built-in but virtio
is modular. Let's just move it up a level.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
This patch implements a software vDPA networking device. The datapath
is implemented through vringh and workqueue. The device has an on-chip
IOMMU which translates IOVA to PA. For kernel virtio drivers, vDPA
simulator driver provides dma_ops. For vhost driers, set_map() methods
of vdpa_config_ops is implemented to accept mappings from vhost.
Currently, vDPA device simulator will loopback TX traffic to RX. So
the main use case for the device is vDPA feature testing, prototyping
and development.
Note, there's no management API implemented, a vDPA device will be
registered once the module is probed. We need to handle this in the
future development.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326140125.19794-9-jasowang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
This patch introduces a vDPA-based vhost backend. This backend is
built on top of the same interface defined in virtio-vDPA and provides
a generic vhost interface for userspace to accelerate the virtio
devices in guest.
This backend is implemented as a vDPA device driver on top of the same
ops used in virtio-vDPA. It will create char device entry named
vhost-vdpa-$index for userspace to use. Userspace can use vhost ioctls
on top of this char device to setup the backend.
Vhost ioctls are extended to make it type agnostic and behave like a
virtio device, this help to eliminate type specific API like what
vhost_net/scsi/vsock did:
- VHOST_VDPA_GET_DEVICE_ID: get the virtio device ID which is defined
by virtio specification to differ from different type of devices
- VHOST_VDPA_GET_VRING_NUM: get the maximum size of virtqueue
supported by the vDPA device
- VHSOT_VDPA_SET/GET_STATUS: set and get virtio status of vDPA device
- VHOST_VDPA_SET/GET_CONFIG: access virtio config space
- VHOST_VDPA_SET_VRING_ENABLE: enable a specific virtqueue
For memory mapping, IOTLB API is mandated for vhost-vDPA which means
userspace drivers are required to use
VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE/VHOST_IOTLB_INVALIDATE to add or remove mapping for
a specific userspace memory region.
The vhost-vDPA API is designed to be type agnostic, but it allows net
device only in current stage. Due to the lacking of control virtqueue
support, some features were filter out by vhost-vdpa.
We will enable more features and devices in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326140125.19794-8-jasowang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Commit 907a076881, forgot that we need to clear old values of
XGMAC_VLAN_TAG register when we switch from VLAN perfect matching to
HASH matching.
Fix it.
Fixes: 907a076881 ("net: stmmac: xgmac: fix incorrect XGMAC_VLAN_TAG register writting")
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If CAVIUM_PTP is m and THUNDER_NIC_VF is y, build fails:
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.o: In function 'nicvf_remove':
nicvf_main.c:(.text+0x1f0): undefined reference to 'cavium_ptp_put'
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.o: In function `nicvf_probe':
nicvf_main.c:(.text+0x557c): undefined reference to 'cavium_ptp_get'
THUNDER_NIC_VF imply CAVIUM_PTP, which allow the config now,
Use IS_REACHABLE() to avoid the vmlinux link error for this case.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: def2fbffe6 ("kconfig: allow symbols implied by y to become m")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Florian Westphal says:
====================
mptcp: various bugfixes and improvements
This series contains the following mptcp bug fixes:
1. Fix crash on tcp fallback when userspace doesn't provide a 'struct
sockaddr' to accept().
2. Close mptcp socket only when all subflows have closed, not just the first.
3. avoid stream data corruption when we'd receive identical mapping at the
exact same time on multiple subflows.
4. Fix "fn parameter not described" kerneldoc warnings.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Obtained with:
$ make W=1 net/mptcp/token.o
net/mptcp/token.c:53: warning: Function parameter or member 'req' not described in 'mptcp_token_new_request'
net/mptcp/token.c:98: warning: Function parameter or member 'sk' not described in 'mptcp_token_new_connect'
net/mptcp/token.c:133: warning: Function parameter or member 'conn' not described in 'mptcp_token_new_accept'
net/mptcp/token.c:178: warning: Function parameter or member 'token' not described in 'mptcp_token_destroy_request'
net/mptcp/token.c:191: warning: Function parameter or member 'token' not described in 'mptcp_token_destroy'
Fixes: 79c0949e9a (mptcp: Add key generation and token tree)
Fixes: 58b0991962 (mptcp: create msk early)
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
mptcp_subflow_data_available() is commonly called via
ssk->sk_data_ready(), in this case the mptcp socket lock
cannot be acquired.
Therefore, while we can safely discard subflow data that
was already received up to msk->ack_seq, we cannot be sure
that 'subflow->data_avail' will still be valid at the time
userspace wants to read the data -- a previous read on a
different subflow might have carried this data already.
In that (unlikely) event, msk->ack_seq will have been updated
and will be ahead of the subflow dsn.
We can check for this condition and skip/resync to the expected
sequence number.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is needed at least until proper MPTCP-Level fin/reset
signalling gets added:
We wake parent when a subflow changes, but we should do this only
when all subflows have closed, not just one.
Schedule the mptcp worker and tell it to check eof state on all
subflows.
Only flag mptcp socket as closed and wake userspace processes blocking
in poll if all subflows have closed.
Co-developed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Christoph Paasch reports following crash:
general protection fault [..]
CPU: 0 PID: 2874 Comm: syz-executor072 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5 #62
RIP: 0010:__pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:471
[..]
queued_spin_lock_slowpath arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:50 [inline]
do_raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:181 [inline]
spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline]
__mptcp_flush_join_list+0x44/0xb0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:278
mptcp_shutdown+0xb3/0x230 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1882
[..]
Problem is that mptcp_shutdown() socket isn't an mptcp socket,
its a plain tcp_sk. Thus, trying to access mptcp_sk specific
members accesses garbage.
Root cause is that accept() returns a fallback (tcp) socket, not an mptcp
one. There is code in getpeername to detect this and override the sockets
stream_ops. But this will only run when accept() caller provided a
sockaddr struct. "accept(fd, NULL, 0)" will therefore result in
mptcp stream ops, but with sock->sk pointing at a tcp_sk.
Update the existing fallback handling to detect this as well.
Moreover, mptcp_shutdown did not have fallback handling, and
mptcp_poll did it too late so add that there as well.
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The variable err is being initialized with a value that is never
read and it is being updated later with a new value. The initialization
is redundant and can be removed.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_ktls.c: In function ‘chcr_short_record_handler’:
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_ktls.c:1770:12: error: implicit declaration of function ‘kmap_atomic’;
did you mean ‘in_atomic’? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
vaddr = kmap_atomic(skb_frag_page(f));
^~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: dc05f3df8f ("chcr: Handle first or middle part of record")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fixes: f41071407c85 ("net: dsa: implement auto-normalization of MTU for bridge hardware datapath")
Signed-off-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
rec->llc is currently being assigned twice, once with the lower 8 bits
from packed_record[8] and then re-assigned afterwards with data from
packed_record[9]. This looks like a type, I believe the second assignment
should be using the |= operator rather than a direct assignment.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Fixes: b8f8a0b7b5 ("net: atlantic: MACSec ingress offload HW bindings")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This allows the changelink operation to succeed if the mux_id was
specified as an argument. Note that the mux_id must match the
existing mux_id of the rmnet device or should be an unused mux_id.
Fixes: 1dc49e9d16 ("net: rmnet: do not allow to change mux id if mux id is duplicated")
Reported-and-tested-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
