sparse warns about converting void * to void __user *. This is not new
but only got noticed now that vhost is built on more systems.
This is just a question of __user tags missing in a couple of places,
so fix it up.
Fixes: f889491380 ("vhost: introduce O(1) vq metadata cache")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
This change adds per-CPU shadow call stacks for the SDEI handler.
Similarly to how the kernel stacks are handled, we add separate shadow
stacks for normal and critical events.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Tested-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
If we detect a corrupted x18, restore the register before jumping back
to potentially SCS instrumented code. This is safe, because the wrapper
is called with preemption disabled and a separate shadow stack is used
for interrupt handling.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reserve the x18 register from general allocation when SCS is enabled,
because the compiler uses the register to store the current task's
shadow stack pointer. Note that all external kernel modules must also be
compiled with -ffixed-x18 if the kernel has SCS enabled.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The graph tracer hooks returns by modifying frame records on the
(regular) stack, but with SCS the return address is taken from the
shadow stack, and the value in the frame record has no effect. As we
don't currently have a mechanism to determine the corresponding slot
on the shadow stack (and to pass this through the ftrace
infrastructure), for now let's disable SCS when the graph tracer is
enabled.
With SCS the return address is taken from the shadow stack and the
value in the frame record has no effect. The mcount based graph tracer
hooks returns by modifying frame records on the (regular) stack, and
thus is not compatible. The patchable-function-entry graph tracer
used for DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS modifies the LR before it is saved
to the shadow stack, and is compatible.
Modifying the mcount based graph tracer to work with SCS would require
a mechanism to determine the corresponding slot on the shadow stack
(and to pass this through the ftrace infrastructure), and we expect
that everyone will eventually move to the patchable-function-entry
based graph tracer anyway, so for now let's disable SCS when the
mcount-based graph tracer is enabled.
SCS and patchable-function-entry are both supported from LLVM 10.x.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Implements CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE for shadow stacks. When enabled,
also prints out the highest shadow stack usage per process.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
[will: rewrote most of scs_check_usage()]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack,
which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being
overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of
shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading
and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack
control flow by modifying the stacks.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
[will: Numerous cosmetic changes]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
v6->v7:
- permit SK_REUSEPORT program type under CAP_BPF as suggested by Marek Majkowski.
It's equivalent to SOCKET_FILTER which is unpriv.
v5->v6:
- split allow_ptr_leaks into four flags.
- retain bpf_jit_limit under cap_sys_admin.
- fixed few other issues spotted by Daniel.
v4->v5:
Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into combination of
CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN and keep some of them under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
The user process has to have
- CAP_BPF to create maps, do other sys_bpf() commands and load SK_REUSEPORT progs.
Note: dev_map, sock_hash, sock_map map types still require CAP_NET_ADMIN.
That could be relaxed in the future.
- CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON to load tracing programs.
- CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN to load networking programs.
(or CAP_SYS_ADMIN for backward compatibility).
CAP_BPF solves three main goals:
1. provides isolation to user space processes that drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN and switch to CAP_BPF.
More on this below. This is the major difference vs v4 set back from Sep 2019.
2. makes networking BPF progs more secure, since CAP_BPF + CAP_NET_ADMIN
prevents pointer leaks and arbitrary kernel memory access.
3. enables fuzzers to exercise all of the verifier logic. Eventually finding bugs
and making BPF infra more secure. Currently fuzzers run in unpriv.
They will be able to run with CAP_BPF.
The patchset is long overdue follow-up from the last plumbers conference.
Comparing to what was discussed at LPC the CAP* checks at attach time are gone.
For tracing progs the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check was done at load time only. There was
no check at attach time. For networking and cgroup progs CAP_SYS_ADMIN was
required at load time and CAP_NET_ADMIN at attach time, but there are several
ways to bypass CAP_NET_ADMIN:
- if networking prog is using tail_call writing FD into prog_array will
effectively attach it, but bpf_map_update_elem is an unprivileged operation.
- freplace prog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can replace networking prog
Consolidating all CAP checks at load time makes security model similar to
open() syscall. Once the user got an FD it can do everything with it.
read/write/poll don't check permissions. The same way when bpf_prog_load
command returns an FD the user can do everything (including attaching,
detaching, and bpf_test_run).
The important design decision is to allow ID->FD transition for
CAP_SYS_ADMIN only. What it means that user processes can run
with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN and they will not be able to affect each
other unless they pass FDs via scm_rights or via pinning in bpffs.
ID->FD is a mechanism for human override and introspection.
An admin can do 'sudo bpftool prog ...'. It's possible to enforce via LSM that
only bpftool binary does bpf syscall with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and the rest of user
space processes do bpf syscall with CAP_BPF isolating bpf objects (progs, maps,
links) that are owned by such processes from each other.
Another significant change from LPC is that the verifier checks are split into
four flags. The allow_ptr_leaks flag allows pointer manipulations. The
bpf_capable flag enables all modern verifier features like bpf-to-bpf calls,
BTF, bounded loops, dead code elimination, etc. All the goodness. The
bypass_spec_v1 flag enables indirect stack access from bpf programs and
disables speculative analysis and bpf array mitigations. The bypass_spec_v4
flag disables store sanitation. That allows networking progs with CAP_BPF +
CAP_NET_ADMIN enjoy modern verifier features while being more secure.
Some networking progs may need CAP_BPF + CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_PERFMON,
since subtracting pointers (like skb->data_end - skb->data) is a pointer leak,
but the verifier may get smarter in the future.
====================
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Implement permissions as stated in uapi/linux/capability.h
In order to do that the verifier allow_ptr_leaks flag is split
into four flags and they are set as:
env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
The first three currently equivalent to perfmon_capable(), since leaking kernel
pointers and reading kernel memory via side channel attacks is roughly
equivalent to reading kernel memory with cap_perfmon.
'bpf_capable' enables bounded loops, precision tracking, bpf to bpf calls and
other verifier features. 'allow_ptr_leaks' enable ptr leaks, ptr conversions,
subtraction of pointers. 'bypass_spec_v1' disables speculative analysis in the
verifier, run time mitigations in bpf array, and enables indirect variable
access in bpf programs. 'bypass_spec_v4' disables emission of sanitation code
by the verifier.
That means that the networking BPF program loaded with CAP_BPF + CAP_NET_ADMIN
will have speculative checks done by the verifier and other spectre mitigation
applied. Such networking BPF program will not be able to leak kernel pointers
and will not be able to access arbitrary kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into
combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN.
For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.
The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
- to load tracing program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON
- to load networking program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN
There are few exceptions from this rule:
- bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON
if networking program is using this helper.
- BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
to discourage production use.
- BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only.
CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions:
- loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time.
- flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id
command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command.
This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to
affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example:
task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link.
task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless
task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything.
Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can
accidentely mess with each other programs and maps.
Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other.
CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data.
Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers.
bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with
CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools.
CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access.
CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2.
CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own.
Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map
and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog.
CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.
Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected.
In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb
program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Fix the assigned-clock-parents to higher frequency clock to avoid h264
encode timeout:
[ 134.763465] mtk_vpu 10020000.vpu: vpu ipi 4 ack time out !
[ 134.769008] [MTK_VCODEC][ERROR][18]: vpu_enc_send_msg() vpu_ipi_send msg_id c002 len 32 fail -5
[ 134.777707] [MTK_VCODEC][ERROR][18]: vpu_enc_encode() AP_IPIMSG_ENC_ENCODE 0 fail
venc_sel is the clock used by h264 encoder, and venclt_sel is the clock
used by vp8 encoder. Assign venc_sel to vcodecpll_ck and venclt_sel to
vcodecpll_370p5.
vcodecpll 1482000000
vcodecpll_ck 494000000
venc_sel 494000000
...
vcodecpll_370p5 370500000
venclt_sel 370500000
Fixes: fbbad0287c ("arm64: dts: Using standard CCF interface to set vcodec clk")
Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200504124442.208004-1-hsinyi@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
In Cilium we've recently switched to make use of bpf_jiffies64() for
parts of our tc and XDP datapath since bpf_ktime_get_ns() is more
expensive and high-precision is not needed for our timeouts we have
anyway. Our agent has a probe manager which picks up the json of
bpftool's feature probe and we also use the macro output in our C
programs e.g. to have workarounds when helpers are not available on
older kernels.
Extend the kernel config info dump to also include the kernel's
CONFIG_HZ, and rework the probe_kernel_image_config() for allowing a
macro dump such that CONFIG_HZ can be propagated to BPF C code as a
simple define if available via config. Latter allows to have _compile-
time_ resolution of jiffies <-> sec conversion in our code since all
are propagated as known constants.
Given we cannot generally assume availability of kconfig everywhere,
we also have a kernel hz probe [0] as a fallback. Potentially, bpftool
could have an integrated probe fallback as well, although to derive it,
we might need to place it under 'bpftool feature probe full' or similar
given it would slow down the probing process overall. Yet 'full' doesn't
fit either for us since we don't want to pollute the kernel log with
warning messages from bpf_probe_write_user() and bpf_trace_printk() on
agent startup; I've left it out for the time being.
[0] https://github.com/cilium/cilium/blob/master/bpf/cilium-probe-kernel-hz.c
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin@isovalent.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513075849.20868-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
Small set of fixes in order to restrict BPF helpers for tracing which are
broken on archs with overlapping address ranges as per discussion in [0].
I've targetted this for -bpf tree so they can be routed as fixes. Thanks!
v1 -> v2:
- switch to reusable %pks, %pus format specifiers (Yonghong)
- fixate %s on kernel_ds probing for archs with overlapping addr space
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAHk-=wjJKo0GVixYLmqPn-Q22WFu0xHaBSjKEo7e7Yw72y5SPQ@mail.gmail.com/T/
====================
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Usage of plain %s conversion specifier in bpf_trace_printk() suffers from the
very same issue as bpf_probe_read{,str}() helpers, that is, it is broken on
archs with overlapping address ranges.
While the helpers have been addressed through work in 6ae08ae3de ("bpf: Add
probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers"), we need
an option for bpf_trace_printk() as well to fix it.
Similarly as with the helpers, force users to make an explicit choice by adding
%pks and %pus specifier to bpf_trace_printk() which will then pick the corresponding
strncpy_from_unsafe*() variant to perform the access under KERNEL_DS or USER_DS.
The %pk* (kernel specifier) and %pu* (user specifier) can later also be extended
for other objects aside strings that are probed and printed under tracing, and
reused out of other facilities like bpf_seq_printf() or BTF based type printing.
Existing behavior of %s for current users is still kept working for archs where it
is not broken and therefore gated through CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE.
For archs not having this property we fall-back to pick probing under KERNEL_DS as
a sensible default.
Fixes: 8d3b7dce86 ("bpf: add support for %s specifier to bpf_trace_printk()")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200515101118.6508-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Given bpf_probe_read{,str}() BPF helpers are now only available under
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE, we need to add the drop-in
replacements of bpf_probe_read_{kernel,user}_str() to do_refine_retval_range()
as well to avoid hitting the same issue as in 849fa50662 ("bpf/verifier:
refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200515101118.6508-3-daniel@iogearbox.net
Given the legacy bpf_probe_read{,str}() BPF helpers are broken on archs
with overlapping address ranges, we should really take the next step to
disable them from BPF use there.
To generally fix the situation, we've recently added new helper variants
bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}() and bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}_str().
For details on them, see 6ae08ae3de ("bpf: Add probe_read_{user, kernel}
and probe_read_{user,kernel}_str helpers").
Given bpf_probe_read{,str}() have been around for ~5 years by now, there
are plenty of users at least on x86 still relying on them today, so we
cannot remove them entirely w/o breaking the BPF tracing ecosystem.
However, their use should be restricted to archs with non-overlapping
address ranges where they are working in their current form. Therefore,
move this behind a CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE and
have x86, arm64, arm select it (other archs supporting it can follow-up
on it as well).
For the remaining archs, they can workaround easily by relying on the
feature probe from bpftool which spills out defines that can be used out
of BPF C code to implement the drop-in replacement for old/new kernels
via: bpftool feature probe macro
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200515101118.6508-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Users can choose which flexcom function to use. Describe the I2C
Flexcom0 function. Add alias for the i2c2 node in order to not rely
on probe order for the i2c device numbering. The sama5d2 SoC has
two dedicated i2c buses and five flexcoms that can function as i2c.
The i2c0 and i2c1 aliases are kept for the dedicated i2c buses,
the i2c flexcom functions can be numbered in order starting from i2c2.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200514050301.147442-16-tudor.ambarus@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Device aliases are board-specific, if needed one should define them
in board dts rather than in the SoC dtsi. If an alias from the SoC
dtsi is addressed by a driver that does not use any of the of_alias*()
methods, we can drop it. This is the case for the i2s aliases, drop
them. tcb aliases point to nodes that are not enabled in any of the
sama5d2 based platforms. atmel_tclib.c is scheduled to go away, any
board using that alias is already broken, so get rid of the tcb aliases
too.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200514050301.147442-14-tudor.ambarus@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
The Flexcom IP is part of the sama5d2 SoC. Move the flx0 node together
with its function definitions in sama5d2.dtsi. Boards will just fill
the pins and enable the desired functions.
There is a single functional change in this patch. With the move of the
flx0 uart5 definition in the SoC dtsi, the uart5 from
at91-sama5d27_wlsom1_ek.dts inherits the following optional property:
atmel,fifo-size = <32>;
This particular change was tested by Codrin.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Tested-by: Codrin Ciubotariu <codrin.ciubotariu@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200514050301.147442-7-tudor.ambarus@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
The fw_devlink_pause() and fw_devlink_resume() APIs allow batching the
parsing of the device tree nodes when a lot of devices are added. This
will significantly cut down parsing time (as much a 1 second on some
systems). So, use them when adding devices for all the top level device
tree nodes in a system.
Signed-off-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200515053500.215929-5-saravanak@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The amount of time spent parsing fwnodes of devices can become really
high if the devices are added in an non-ideal order. Worst case can be
O(N^2) when N devices are added. But this can be optimized to O(N) by
adding all the devices and then parsing all their fwnodes in one batch.
This commit adds fw_devlink_pause() and fw_devlink_resume() to allow
doing this.
Signed-off-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200515053500.215929-4-saravanak@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 4dbe191c04 ("driver core: Add device links from fwnode only for
the primary device") skipped linking a fwnode's secondary device to
the suppliers listed in its fwnode.
However, a fwnode's secondary device can't be found using
get_dev_from_fwnode(). So, there's no point in trying to see if devices
waiting for suppliers might want to link to a fwnode's secondary device.
This commit removes that unnecessary step for devices that aren't a
fwnode's primary device and also moves the code to a more appropriate
part of the file.
Signed-off-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200515053500.215929-3-saravanak@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
